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INTRODUCTION
The legal controversy over abortion has been a dispute
about constitutional "liberty." Constitutional debate has ranged
far and wide over questions of natural law, interpretative
method, and judicial function,2 yet liberty remains the focal
2. Compare Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How
Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 381, 387 (1992) (arguing that the
words of the Bill of Rights denote "broad and abstract principles of political
morality" that courts must interpret) with Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance
and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. Rav. 85, 125 (arguing that the "method of sub-
stantive due process" is that "the Court makes no pretense that its judgments
have any basis other than the Justices' view of desirable policy") with Richard
A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases,
1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159, 185 (criticizing the "entire method of constitutional
interpretation that allows the Supreme Court in the name of Due Process both
to 'define' and to 'balance' interests on the major social and political issues of
our time") and with MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS ix (1982) (defending "noninterpretive review"-by which Perry
means "constitutional policymaking (by the judiciary) that goes beyond the
value judgments established by the framers of the written Constitution"-in
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point. It is widely believed that if abortion and privacy rights
derive from anything in the Constitution, they derive from "lib-
erty," and that if anything in the Constitution tells us how to
treat those rights, "liberty" does.3
In Roe v. Wade,4 the Court traced abortion rights to the "lib-
erty" guaranteed in the Due Process Clauses. 5 Planned
Parenthood v. Casey6 reaffirmed those rights in an opinion that
began and ended with the word "liberty."7 Critics of Roe and
Casey argue that "liberty" does not or cannot encompass abor-
tion rights,8 or that abortion represents an ordinary "liberty in-
terest" that governments may restrict with a relatively free
hand, rather than a fundamental right deserving strict
scrutiny.9
These views of liberty rest on a century old interpretation of
the phrase "life, liberty, or property" that treats "liberty" as the
preeminent term in the Due Process Clauses and as a source of
new, unenumerated rights. The phrase "life, liberty, or prop-
human rights cases); see also Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE
L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981) (arguing that the current controversy about fundamental
rights and substantive due process is unproductive, "Iimit[ing] both our vision
and the possibilities for social change"); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of
Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REv. 669, 702-
09 (1991) (in a modification of his earlier positions, arguing that "originalism"
in constitutional interpretation also "entails nonorginalism" and providing a ty-
pology of orginalist and nonorginalist positions). See generally GERALD GUN-
THER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 514-21 (12th ed. 1991) (summarizing the debates
over these subjects).
3. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) ("The controlling word in
the case before us is 'liberty.'"); id. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("A fervent view of individual liberty... [has] led the
Court... [to reaffirm Roe]."); id. at 2853 (Ihe Chief Justice's criticism of Roe
follows from his stunted conception of individual liberty.").
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V & amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
7. Id. at 2803 ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt"); id. at
2833 ("Our Constitution is a covenant .... We invoke it once again to define
the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise of
liberty.").
8. E.g., ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEmpriNG OF AhERICA 111-16 (1990).
9. E.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (describing access to abortion as a "liberty interest"); Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("A woman's interest in having an abortion is a form of lib-
erty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion
procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
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erty" and the word "liberty," however, carried different mean-
ings when the Due Process Clauses became part of the
Constitution. Tracing back to the Magna Carta,'0 the phrase ac-
quired its modern connotation-as a comprehensive list of im-
portant or fundamental rights-in seventeenth and eighteenth
century England, particularly in the writings of Whigs and so-
cial contract theorists like John Locke and Frances Hutcheson."
This tradition considers life, not liberty, the most basic right.
Moreover, this "life" includes more than mere biological exist-
ence; it also encompasses physical integrity, "health and in-
dolency of body,"12 and even a minimum quality of life. Guided
by these influences, eighteenth and nineteenth century Ameri-
cans thought of "life" expansively when they devised the Consti-
tution and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. 13
Today "right to life" designates a political position opposed
to abortion. Yet, if "life" means what it did when the Framers
drafted the Constitution, bodily integrity is part and parcel of
the concept, and abortion, which implicates a woman's "health"
and "body," warrants constitutional protection as an aspect of
"life."
Although a right does not gain in constitutional stature sim-
ply because it rests on a different word, the shift from "liberty"
to "life" involves more than just semantics. The textual and his-
torical evidence for abortion rights exists under the rubric of
'ife," but critics, blinded by their anachronistic understanding
of "liberty," miss the evidence. Looking at the wrong word, they
charge that abortion rights lack a basis in the constitutional
text.' 4 Meanwhile, proponents of abortion rights offer general
theories of text interpretation and constitutional method to
prove that "liberty" includes a right of abortion. Such theories
10. Reprinted in SELECT DocUMEms OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
42 (George B. Adams & H. Morse Stephens eds., 1929); see generally Robert E.
Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 941, 948-58 (examin-
ing the antecedents of due process in the Magna Carta).
11. See discussion infra part II.
12. JOHN LOCKE, A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION 26 (James H. Tully
ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (William Popple trans., 1st ed. 1689) (capital-
ization in original omitted).
13. See discussion infra part HI.
14. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("the Con-
stitution says absolutely nothing about [abortion]"); Bornu, supra note 8, at 112
("the right to abort, whatever one thinks of it, is not to be found in the Constitu-
tion"); John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 943 (1973) ("Roe lacks even colorable support in the constitu-
tional text, history, or any other appropriate source of constitutional doctrine").
588 [Vol. 78:585
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are unnecessary, however, to explain the obvious relationship
between abortion and a woman's health and body, and therefore,
between abortion and the constitutional right of life. "Life" pro-
vides a textual source for abortion rights, answering the charge
that abortion lacks a basis in the Constitution.
In addition to ignoring "life," modern constitutional theo-
rists understand "liberty" in a way that conflicts with the Fram-
ers' understanding. Locke, one of the main influences on
revolutionary American thinkers, understood "liberty" to mean
"enjoyment of natural rights," such as the right of life.15 This
"liberty" does not grow out of any concept of freedom from physi-
cal restraints, as the modern concept does, and it does not imply
freedom from valid rules that enhance lives. 16 Nor could one de-
rive new rights from the Lockean concept of liberty: its shape
and reach depend on the meaning of other natural rights which
do not, in turn, depend on the meaning of liberty.
The modern understanding of "liberty" lacks a conceptual
grounding. The Court repudiated Lochner v. New York 17 and its
conception of liberty during the 1930s,'8 but the Court has not
enunciated a new concept of "liberty" to replace Lochner's. In
the name of "liberty," the Court has eased review of social and
economic legislation, incorporated guarantees of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, and proclaimed a sub-
stantive due process doctrine that encompasses rights of privacy
and abortion. 19 The Court, however, has not related these three
strands of liberty to one another, nor has it related them to a
larger conception of liberty, as it did in the Lochner era. Lacking
any larger conception of liberty, the Court and modern commen-
tators fall back on apparent commonplaces. "Liberty" is pre-
15. See discussion infra part H.B.2.
16. In particular, if a duly enacted law preserves human life, according to
Locke, that law could not also infringe on liberty. See discussion infra parts
II.B.3, V.A.
17. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
18. During the Lochner era, the Court struck down welfare enactments
and economic reforms as violations of Fourteenth Amendment "liberty." See
generally GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 436-53 (surveying Lochner era thinking
and decisions). For further discussion, see infra parts IV.B, V.C.3.
The Lochner line of cases was effectively overruled by West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which upheld a minimum wage law against a
constitutional challenge. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2798 (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (describing West Coast Hotel as the case
that overturned the Lochner line of cases).
19. See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 491-93 (surveying developments).
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sumed to mean "freedom from restraint,"20 with the most basic
liberty characterized as the freedom of movement.21 The need
for balancing liberty against public imperatives is thought to be
obvious. 22
Such commonplaces seem self-evident, but each conflicts
with Locke's, and the Framers', conception of liberty: that lib-
erty is not freedom from restraint; its core meaning is not free-
dom of movement; and, because it never opposes individual
rights to public imperatives, it leaves nothing to be "balanced."
Indeed, the modem commonplaces about liberty originally ap-
peared 200 years ago as David Hume's criticisms of Locke's the-
ory.2 3 When the Framers embraced the social contract,
however, they necessarily rejected Hume's critical views. 24 The
modern commonplaces about liberty, which appear obviously
true, are in fact historically false.
All of this bears on arguments made against Roe. Critics
portray Roe as an egregiously wrong interpretation of Four-
teenth Amendment "liberty," and so as a uniquely bad decision
lacking any semblance of support in the Constitution's text.
25
Yet, if liberty's core meaning is not "freedom from physical re-
straint," then Roe's right of abortion is no more farfetched, as a
textual matter, than O'Connor v. Donaldson's26 right of a sane,
nondangerous person to be free from physical confinement in a
state mental hospital. For O'Connor becomes more plausible
20. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (joint opinion
of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) ("liberty... includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints") (quoting Poe v.
Ulliman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on ju-
risdictional grounds)); Ely, supra note 14, at 935 ("Of course a woman's freedom
to choose an abortion is part of the 'liberty' the Fourteenth Amendment says
shall not be denied without due process of law, as indeed is anyone's freedom to
do what he wants.").
21. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the meaning of liberty
"extends beyond freedom from physical restraint"); Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S.
Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992) ("Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary govern-
mental action."); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) ("Liberty from
bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause.") (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,
442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part));
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("freedom from bodily restraint").
22. See, e.g., Romeo, 457 U.S. at 321 (asserting that "liberty interests" must
be balanced against "relevant state interests").
23. See discussion infra part ll.C.3.
24. See discussion infra part III.A.
25. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14.
26. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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than Roe only when "liberty" means physical freedom, the very
meaning Locke rejected. Robert Bork, for example, argues that
the constitutional "liberty" to do anything (such as have an abor-
tion) implies the liberty to do everything, because the concept of
liberty cannot distinguish among different human wants.27 His
argument presumes that "liberty" means "freedom from re-
straint."28 If liberty does not have that meaning, however, as it
does not in the Lockean tradition, then Bork's reductio ad ab-
surdum collapses.
The Lockean conception of liberty has another, more direct
bearing on the abortion controversy. The modern doctrine of
substantive due process, the judicial technique of strict scrutiny,
and the various strands of "liberty" in the modern Court's juris-
prudence all reflect a Lockean idea of "liberty." Roe itself re-
flects the same idea, and, in that way, marks a return to the
Framers' own conception of liberty.
The remaining sections of this Article provide evidence for
the arguments summarized in this introduction. Part I outlines
the present day controversy over liberty and abortion, including
the multiple, conflicting opinions in Casey. Part II examines the
phrase "life, liberty, or property," and the meaning of its compo-
nent rights, in the era before the American Revolution. This his-
tory begins with the Magna Carta and reaches a crucial stage in
seventeenth century England, when social contract theory ap-
peared. Part HI, which surveys the meaning of "life, liberty, or
property" during the American revolutionary era, concludes that
the Framers adopted the Lockean, social contract meaning of
that phrase. Part IV describes the movement away from social
contract conceptions during the Lochner era, when the Court de-
fined "liberty" to mean "freedom from restraint." Part V argues
that each of modern liberty's three strands-incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, rational review of social and economic legislation,
and protection of fundamental rights-recreates earlier social
contract conceptions, and that modern "privacy" recreates the
27. Every clash between a minority claiming freedom from regulation
and a majority asserting its freedom to regulate requires a choice be-
tween the gratifications (or moral positions) of the two groups. When
the Constitution has not spoken, the Court will be able to find no scale,
other than its own value preferences, upon which to weigh the compet-
ing claims.... There is... no principled way to make the necessary
distinctions.
BoRK, supra note 8, at 257-58; see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1971) (asserting that the
Court "cannot pick and choose between competing [individual] gratifications").
28. See discussion infra part H.B.2.
1994]
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social contract right of "life." Finally, Part VI reexamines the
abortion debate in light of the historic concepts of "life" and "lib-
erty." It argues that historic "life" provides an ample warrant
for the right of abortion, that Roe's opponents employ a concep-
tion of liberty that the Framers rejected, and that strict scrutiny
aptly implements our historic rights.
I. LIBERTY, ROE v. WADE, AND THE CRITICS
A. MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY
Nothing in the Constitution's wording suggests that "life,"
"liberty," and "property" differ dramatically in their significance
or operation as rights.29 Yet today, "liberty" is preeminent. In-
deed, it is capable of designating the entire set of Fourteenth
Amendment freedoms. The Court has said that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates a right when that right represents
"fundamental principles... of liberty"30 or is "necessary to...
[a] regime of ordered liberty."31 "Liberty" has also become the
textual source for substantive due process rights that appear no-
where else in the Constitution, rights such as physical integrity
and bodily autonomy,32 freedom of movement,33 freedom from
harm,3 4 treatment in state institutions,35 the opportunity to at-
tend private schools,3 6 and to learn foreign languages in public
29. For an argument that one of the three rights has always predominated
over the others, see discussion infra part II.B.3.d.
30. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)). The Duncan Court was speak-
ing of rights appearing in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id.
31. Id. at 150 n.14 (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (asserting
that state prisoners possess "a significant liberty interest in avoiding the un-
wanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977)
("corporal punishment in public schools implicates a constitutionally protected
liberty interest").
33. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (declaring "freedom from
bodily restraint" to be at "the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause") (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
34. Id. at 315 (asserting that "personal security" is a liberty interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 (same).
35. E.g., Romeo, 457 U.S. at 322 (finding a retarded inmate of a state
school entitled to "such training as may be reasonable in light of... [his] liberty
interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints").
36. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (referring to the
"liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees"). Pierce also used "lib-
erty" in the more general sense described earlier in this paragraph by referring
to "the fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose." Id.
592
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schools, 37 as well as the right of abortion. Indeed, "liberty" can
stand for all constitutional rights, a connotation that the Casey
Court employed when it equated the "freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution's own promise" with the "promise of liberty."3 s
"Property," in contrast, receives a narrower reading. The
Court decides when economic expectations constitute protected
"property" interests, entitling someone to procedural due pro-
cess,3 9 but property in the Due Process Clauses is not a broad
source of constitutional right. The Court set this pattern during
the Lochner era when, as one commentator observes, an "ex-
panded definition of 'liberty' swallowed up 'property"' 40 and
"[t]he right to acquire, own, and use property became an aspect
of the broad 'liberty' secured by due process."4 1
"Life" plays an even smaller constitutional role today. Say-
ing that the "words 'liberty' and 'property' in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be given some
meaning,"42 the Court has implied that "life," which appears in
37. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("The problem for our de-
termination is whether the statute.. unreasonably infringes the liberty guar-
anteed... by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
38. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2833 (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (holding that a stu-
dent's suspension from a public school implicates property and liberty interests
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
40. Henry P. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and 'Property," 62 CoRNE.L L. REv.
405, 413 n.57 (1977).
41. Id. at 434-35. Monaghan notes that the Lochner era of the Court was
in step with "social and political theorists" who "increasingly emphasized that
the protection of economic interests was an aspect of 'liberty,' rather than 'prop-
erty.'" Id. at 434. Monaghan cites Coppage v. Kansas which graphically illus-
trates liberty's new preeminence:
The principle is fundamental and vital. Included in the right of per-
sonal liberty and the right of private property-partaking of the nature
of each-is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of prop-
erty... If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with,
there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long-established con-
stitutional sense ....
An interference with this liberty so serious as that now under con-
sideration ....
236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) (emphasis added). What began the paragraph as rights of
"personal liberty and.., private property" became, by the start of the next
paragraph, a right of "liberty."
42. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). "Prior to Roth,"
Monaghan writes, "Supreme Court definitions of 'liberty' and 'property' had
amounted to taking the words 'life, liberty or property' as a universal concept
embracing all interests valued by sensible men." Monaghan, supra note 40, at
409. In effect "liberty" and "property" exhausted the meaning of the Due Pro-
cess Clause, making "life" superfluous: "[T]here seems to have been an overrid-
ing consensus," according to Monaghan, "that every individual 'interest' worth
19941
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the same clause, need not. Substantive and procedural rights no
longer receive recognition under the rubric of "life." Life itself,
in the sense of biological existence, counts as a "liberty" interest,
and even the "right to die" receives analysis as an aspect of "lib-
erty."43 As Justice Marshall once accurately observed, "constitu-
tional principles of liberty, property, and due process, evolve
over time,"44 an observation that includes all of the operative
terms of the Due Process Clause except "life." "Life" was omitted
because it does not designate a "constitutional principle" or even
a legal concept, but only the fact of "biological existence." In ef-
fect, the newly expanded right of "liberty" swallowed up the his-
toric right of life.
The modern, expansive interpretation of "liberty" has, of
course, received criticism. Justice Black, in particular, dis-
sented from the idea of "fundamental liberties ... [as] things
apart from the Bill of Rights."45 He argued that the Four-
teenth Amendment created no new substantive rights.46 By
the time of Roe, however, every sitting Justice had accepted the
idea of substantive due process rights in principle,4 7 and it
talking about is encompassed within the 'liberty' and 'property' secured by the
due process clause." Id. at 406-07. Monaghan was describing doctrinal changes
that limited the reach of "liberty" and "property;" he was not himself suggesting
that "life" had been overlooked in interpretations of the clause.
43. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7
(1990) ("We believe this issue is... properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest.").
In dissent, Justice Stevens questioned whether a woman in a profound,
irreversible vegetative state still has "'ife' as that word is commonly under-
stood, or as it is used in both the Constitution and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence." Id. at 345. Yet, Justice Stevens also described the issue as "whether...
the Constitution protects the liberty of seriously ill patients to be free from life-
sustaining medical treatment." Id. at 331 (emphasis added). "Life" became a
factor because the state had asserted an interest in preserving life to counter
Ms. Cruzan's liberty interest. Id. at 335.
44. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
45. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 86 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting);
see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J., concurring);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). In
these cases, Justice Black argued that the Fourteenth Amendment, taken as a
whole, incorporates the first eight amendments and makes them binding
against the states. E.g., Adamson, 332 U.S. at 89. He denied, however, that
"liberty," or any other word in the Due Process Clause, confers rights other than
those guaranteed in the Constitution's first eight amendments. E.g., Duncan,
391 U.S. at 168-71.
46. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 90 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. Seven Justices joined Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade which
treats abortion as a "fundamental" right, see 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973), and
as an aspect of the right of privacy "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
594 [Vol. 78:585
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fell to commentators to advance criticisms as broad as Justice
Black's.
B. Two CMTICS OF ROE V. WADE
John Hart Ely and Robert H. Bork are two of Roe's most
prominent critics. Ely made his arguments shortly afler Roe
was decided;48 Bork has critiqued the case more recently.49
They disagree about much in constitutional law. Ely allows a
limited role for judges in declaring new constitutional rights, 50 a
position that Bork considers a constitutional "heresy."51 Bork
argues that the unvarying test of constitutional meaning lies in
the Framers' original intent,5 2 a view that Ely describes as an
"impossibility."53 Yet, they concur about Roe: both men regard
the case as a constitutional catastrophe.
Ely and Bork offer two general criticisms of Roe. First, like
Justice Black,54 they challenge the very idea of substantive due
process rights. Ely argues that the Due Process Clause confers
only procedural rights because "due process" means "procedure,"
and, thus, it cannot create new substantive entitlements like a
right of abortion.55 Bork agrees.56
concept of personal liberty," id. at 153. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, id.
at 167, expressly describes the holding of Griswold as a return to the "doctrine
of substantive due process," id. at 168, and notes that he "now accept[s] it as
such." Id. Justice Rehnquist dissented in Roe, id. at 171, but agreed that lib-
erty "embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of Rights," id. at 173.
Thus, he too accepted a variant of substantive due process. For discussion of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on substantive due process, see infra parts
I.C.1, V.B. Justice White also dissented in Roe, saying that "nothing in the
language or history of the Constitution supports a right to abortion." 410 U.S.
at 221. Justice White, however, had already accepted a substantive concept of
"liberty" in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J.,
concurring).
48. Ely, supra note 14; JoHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT (1980).
49. Bouc, supra note 8; but see Bork, supra note 26 (a pre-Roe essay criti-
cizing substantive due process theories).
50. Ely, supra note 48, at 73-179.
51. BoRi, supra note 8, at 1-4, 178-85, 194-99.
52. Id. at 143-60.
53. Ely, supra note 48, at 1-41. Ely and Bork have also expressed a critic's
admiration for each other's work. E.g., Bopju, supra note 8, at 194 (calling Ely's
critique of fundamental values theory "devastating" and "highly entertaining,"
and "recommend[ing it highly"); John H. Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitu-
tional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Leg-
islatures, 77 VA. L. REv. 833, 846 n.30 (1991) (declaring Bork's criticisms of
Ely's own work "among the fairest that has appeared").
54. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
55. ELY, supra note 48, at 14-21.
56. BoRK, supra note 8, at 32.
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This criticism has two practical drawbacks, however. First,
its narrow view of the Due Process Clause is unlikely to carry
the Court in the foreseeable future because each member of the
Court, at the time Casey was decided, had rejected it,57 possibly
because of its far reaching consequences. By adopting this view,
the Court would overturn Griswold v. Connecticut's right of mar-
ital privacy,58 as well as Roe's right of abortion.59 In fact, every
substantive due process right would fail, unless the Court recon-
ceptualized the rights under another constitutional provision. 60
Furthermore, the First Amendment would no longer apply to
the states if the Fourteenth Amendment carried only a proce-
dural meaning.61 Although Ely and Bork argue that democratic
legislatures would not enact such measures, 62 the possibility re-
mains daunting.
57. Every opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, except Justice Scalia's,
explicitly endorsed a substantive conception of liberty. See discussion infra
part I.C.1. Justice Scalia would have applied a rational relationship test, a test
also making Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" a substantive right, albeit a rela-
tively weak right. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2875 (1992).
Moreover, Justice Scalia also joined Chief Justice Relmquist's opinion, which
deemed abortion a (substantive) "liberty interest." See discussion infra part
I.C.1; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing how every
member of the Roe Court has embraced some idea of substantive due process
and some kind of Fourteenth Amendment substantive liberty right).
58. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
59. Other substantive laws not covered by this conception of the Due Pro-
cess Clause might include a ban on marriage, a requirement that women be-
come pregnant, or, conversely, a requirement that women undergo abortion or
sterilization. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 8, at 64 ('To say, for example, that
sterilization... [is] a deprivation of liberty without due process of law would...
[be] transparently to add to the Constitution a principle that had not been there
before.").
60. Bork, for example, suggests that Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (invalidating, on substantive due process grounds, a ban on foreign lan-
guage instruction in public schools) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (invalidating, on substantive due process grounds, a ban on attend-
ance at private elementary schools) could have reached the same results on
First Amendment grounds. BRoE, supra note 8, at 47-49.
61. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,
27 STA. L. Rav. 703, 710-14 (1975) (cataloging the doctrinal consequences of
what he then termed the "pure interpretative" model of the Constitution). For
his part, Bork observes that the "controversy over the legitimacy of incorpora-
tion [of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment] continues to this
day" but "as a matter ofjudicial practice, the issue is settled." BoRK, supra note
8, at 94.
62. BoRK, supra note 8, at 234 (arguing that "[tihe Constitution does not
forbid every ghastly hypothetical law.... We are not framing a constitutional
philosophy for a society imagined in a particularly horrible piece of science fic-
tion. We are talking about our society"); ELY, supra note 48, at 182 (suggesting
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The second problem with the general argument against sub-
stantive due process is that it makes abortion rights a constitu-
tional inference no worse than the right to marital privacy,63 the
right to attend private schools, 64 or even the right of sane per-
sons to remain free from state mental hospital commitment.65
By putting Roe in the same class as other substantive due pro-
cess decisions, the argument fails to capture Bork's and Ely's
sense of Roe as a uniquely bad decision.
Perhaps as a way to avoid these problems, Ely and Bork
also characterize Roe as a case utterly lacking support in the
Constitution. This line of criticism has proven more influential.
Ely finds Roe "frightening" because the "super-protected right"
of abortion is not "inferable from the language of the Constitu-
tion, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in is-
sue, any general value derivable from the provisions they
included, or the nation's governmental structure."66 The Court
simply addressed "a question [that] the Constitution has not
made the Court's business."6 7 Moreover, if the right of abortion
does not originate in the Constitution, it must have originated
from some other source. Ely identifies that source as the per-
sonal value preferences of the Roe Justices, which Roe imposed
on the nation.68
More than a decade later, Bork echoes Ely's description.
Bork argues that Roe provides "not one line of explanation, not
one sentence that qualifies as legal argument," because "the
right to abort, whatever one thinks of it, is not to be found in the
Constitution."69 Roe is "not legal reasoning," but "fiat," a glaring
example of constitutional "heresy," Bork continues.70 This her-
esy is that the Justices' personal views about politically correct
outcomes, rather than the Constitution, are the law of the
that those who think that judges are needed to prevent irrational laws, like a
hypothetical ban on gall bladder surgery, simply "don't believe in democracy.").
63. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
64. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
65. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-75 (1975) (holding that a
state may not confine in a mental hospital persons found to pose no threat, at
least without affording treatment).
66. Ely, supra note 14, at 935-36 (internal citations omitted).
67. Id. at 943.
68. Id. at 937-43. Specifically, Ely describes Lochner v. New York as a case
in which the Court "manufactured a constitutional right... and used it to su-
perimpose its own view of wise social policy" and argues that Roe is like Loch-
ner. Id. at 937.
69. BoRK, supra note 8, at 112.
70. Id. at 114.
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land.71 Bork makes the same point in a discussion of Casey:
"[T]he Constitution contains not one word that can be tortured
into the slightest relevance to abortion, one way or the other."72
This line of criticism, unlike the earlier one, allows a dis-
tinction between Roe and cases involving physical liberty, such
as the decision barring commitment of sane, harmless, and un-
treated persons to mental hospitals.73 Presumably, the Court
could "torture" the word "liberty" so that it seems relevant to
whether a person should remain physically free. 74 Such deci-
sions may be mistaken, because the word "liberty" confers no
substantive rights, but the error is less egregious than Roe's: at
least something in the Constitution's language supports the re-
sult.75 On the other hand, abortion has no relation whatsoever
to "liberty," unless "liberty" means that one can do whatever one
wants, which is absurd.76
Justice White elaborated on this argument in Bowers v.
Hardwick.77 Rejecting a claim to constitutional "privacy" for ho-
mosexual relations, he wrote: "The Court is most vulnerable
and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the lan-
guage or design of the Constitution."78 This suggests a kind of
71. Id. at 7 (describing the "heresy of political judging" in constitutional
cases).
72. Robert H. Bork, Again, a Struggle for the Soul of the Court, N.Y. TIMas,
July 8, 1992, at A19.
73. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-75 (1975).
74. Bork also criticizes the idea that the Due Process Clause "guarantee[s]
... laws with substance that strikes [the Supreme Court] as fair." Bork, supra
note 72, at A19. It is not clear, however, whether Bork thinks that in a decision
about substantive standards for mental hospital commitment, "liberty" counts
as a word that can be "tortured into the slightest relevance" to the affected per-
son's freedom.
75. BoRE, supra note 8, at 47-49.
76. Bork, supra note 27, at 9 (arguing that a constitutional "right of free-
dom" would be tantamount to "a general constitutional right to be free of legal
coercion, a manifest impossibility in any imaginable society").
77. 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
78. Id. at 194. Bork regarded Bowers as evidence that Justice White "knew
the Court had long been performing a questionable function in this area."
BoRE, supra note 8, at 117; see id. at 117-19 (continuing the discussion). Re-
garding the passage quoted in the text, Bork comments as follows:
That is quite right, or almost so. Perhaps [Justice White] had to put
the matter as one of coming 'nearest to illegitimacy' in order not to
offend members of the majority who had joined decisions that had no
roots in the 'language or design of the Constitution,' but on this topic
there is no question of near or far. When constitutional law is judge-
made and not rooted in the text or structure of the Constitution, it does
not approach illegitimacy, it is illegitimate, root and branch.
598
"LIFE" AND "LIBERTY"
sliding scale, with increasing judicial caution as a right's "cogni-
zable roots" in the Constitution diminish. It also suggests that,
at the short end of the scale, acute questions exist about the
Court's legitimate function and constitutional role.
C. PLAA WED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY
In Casey, the Court confronted basic questions of "liberty"
and abortion. Reaffirming the "essential holding"7 9 of Roe by a
vote of five to four, the Court produced five opinions.80 Bitterly
divided, the Justices agreed only that their dispute revealed
profound differences over the meaning of constitutional
"liberty."
1. Casey and the Concept of Liberty
In Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter signed
an extraordinary "joint opinion" which Justices Stevens and
Blackmun joined insofar as it affirmed Roe.81 This opinion de-
clared the "definition of liberty" to be the central issue in abor-
tion controversies, 8 2 defended stare decisis as a means of
securing liberty (because liberty requires certainty),8 3 explained
that "the reservations any of us may have... [about] Roe are
Id. at 119-20. While Bork insists that a right either is or is not supported by the
Constitution's text, Justice White recognizes degrees of constitutional support.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194. Moreover, this support need not be immediately visi-
ble or transparent, since Justice White wrote about "cognizable roots" found in
the Constitution and "roots," of course, are hidden from sight. Id. Interest-
ingly, Bork appropriates the same metaphor of "roots" in commenting on Jus-
tice White's observation, but in Bork's case, the metaphor became an "all or
nothing" affair: constitutional error should be eliminated, "root and branch."
Bom, supra note 8, at 120.
79. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) ("reaf-
firm[ing]" the "essential holding" of Roe); see also id. at 2808 (referring to Roe's
"central holding"). Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter understood Roe's
essential holding to include the "right of the woman to choose to have an abor-
tion before [fetal] viability." Id. at 2804. Roe recognized two state interests
that might restrict the right to choose an abortion before viability: an interest
in the mother's health and an interest in the fetus' potential life. Id. Like Roe,
the joint opinion found these interests "insufficient to justify a ban on abortions
prior to viability." Id. at 2817.
80. Id. at 2803, 2838, 2843, 2855, 2873.
81. Id. at 2803.
82. "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt," the opinion began,
"[y]et 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages.., that definition of liberty is
still questioned." Id. at 2803.
83. Id. ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.").
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outweighed by the explication of individual liberty"8 4 given in
the opinion, and ended by linking liberty, in near mystical fash-
ion, to the Court's constitutional role and to the identity of the
nation.8 5 Although the joint opinion affirmed Roe's "essential
holding," it also upheld all but one of the abortion restrictions
before the Court8 6 using a new constitutional standard, the "un-
due burden" test.8 7
Justices Stevens and Blackmun wrote separate opinions ex-
panding on their respective views of Roe, concurring in the in-
84. Id. at 2808. The opinion also offered "liberty" as the reason why some
of the joint opinion's authors voted to uphold Roe even though "as individuals
S. . [we] find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality." Id. at
2806. The Justices' personal views could not "control [their] decision," however,
because "[their] obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [their]
own moral code." Id.
85. The opinion closes with the following passage:
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of
Americans to us and then to future generations.... Each generation
must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas
and aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We accept our
responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the
covenant in light of all of our precedents. We invoke it once again to
define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the
promise of liberty.
Id. at 2833.
86. The disputed Pennsylvania law in Casey required that physicians in-
form women about the risks of abortion and about the "probable gestational age
of the child"; abortion facilities notify women about the availability of litera-
ture, authored by the state, describing fetal development and alternatives to
abortion; women receive medical counseling about alternatives to abortion; wo-
men wait 24 hours after receiving the notices and the counseling before ob-
taining abortions; and minors obtain parental consent, or court approval, for an
abortion. Id. at 2822, 2825, 2832. On the last point, the joint opinion would
follow earlier cases such as Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497
U.S. 502 (1990) and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). The Penn-
sylvania abortion law also included emergency provisions that dispensed with
the restrictions when necessary for a woman's health, which the Court inter-
preted so that "compliance with [Pennsylvania's other] abortion regulations
would not in any way pose a significant threat to the life or health of a woman."
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.)
(quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 701 (1991)). It also con-
tained provisions that required abortion facilities to file medical reports with
the state. Id. at 2832. In these reports, the identity of the patient remained
confidential, but facilities had to report the identity of the physician performing
each procedure, the woman's age, the number of the woman's prior pregnancies
and also the number of prior abortions she had received, any medical complica-
tions, medical conditions that would have complicated the woman's continued
pregnancy, the weight of the aborted fetus, the marital status of the woman,
and, if applicable, the basis for invoking the emergency provisions. Id.
87. The joint opinion struck down, as an "undue burden," the requirement
that women notify their husbands of an impending abortion. Id. at 2826-31.
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validation of a spousal notification requirement, and dissenting
from the Court's treatment of the other state regulations.88
Both Justices based their positions on an understanding of "lib-
erty." 9 Justice Stevens wrote that "Roe is an integral part of a
correct understanding of... the concept of liberty."90 Justice
Blackmun contended that "[a] fervent view of individual lib-
erty"91 had led the Court to reaffirm Roe, while a "stunted con-
ception of individual liberty"92 underlay the opposing position.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia also wrote sepa-
rate opinions, joined by each other and by Justices Thomas and
White. 93 Both argued for sustaining all the challenged regula-
tions; language in each opinion strongly implied that Roe, and
Casey, should be overruled as soon as practicable. 94 Unsurpris-
ingly, both opinions also featured discussions of "liberty."
88. Justice Stevens would have struck down the following requirements,
which the joint opinion sustained: notice of the availability of state authored
materials about abortion, id. at 2841; the 24 hour waiting period, id.; notice of
potential state financial assistance for the costs of prenatal care and childbirth,
id. at 2843; as well as the potential liability of the father for child support, id.;
notice of the gestational age of the fetus, id.; and counseling about alternatives
to abortion, id. Justice Stevens seemingly accepted post-viability regulations
on abortion because of stare decisis, rather than his own independent analysis.
Id. at 2838-39; see also id. at 2839-40 & n.3 (analyzing the state's interest in
potential life in such a way that post-viability abortions do not affect the inter-
est any more than pre-viability abortions do).
Justice Blackmun would have invalidated all of the challenged Penn-
sylvania provisions, including the provision that only a physician may supply
information about the nature of abortion, its health risks, and the probable ges-
tational age of the fetus. Id. at 2850-52.
89. In addition, Justices Blackmun and Stevens suggested that abortion
implicates a woman's right to equality. Id. at 2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("A State's
restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy... implicate consti-
tutional guarantees of gender equality."); id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Roe is an integral part of a correct understanding
of both the concept of liberty and the basic equality of men and women."); see
also id. at 2847 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judg-
ment in part, and dissenting in part) (citing commentators who have advanced
equal protection theory); see also Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 124
n.10 (1989) (reviewing other authorities supporting the equal protection theory
of abortion rights).
90. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
91. Id. at 2844.
92. Id. at 2853. Justice Blackmun also referred to "the Chief Justice's
cramped notion of individual liberty." Id.
93. Id. at 2855, 2873.
94. Chief Justice Rehnquist described the joint opinion's "undue burden"
test as "a standard which is not built to last," Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2866, labeled
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Justice Scalia attacked the joint opinion's claims that "lib-
erty" lends itself to meaningful, principled interpretation by
judges using "reasoned judgment." "[Wihat the Court calls 'rea-
soned judgment,'" Justice Scalia wrote, "turns out to be nothing
but philosophical predilection and moral intuition."95 For his
part, Justice Scalia was "sure"96 that abortion is not "a liberty
protected by the Constitution" because of "two simple facts: (1)
the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the
longstanding traditions of American society have permitted
[abortion] to be legally proscribed."97 Justice Scalia's portrayal
the joint opinion's outcome "an unjustified constitutional compromise," id. at
2855-56, and stated that "authentic principles of stare decisis do not require
that any portion of the reasoning in Roe be kept intact," id. at 2860-61, a judg-
ment that presumably applies to the Casey joint opinion's "reasoning" as well.
Justice Scalia stated that a constitutional holding should be overruled if
the Court incorrectly decided the case and it had failed to produce a settled
body of law. Id. at 2884. Using those standards, Roe warrants overruling. Id.;
see also id. at 2875 ("Roe was plainly wrong"); id. at 2880-81 (Casey's depar-
tures from Roe demonstrate that Roe failed to produce a settled body of law.).
Using the same standards, it would appear that Casey also warrants overrul-
ing, see id. at 2880 (The undue burden test is "inherently standardless" and
produces a "jurisprudence of confusion."). Moreover, the joint opinion brought
"vividly to [Justice Scalia's] mind," id. at 2885, the plight of Chief Justice Taney
who-like the Casey joint opinion's authors-thought he had permanently set-
tled a major national controversy with a constitutional decision: Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). "We should get out of this area," Justice
Scalia concluded, "where we have no right to be, and where we do neither our-
selves nor the country any good by remaining." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885.
Justice Blackmun, in contrast, closed his opinion by stating- "I am 83 years
old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down, the confir-
mation process for my successor well may focus on the issue before us today.
That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice... will be made." Id. at 2854-
55. It is remarkable that Justice Blackmun wrote in this way, but, in light of
the dissenters' all but expressed determination to overrule Roe and Casey, he
only stated the obvious.
95. Id. at 2884. Justice Scalia asserted that both the Roe majority and the
Casey joint opinion used a "reasoned judgment" technique, and he found its fail-
ings to be evident:
The emptiness of the "reasoned judgment" that produced Roe is dis-
played in plain view by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort
by some of the brightest (and most determined) legal minds in the
country, after more than 10 cases upholding abortion rights in this
Court, and after dozens upon dozens of amicus briefs submitted in this
and other cases, the best the Court can do to explain how it is that the
word "liberty" must be thought to include the right to destroy human
fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a
value judgment and conceal a political choice.
Id. at 2875.
96. Id. at 2874.
97. Id. Justice Scalia thus suggested tradition as a source of constitutional
right, even in the absence of supporting constitutional text. Id. At the same
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of a Constitution silent about abortion and a "liberty" that can-
not-by itself, at least-produce new constitutional rights re-
calls Ely's and Bork's criticisms of Roe.9 8 Like Ely and Bork,
Justice Scalia discerned a constitutional catastrophe in Roe's ap-
proach to "liberty."99
Chief Justice Rehnquist approached "liberty" in a less gen-
eral way, but the concept remains vital to his opinion. The
meaning of liberty "extends beyond freedom from physical re-
straint,"1°° he wrote, citing cases protecting marriage, pro-
creation, and contraceptive use as aspects of "liberty."101
Nonetheless, the Chief Justice argued that it is a mistake to
treat abortion as a fundamental right warranting strict scru-
time, he questioned the states' ability to require abortions. Id. at 2873-74. Roe,
he wrote, "sought to establish-in the teeth of a clear, contrary tradition [the
history of state abortion prohibitions and restrictions before 19721-a value
found nowhere in the constitutional text." Id. at 2874 n.1. "[Ilt does not follow,"
he continued, "that the Constitution does not protect childbirth simply because
it does not protect abortion." Id. The difference is that "[tihere is, of course, no
comparable tradition barring recognition of a 'liberty interest" in carrying one's
child to term free from state efforts to kill it." Id. This example, he concluded,
"shows the utter bankruptcy of constitutional analysis deprived of tradition as a
validating factor." Id. (emphasis added).
Justice Scalia finds no provision of the Constitution that speaks to abor-
tion, and he cites none that speaks to childbirth. Id. at 2874. Apparently, then,
whenever the Constitution is silent, tradition can create a constitutional right.
Indeed, it is the absence of any tradition barring childbirth that Justice Scalia
finds dispositive. Id. It is true that throughout American history childbirth
was not prohibited. If such a tradition creates enforceable constitutional rights,
however, legislatures may not regulate new subjects and Lochner may well be
correct. Perhaps this explains why Justice Scalia cited, in the case of child-
birth, not a tradition of no regulation, but the lack of a tradition regulating it.
It is possible, however, that Justice Scalia himself would not find a constitu-
tional right to childbirth, and only meant to say that a judge who does find such
a right commits a less egregious error than that of Roe.
98. See supra notes 55-76 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 94 (comparing Roe and Casey to Dred Scott).
100. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859.
101. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptive use); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation)). Although Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist joined in each other's opinions (and Justices Thomas and White joined
both), Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to have a broader conception of substan-
tive "liberty." For example, to show that marriage is a protected aspect of lib-
erty, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), a case
that invalidated state prohibitions of interracial marriage. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2859. Justice Scalia also cited Loving approvingly, but he only described it as
an equal protection case. Id. at 2874 n.1. Furthermore, Justice Scalia's opinion
said nothing about procreation or contraceptive use. It is not obvious how Jus-
tice Scalia's "text plus tradition" approach could square with Griswold's right to
use contraceptives. See supra note 97 (explaining Justice Scalia's "text plus
tradition" approach).
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tiny.10 2 Because "[a] woman's interest in having an abortion is
[only] a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,"'0 3
not a fundamental right, 0 4 he concluded that states "may regu-
late abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest."'0 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist then cited
Williamson v. Lee Optical,10 6 a case employing a particularly
toothless version of the rational basis test. 07 Chief Justice
Rehnquist thus considered rational basis scrutiny as the default
standard of constitutional review, even in matters affecting a
person's health and body.
2. Undue Burdens and Roe's "Essential Holding"
Although Casey reaffirmed Roe's "essential holding," the
joint opinion departed from Roe in a number of ways. Repudiat-
ing Roe's "trimester framework," 08 it produced two changes in
102. We are now of the view that, in terming this right fundamental,
the Court in Roe read the earlier opinions on which it based its decision
much too broadly. Unlike marriage, procreation and contraception,
abortion "involves the purposeful termination of potential life."... The
abortion decision must therefore "be recognized as sui generis, different
in kind from the others that the Court has protected under the rubric
of personal or family privacy and autonomy."
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 2867.
104. Beginning with his Roe dissent, the Chief Justice has consistently por-
trayed abortion as a liberty interest, rather than a fundamental right. In Roe,
he argued that abortion regulations constitute a form of "social and economic
legislation" and that the Court "traditionally applie[s]" the rational basis test to
such legislation. 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
same argument, however, applies with equal force to contraceptive bans, mar-
riage regulations, and sterilization, leaving no room for strict scrutiny. See
supra note 101. Thus, at the time of Roe, the Chief Justice disagreed with the
majority of the Court about the meaning of constitutional liberty.
In contrast, in his Casey opinion, the Chief Justice suggested that abortion
is "sui generis" and therefore, it should not receive the same constitutional
treatment as marriage, procreation, or contraception. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text. He thus implied, but did not explicitly state, that those
other activities warrant more stringent protection than rational basis scrutiny.
His Casey opinion also quoted Justice White's caution that the Justices should
not take an "'expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental
rights,'" a view that presupposes that there are fundamental rights, even if
abortion is not among them. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860 (quoting Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986)).
105. Id. at 2867.
106. Id. (citing 348 U.S. 483 (1955)).
107. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CoNsTITIONAL LAw § 8-7, at
582 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Williamson as an example of "virtually complete judi-
cial abdication" in the review of socioeconomic legislation).
108. The joint opinion described the trimester framework as one allowing
"almost no regulation at all... during the first trimester of pregnancy; regula-
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the abortion law. First, the joint opinion replaced Roe's trimes-
ters with a system of unequal semesters, one pre-viability and
one post-viability. During the pre-viability semester, states may
regulate but not "unduly burden" the right of abortion.10 9 In the
post-viability semester, states may prohibit abortion outright to
protect the potential life of the fetus.110 To the limited extent
that fetuses become "viable" before the third trimester, this new
framework advances the point at which states may prohibit
abortion. This change is quite modest in terms of dates,111 and
arguably is not inconsistent with Roe at all, because Roe also
used viability as its ultimate criterion. 12
The second change produced by Casey is more significant,
for it allows some pre-viability regulations that post-Roe cases
had previously prohibited. Roe barred pre-viability abortion re-
strictions when their purpose was to preserve fetal life."13 The
joint opinion, however, allowed such state restrictions, as long
as they do not conflict with the "urgent claims of the woman to
retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body."114
To reconcile the state's interest in potential life with the conflict-
ing "claims" of the woman, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter propounded the "undue burden" test.
An undue burden exists, according to Casey, when "a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus.""15 Statutes "designed to strike at the right itself"" 6 and
tions designed to protect the woman's health, but not to further the State's in-
terest in potential life, are permitted during the second trimester; and during
the third trimester, when the fetus is viable, prohibitions are permitted pro-
vided the life or health of the mother is not at stake." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817-
18.
109. Id. at 2820-21.
110. Id. at 2821.
111. The Justices, in the joint opinion approached this issue as follows:
The soundness or unsoundness of... [using viability as a legal divid-
ing line] in no sense turns on whether viability occurs at approximately
28 weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it
sometimes does today, or at some moment even slightly earlier in preg-
nancy, as it may if fetal respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced
in the future.
Id. at 2811.
112. "Whenever... [viability] may occur, the attainment of viability may
continue to serve as the critical fact, just as it has done since Roe." Id. at 2811-
12.
113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
114. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816.
115. Id. at 2820.
116. Id. at 2819.
19941 605
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:585
statutes that use means other than reasonable persuasion to de-
ter women from obtaining abortions117 fail the purpose compo-
nent of the test. Measures that do more than "make abortions a
little more difficult or expensive to obtain 118 will fail the "effect"
prong.119 Applying this test, the joint opinion found that all of
the challenged notice and consent regulations, except spousal
notification, were reasonable attempts at persuasion 120 that did
not, on their face, make abortion significantly "more difficult or
expensive to obtain."121 Hence, the restrictions did not consti-
117. Id. at 2820 ("the means chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder
it").
118. Id. at 2829.
119. See id. at 2821 ("To promote the State's profound interest in potential
life, throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the wo-
man's choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will
not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the
right.").
120. Id. at 2821-33. The joint opinion used language suggesting that a state
interest in informed medical decision making-rather than any interest in po-
tential life-was at stake. For example, states may "ensure" a woman's abor-
tion decision "is thoughtful and informed." Id. at 2818. Further, states may
mandate "a reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision," id., and
require "the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of
the procedure," id. at 2823. Nevertheless, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter relied on the more controversial interest in potential life, not on the
state's interest in informed medical decision making. A brief examination of
the practical issues may shed light on these Justices' reasoning.
In enacting the Pennsylvania statute, the legislature tried "to persuade the
woman to choose childbirth over abortion." Id. at 2821. Simple honesty re-
quired the Justices to acknowledge that fact. Nor was it plausible to invoke a
generalized state interest in medical decision making when candidates for other
surgical procedures-gall bladder removal, for example-were not subject to
similar requirements. Moreover, the joint opinion conceivably used the "inter-
est in potential life" as an olive branch to Roe's opponents. Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter were "call[ing] the contending sides of a national contro-
versy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in
the Constitution," an undertaking that would be expedited if each side saw
something positive in the Court's opinion. Id. at 2815.
121. Id. at 2829. Casey was a challenge to the facial constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania statute, and it remains possible that, upon a fuller factual record,
more of Pennsylvania's abortipn restrictions could fail the undue burden test.
See, e.g., id. at 2826 (upholding the 24 hour waiting period "on the record before
us, and in the context of this facial challenge"); see also id. at 2845 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) (noting that "the joint opinion has not ruled out the possibility that these
regulations may be shown to impose an unconstitutional burden" and expres-
sing confidence that "in the future evidence will be produced" that warrants
invalidating the remaining requirements); id. at 2880 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with Justice Blackmun
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tute undue burdens, and the state could attempt to preserve po-
tential fetal life by imposing them.
The joint opinion also applied the undue burden test to
health regulations. After Roe, the Court applied strict scrutiny
to such measures, 122 but the joint opinion repudiated those deci-
sions and substituted its undue burden test: "As with any medi-
cal procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the
health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary
health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting
a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose
an undue burden on the right."123 Nor are states restricted to
the technique of reasonable persuasion, as they are when poten-
tial fetal life is at stake. In order to protect a woman's health,
states may mandate the conditions under which abortions take
place, if such conditions do not unduly burden the right.
3. The Puzzle of Undue Burdens
Although the words "undue burden" appeared in earlier
abortion cases, 124 Casey created the undue burden test. In doing
so, the joint opinion seemingly confounded the distinction be-
tween strict scrutiny and rationality review that lay at the heart
of the Justices' disagreements about abortion. Until Casey, the
Justices premised their disagreement about abortion on a few
basic propositions: fundamental rights receive strict scru-
tiny;125 strict scrutiny allows abridgements of a right only when
necessary to further a compelling government interest; 26 and
mere liberty interests could be abridged by any state measure
that, on a different factual record, the undue burden standard might "ulti-
mately require the invalidation of each provision upheld today").
122. E.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,481-82 (1983)
(striking down a requirement that second trimester abortions be performed in
hospitals, rather than outpatient clinics); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 437-39 (1983) (same).
123. 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
124. See id. at 2819 (citing cases); id. at 2820 (citing opinions by "individual
members of the Court, including two of us" using the undue burden test in pos-
sibly inconsistent ways); see also id. at 2876 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (concluding the joint opinion was
"clearly wrong" to claim that earlier cases established the undue burden
standard).
125. Fundamental rights are those rights deemed fundamental under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See generally TRIBE, supra note 107, § 11-4 (discuss-
ing the concept of fundamental or preferred rights).
126. See generally GutN=ruaa, supra note 2, at 491-93, 505-06 (analyzing
strict scrutiny of substantive due process rights).
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rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.127 The undue
burden test, however, has no apparent connection to the frame-
work of strict scrutiny and rational basis review.
Instead, the joint opinion said that state regulations inci-
dentally affect every right and that "not every law which makes
a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of
that right."128 To determine which regulations infringe a consti-
tutional right, the joint opinion deployed the undue burden test,
a test reminiscent of Commerce Clause129 standards for distin-
guishing permissible burdens on interstate commerce from im-
permissible ones.130
The undue burden test is not necessarily inconsistent with
characterizing abortion as a fundamental right. In abortion
funding cases, while Roe remained an unquestionable authority,
the Court struggled nonetheless with questions about the scope
of the right and whether the right controls state funding deci-
sions. 13 The undue burden test seems relevant to such
problems. Moreover, Roe itself stated that a state "may... regu-
late the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related
to maternal health."13 2 Health regulation of a fundamental
127. See generally id. (analyzing rational basis review of substantive due
process rights).
128. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Sou-
ter, JJ.). The Justices stated that "not every ballot access limitation amounts to
an infringement of the right to vote. Rather, the States are granted substantial
flexibility in establishing the framework within which voters choose the candi-
dates for whom they wish to vote." Id.
Perhaps the constitutional right to attend private schools provides a more
apt analogy. Notwithstanding this right, a state could presumably encourage
parents to utilize public schools. To that end, a state could perhaps require
private school principals to inform prospective students of public school alterna-
tives; impose a 24 hour waiting period on private school enrollment; or provide
state literature regarding public schools. On the other hand, it seems doubtful
that election laws could require a 24 hour waiting period before someone voted
Republican, or, for that matter, that a housing law could require a 24 hour wait-
ing period before someone moves into a racially integrated neighborhood.
129. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power To regulate com-
merce ... among the several States. .. ").
130. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1914 (1992)
(stating that "[u]ndue burdens on interstate commerce may be avoided").
131. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding a federal statute bar-
ring Medicaid payments for certain medically necessary abortions); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a state's exclusion of medically unneces-
sary abortions from its Medicaid program).
132. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (emphasis added). See generally
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2857 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (surveying the Court's post-Roe decisions on health reg-
ulations of abortion).
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right, it seems, triggers a reasonableness standard rather than
strict scrutiny. Although post-Roe decisions subjected health
regulations to heightened scrutiny, the language of Roe suggests
that something less than strict scrutiny comports with abor-
tion's status as a fundamental right. Perhaps Roe's strict scru-
tiny only applies to core applications of the right.
The Casey Court, however, did not explicitly confine the un-
due burden test to peripheral applications of Roe or to questions
about the scope of abortion rights. Rather, the Court left open
the possibility that the test completely supplants the strict scru-
tiny framework. The joint opinion never said whether the "right
[to abortion] itself," s33 at its core, constitutes a fundamental
right that enjoys strict scrutiny.13 4
Nor did Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter merely ig-
nore strict scrutiny and the distinction between it and rational
basis review. 135 Rather, the joint opinion repeatedly used lan-
guage that confounds fundamental rights and liberty interests,
strict scrutiny and the rational basis test. For example, the
opinion described a state's interest in potential life as
"profound"13 6 and "substantial,"137 terms that do not readily fit
the strict versus rational scrutiny framework. 138 A "profound"
133. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Sou-
ter, JJ.) ("The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to
strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.") (em-
phasis added).
134. Justice Blackmun viewed the joint opinion in a different light: "Our
precedents and the joint opinion's principles require us to subject all non-de
minimus abortion regulations to strict scrutiny." Id. at 2846 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia disagreed and responded:
Justice Blackmun's effort to preserve as much of Roe as possible leads
him to read the joint opinion as more "constan[t]" and "steadfast" than
can be believed. He contends that the joint opinion's "undue burden"
standard requires the application of strict scrutiny to "all non-de
minimis" abortion regulations... but that could only be true if a "sub-
stantial obstacle"... were the same thing as a non-de minimis obsta-
cle-which it plainly is not.
Id. at 2883 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (internal citations omitted).
135. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520
(1989).
136. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Sou-
ter, JJ.).
137. Id. at 2820.
138. The term "substantial," however, describes the kind of state interest
required to withstand an Equal Protection Clause challenge under application
of intermediate level scrutiny. For a discussion of intermediate scrutiny, see
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interest, however, sounds like a "compelling" interest. To ad-
vance compelling interests, a state may prohibit abortion at any
point during a pregnancy. 13 9 Yet, the joint opinion reached the
opposite conclusion-holding that states may not prohibit pre-
viability abortions-which only adds to the confusion.
The joint opinion also invoked "legitimate" state ends.' 40 It
said that recognizing potential life as a legitimate interest, as
Roe did, implies that states must be able to further that interest
throughout a pregnancy. 1 1 For that reason, the joint opinion
regarded Roe as self-contradictory. Once Roe recognized a legiti-
mate state interest in potential life, the Court could not bar all
pre-viabiity measures to protect that life, or so the joint opinion
argued. Criticizing that argument, Justice Stevens observed as
follows:
[I]t is not a "contradiction" to recognize that the state may have a legit-
imate interest in potential human life and, at the same time, to con-
clude that that interest does not justify the regulation of abortion
before viability .... The fact that the State's interest is legitimate
does not tell us when, if ever, that interest outweighs the pregnant
woman's interest in personal liberty.1 4 2
Justice Stevens's objection, however, presumes that strict scru-
tiny, or at least something more than the rational basis test, ap-
plies, because, under a rational relationship test, some means
are inevitably available to advance every legitimate state inter-
est. Thus, if the joint opinion applied the rational basis test, its
discussion of pre-viability abortion restrictions would make
sense: the validity of some abortion restrictions would follow
from the existence of a state interest in potential life. Once
again, however, the joint opinion's terms of art clash with its
conclusions. The rational basis test allows abortion prohibitions
at any point during a pregnancy, a conclusion the joint opinion
emphatically rejected.
Justice Scalia suggested an explanation for these contradic-
tions. The joint opinion stated that undue burdens on abortion
JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITUTIoNAL LAw § 14.3, at 576-78,
§ 14.23 (4th ed. 1991) (surveying cases).
139. See supra note 79. By definition, this passes the other benchmark of
strict scrutiny: a prohibition of abortion is "necessary" to preserve a nonviable
fetus' potential life.
140. E.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, &
Souter, JJ.). "A statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or
some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of
serving its legitimate ends." Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 2821.
142. Id. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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are not "permissible" means of advancing "legitimate inter-
ests." 143 Those terms, Justice Scalia observed, are "commonly
associated with the rational-basis test."144 Yet, Justice
O'Connor, a co-author of the joint opinion, had previously associ-
ated "undue burdens" with strict scrutiny.145 "This confusing
equation of the two standards," Justice Scalia wrote, "is appar-
ently designed to explain how [Justice Kennedy] who joined the
plurality opinion in Webster... which adopted the rational basis
test, could join an opinion expressly adopting the undue burden
test."146 Justice Scalia's explanation could apply as well to the
general confounding of strict scrutiny and rational basis review
that emerges from the joint opinion. On this theory, the joint
opinion covered the Court's tracks, in effect, by destroying the
woods.147
The joint opinion's goal of settling the constitutional contro-
versy over abortion once and for all suggests another explana-
tion. Perhaps it ignored the distinction between strict and
rational basis scrutiny to achieve common ground among the
Justices, who sharply disagreed about the proper treatment of
abortion rights.148 Whether that reason is "principled" or is
just another way of phrasing Justice Scalia's point seems
debatable. 149
143. Id. at 2877 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (quoting id. at 2820-21).
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 463 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (The 'undue burden'.., represents
the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court can
require a State to justify its legislative actions under the exacting 'compelling
state interest' standard.").
146. Id. at 2877 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
147. This explanation comports with the rest of Justice Scalia's opinion,
which portrays the joint opinion as unprincipled in every respect. E.g., id. at
2883 ("It is particularly difficult... to sit still for the Court's lengthy lecture
upon the virtues of 'constancy,'... of 'remainfing] steadfast,'... of adhering to
'principle.'") (citations omitted).
148. E.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520-21
(1989).
149. An obvious tension exists between demands of principle, viewed in
terms of the careers and convictions of the individual Justices, and the same
demands on the Court as an institution. The Casey dissenters argued that past
constitutional mistakes (notably, in their view, Roe v. Wade) should be readily
overturned, even by newly appointed justices. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860-61.
This view suggests that the Court is not unprincipled if every Justice acts ac-
cording to his or her own personal principles. In contrast is the joint opinion's
insistence on institutional integrity. Id. at 2808, 2814-16. The joint opinion
looked to the institutional integrity of the Court which consisted of the collec-
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This Article suggests a different explanation. 150 Rationality
review and strict scrutiny embody antagonistic conceptions of
liberty that date from the seventeenth century. Largely forgot-
ten, this historic conflict today hides behind the unchanging
formula of "life, liberty, and property." Nevertheless, Casey rep-
resents a continuation of this 300 year old dispute about human
rights. Unwittingly, the joint opinion tried to embrace both his-
torically antagonistic positions.151
II. THE HISTORIC MEANINGS OF LIFE, LIBERTY,
AND PROPERTY
A. THE MAGNA CARTA
The language of the Due Process Clause traces back to
Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, which reads: "No free man
shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or
banished, or in any way destroyed.., except by the legal judg-
ment of his peers or by the law of the land."15 2 This chapter
possesses the same general structure and, allowing for the lin-
guistic differences between the time periods, 153 the same mean-
ing as the Due Process Clause. Both begin with a prohibition,
proceed to a list of rights, and conclude with an "except" clause.
The lists of rights are strikingly similar. The Magna Carta
speaks of being "dispossessed;" the Due Process Clause speaks of
a right to "property." The Magna Carta protects against being
"taken or imprisoned;" the Due Process Clause protects "liberty."
The Magna Carta guarantees against being "in any way de-
stroyed;" the Due Process Clause protects life." Finally, the "ex-
cept" clauses are synonymous, or at least they were in the minds
tive integrity of the Justices and their adherence to precedent, while the Casey
dissenters assessed judicial integrity justice by individual Justice.
150. See discussion infra parts II-V (describing historical conceptions of life
and liberty) and part VI.A (reexamining the Casey opinions in light of those
historic conceptions of rights).
151. See discussion infra part VIA
152. SELECT DocUmiNTs OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note
10, at 47.
153. The Due Process Clause simply replaces the Magna Carta's passive
verb phrases with abstract nouns that designate rights and rearranges the or-
der of those rights. Thus, "[n]o free man shall be taken or imprisoned" becomes
"[n]or shall any state deprive any person of... liberty;" the freedom from being
"dispossessed" becomes a right to "property;" and the freedom from being "de-
stroyed" becomes a right to "life." Compare id. with U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1 (emphasis added).
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of the Framers, who thought "due process of law" meant the
same thing as "law of the land."15 4
Standing alone, these parallels suggest that "life" in the
Due Process Clause means more than mere animate existence.
The Magna Carta's freedom from "destruction" protected
against physical alteration, short of death, and against bodily
harms.'5 5 When Kings cut off subjects' limbs, for example, it
"destroyed" the victims in an obvious way, although the unfortu-
nate person remained alive. If the Due Process Clause excluded
guarantees against dismemberment and maiming, it would pro-
tect significantly less than Magna Carta "ife." That would be
surprising, given the close parallels between the two documents.
More than 500 years elapsed between the Magna Carta and the
Constitution, but it is difficult to believe that at any point during
that time rights were reformulated so as to preserve all the
Magna Carta's freedoms except the freedom from bodily harm.
B. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
During the seventeenth century, while Parliament and Stu-
art Kings battled each other,'5 6 Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta
became critically important to England's political life.' 5 7 In
these struggles, Chapter 39 freedoms played three different
roles. First, Stuarts' opponents cited the Magna Carta as a
binding law limiting the King's powers,' 58 with Chapter 39 func-
tioning as a simple list of rights granted by royal charter. Also,
there came to exist a sense of the Magna Carta as "fundamen-
tal," as in some way basic to the English government, even bind-
ing on the King and Parliament in a special way.'5 9 Last, the
154. Rightly or wrongly, the Framers followed Coke's view on this point. Pa-
cific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. Closer in time to the drafting of the Constitution, Blackstone observed
that persons had a "natural inherent right" not to have their limbs "wantonly
destroyed or disabled." 1 WILLaL BLAcKSToNE, Co mNTARIus *126.
156. This struggle included the Civil War of 1640 and the Revolution of
1688, which deposed the Stuart dynasty. Against the Stuarts' claims of abso-
lute royal power, their opponents raised the powers of Parliament and the re-
straints of English law.
157. The Magna Carta already formed a basic part of the British Constitu-
tion by this time; Parliaments had reenacted it and Kings had reconfirmed it
numerous times during the Middle Ages. Faith Thompson, Parliamentary Con-
firmations of the Great Charter, 38 AM. HIsT. Ruv. 659, 660-64 (1933) (stating
that the Magna Carta had been reconfirmed at least 44 times).
158. See generally WmLLt F. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA: LEGEND AND LEG-
ACY 166-207 (1965) (describing seventeenth century controversies over royal
powers).
159. See generally Riggs, supra note 10, at 963.
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idea emerged that Chapter 39 freedoms originated from the "so-
cial contract," a more profound source than the Magna Carta
itself.
In late seventeenth century England, social contract theory
became the political philosophy of the Whigs, the party that pre-
vailed over the Stuarts in the Glorious Revolution of 1688.160
The theory of a social contract holds that people create political
societies by exchanging promises that set the terms upon which
government functions.161 Beyond that basic point, however, so-
cial contract theorists disagreed among themselves. In John
Locke's version, the social contract guarantees Magna Carta
freedoms, including rights of body, health, and limb.162 In con-
trast, Thomas Hobbes, the founder of social contract theory, ar-
gued that Magna Carta freedoms did not exist at all, because the
social contract had ruled them out.163 This division in social
contract theory would be replayed in an uncannily similar way
within American constitutional law.'64
1. Thomas Hobbes
America's founding fathers had little use for the inventor of
social contract theory. In his magnum opus, Leviathan,165
160. The most famous social contract theorist, John Locke, was an active
Whig, and according to recent scholarship, he was also a participant in Whig
conspiratorial activities against the King. RICHAR ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY
POLITICS AND LOCKE'S Two TREATISES OF GovE mAENT passim (1986). Indeed,
Locke wrote most of his Second Treatise of Government, the classic of social
contract theory, in advance of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, intending the
work as a call to rebellion. See Peter Laslett, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GovE RmNr 46-49 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed.
1698). The book was not published, however, until after the revolution, and it
was widely read as an after-the-fact justification for the events of 1688. Id. at 3.
161. See discussion infra parts II.B.1-2, II.C.1.
162. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
163. See discussion infra part II.B.1.
164. For discussion of the Americans' endorsement of social contract theory,
see for example, BERNARD BAmYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 58-59 (1967) (discussing the American colonists' acceptance of so-
cial contract theory of government); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 90 (1989) ("The American revolutionary and con-
stitutional minds... framed their enterprises on the basis of Lockean political
theory."); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-
1787, at 282-91 (1969) (describing the increasing importance of Locke's social
contract theory in American political thinking after 1776, especially in the
drafting of state constitutions). For discussion of how the seventeeth century
themes and opposition within the theory reemerge in American constitutional
law, see infra parts II.B.3.c-d.
165. THoMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1985) (Head ed.
1651).
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Thomas Hobbes argued that subjects owe absolute obedience to
sovereigns and that rebellion or revolution is always wrong, re-
gardless of government provocation.166 These positions, of
course, completely contradict the views of the Framers. More-
over, Hobbes never used the phrase "life, liberty, or property."167
Yet, he remains an important figure in the history of the Due
Process Clause. His creation, social contract theory, animated
the Framers, launched the modern rights of life and liberty, and
set in motion a dynamic between those rights which still per-
sists. Hobbes is also important because the Framers regarded
his version of the social contract as an anathema. That makes
Hobbes's views significant, albeit negative, clues to the Framers'
intentions.
In general, Hobbes's social contract theory posits two stages
of political life, nature and society, each having a distinctive
kind of "liberty." People surrender natural liberty for civil lib-
erty. The social contract creates civil society and thereby en-
hances human life. This theory of a social bargain contains
three elements: an account of human life in a state of nature,
including an examination of the rights that exist in nature; an
explanation of why people change their natural state and form
political society; and an account of the political society that so-
cial contracts produce, including, crucially, an account of the in-
dividual political rights that result from the contract. 168
Hobbes thought that people lived in a condition of "mere na-
ture" before governments existed. Neither governments nor en-
acted laws restrained anyone's actions.' 69 This was a state of
pure liberty, because Hobbes defined liberty as the "absence of
166. Id. at 228-32, 270.
167. This wording appeared frequently in Stuart England, see infra part
H.B.1, and Hobbes occasionally lapsed into something very close to it. For ex-
ample, he said that political society affords the only means for a person to "se-
cure his life and liberty." HOBBES, supra note 165, at 163. Hobbes rarely used
such expressions, however, and his phrase "life and liberty" has nothing like the
talismanic quality it would acquire from other writers. Moreover, Hobbes be-
lieved that people lose all their natural liberty by seeking the aid of political
society, and that the kind of "liberty" that remains hardly deserves the word.
See discussion infra part II.B.1.
168. See infra notes 169-181 and accompanying text. Locke's theory con-
tains the same general architecture and the same three elements as Hobbes's,
but Locke's interpretation of each element differs significantly. See discussion
infra part H.B.2. The differences produced two dramatically different accounts
of political rights.
169. HOBBES, supra note 165, at 183-88.
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externall [sic]17 ° Impediments,"171 and he counted legal obliga-
tions among those impediments.' 7 2 In this state of uncon-
strained free choice, or liberty, everyone could choose to do
anything, including choosing to take another's life or posses-
sions. Neither possessions nor persons enjoy any protection be-
yond one's own capacity for self defense. This result, a condition
of lawlessness, produces a war of all against all. As Hobbes fa-
mously wrote, "the life of man [in a state of nature was] ...
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."173
In order to secure their "lives'-and, as we shall see, Hob-
bes did not use that word casually-people surrender all of their
natural liberty to a sovereign through the social contract. 174
This is the second element of the theory. Under Hobbes's ver-
sion, the contract creates a sovereign who becomes vested with
the natural liberty that the subjects had enjoyed in mere na-
ture.'7 5 Liberty in a "Common-wealth," 176 as Hobbes called this
new condition of political life, differs radically from the natural
liberty of "mere nature":
The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention...
is not the Libertie of Particular men; but the Libertie of the Common-
wealth .... For as amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war,
of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the
Son, nor to expect from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no
security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So
... every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to
doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie
that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit.1 7 7
In short, the sovereign's liberty to affect its will is the political
liberty of the subjects in a commonwealth. Hobbes reconciled
liberty with absolute power by making them identical. That is
paradoxical if we think of individual liberty as a set of rights
against government; Hobbes obviously did not think that way.
Hobbes did offer, however, a second description of political
liberty that better suits the idea of liberty as rights against
government:
170. Certain authorities frequently quoted in this Article, like Hobbes,
wrote in Old English. To ensure that the device, sic, is not overused, the editors
have not indicated any other variations in spelling or grammar found in the Old
English quotations.
171. HOBBES, supra note 165, at 189.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 186.
174. Id. at 228-39.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 223-39.
177. Id. at 266.
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As for... Lyberties,1 78 they depend on the silence of the Law. In cases
where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the
liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And there-
fore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in
some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the
Soveraignty shall think most convenient. 179
Consistently with the first account, Hobbes identified "liberty"
with an absolute sovereign's will. Now, however, "liberty" re-
lates to subjects' freedom of action, not the sovereign's. Hobbes
had derived a meaning for individual liberty from his idea of un-
fettered sovereign power.
Hobbes insisted that a sovereign cannot give up its powers
over liberty and property. Magna Carta-type restraints on the
sovereign, its protections of liberty or property, are ineffective,
Hobbes claimed, because the social contract settles the sover-
eign's powers once and for all.' s ° Having surrendered natural
liberty to form a commonwealth, Hobbes's social contractors
gained life" in return. "[T]he motive, and end [of the social con-
tractors].., is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in
his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary
of it."18s Thus, Hobbesian "life" encompasses bodily integrity
(the "security of a mans person, in his life"), biological existence
("preserving life"), and an element of quality of life ("the [neces-
sary] means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it.").
These aspects of life describe the social contractors' goals in
surrendering their liberty, but they also supply a basis for a
kind of right within commonwealths:
As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine
Rights of Nature; that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they [like]:
so it is necessarie for mans life, to retaine some; as [the] right to
governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from
place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or
not live well.1 8
2
In this quotation, Hobbes again invested "life" with three differ-
ent aspects: biological existence, bodily integrity, and quality of
178. The full text states, "[ais for other Lyberties." Id. at 271 (emphasis ad-
ded). Hobbes explained that people possess the liberty of defending their own
lives against the sovereign. Id. This right, however, is less important than it
might seem, because the sovereign retains the right to overcome the subject's
resistance. See infra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
179. HOBBES, supra note 165, at 271.
180. Id. at 230 (arguing that, although society is formed by a social contract,
"there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne").
181. Id. at 192.
182. Id. at 211-12.
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life.' 83 Now, however, Hobbes suggested that the only liberties
to survive a transition from "nature" to commonwealth are those
necessary to secure life."
Hobbes confirmed and refined the point elsewhere in Levia-
than. Because the purpose of a social contract is to secure the
contractors' lives, "no man can transferre, or lay down his Right
to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment." 8 4
Those rights not being surrendered, subjects retain them in
Commonwealth, even against the sovereign. Thus, a subject en-
joys a "Liberty to disobey" sovereign commands "to kill, wound,
or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to
abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing,
without which he cannot live."18 5 These are the only commands
that a subject may disobey. Deriving these liberties from a con-
cept of "life," Hobbes reversed the procedure of modern courts
which deduce "life interests" from a concept of "liberty."
Yet, Hobbes's descriptions of the right to disobey are incon-
sistent. His first account extends to "life" in all three of its as-
pects, including quality of life ("all things... without which a
man cannot live, or not live well)."' 8 6 The second account, on the
other hand, omits quality of life. Hobbes said only that a person
can disobey a sovereign's instruction to "abstain from the use of
food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he can-
not live." 8 7
It is easy to see why Hobbes equivocated about quality of
life. Including it seems to give subjects the right to disobey sov-
ereign commands that affect in any way the quality of their
lives.' s8  That would render the supposedly absolute sovereign
183. The same three elements appear in Hobbes's description of the first law
of nature: "[A] man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or
taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he
thinketh it may be best preserved." Id. at 189.
184. Id. at 199. Interestingly, this passage treats imprisonment in the same
way as bodily "destruction."
185. Id. at 269.
186. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
188. Leviathan's frontispiece includes a graphic representation of how the
social contract intermingles the sovereign's existence and the subjects' lives.
See front cover of Leviathan for this portion of the original frontispiece; see also
id. at 73 (reprinting the full frontispiece). The frontispiece depicts a crowned
sovereign towering over a hilly terrain. Id. Small towns and trees dot the land-
scape. Id. From a distance, the sovereign views this scene and appears to be
wearing a rough, chain mail suit. Id. On closer inspection, however, a mass of
small human figures comprise the chain mail suit. Id. These people are not
part of an article of clothing: their mass forms the sovereign's body. Id.
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virtually powerless to command individuals, because almost
anything can affect one's quality of life. It would change Hob-
bes's theory beyond recognition.
Despite the reference to "liv[ing] well," Hobbes's scheme of
retained rights does not include everything that might enhance
a person's life. Many life enhancements result from the institu-
tion of a commonwealth: they are not retained from nature.
Consequently, subjects have no right to disobey the sovereign's
commands relating to these aspects of life. Consider Hobbes's
full description of the deficiencies of "mere nature":
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit
thereof is uncertain and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Nav-
igation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such
things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no
account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of
all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man,
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.1 8 9
Hobbes's reference to "liv[ing] well," then, does not confer a right
to disobey sovereign commands relating to "Industry" or "Arts"
or "commodious Building," even though they are among the
things that separate the life of a commonwealth from the "soli-
tary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" life of mere nature.
Such problems have little practical significance in Levia-
than, given how the rest of Hobbes's theory unfolds. A subject's
right of disobedience, according to Hobbes, imparts no corre-
sponding duty upon a sovereign to respect either the right or the
act of disobedience. A sovereign remains at liberty to kill, maim,
and starve its subjects, despite the retained liberties of the lat-
ter. Moreover, a subject's resistance to a sovereign is bound to
Just as a social contract transforms the liberty of individuals into the sov-
ereign's liberty, it seems to transform the lives of individuals into the sover-
eign's life, at least in the sense that their bodies become his. This image
captures many of the nuances of Hobbes's theory. Under the Hobbesian social
contract, people retain the right not to submit to the sovereign's demands upon
their lives, in the sense of existence or physical integrity. See supra note 185
and accompanying text. The frontispiece shows discrete persons who retain
their individual identities-although their faces are turned toward the sover-
eign-who, together, form the body of the state. See HOBBES, supra note 165, at
73.
In light of this picture, one could theorize that a "good life" and the benefits
of culture were Hobbesian attributes of the collective, the sovereign. All that
was necessary to individual existence and individual physical integrity had to
be preserved because without the individual units, the collective itself could not
exist.
189. See HOBBES, supra note 165, at 186.
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fail,19 0 because no one could assist the subject' 9 1 and everyone is
bound to assist the sovereign against the subject, despite the af-
fected subject's "right" to disobey.192 In the context of modern
constitutional theory, however, this "quality of life" dilemma in
Leviathan assumes considerable importance.
Hobbes gave 'qfe" the kind of expansive definition that "lib-
erty" enjoys today. Hobbesian "life," as we have seen, includes
mere existence, bodily integrity, and, to some degree, things nec-
essary for a good life. Conversely, Hobbesian "liberty" is a de-
nuded concept. Its underlying idea, "absence of restraint," says
nothing about which rights or restraints ought to exist. Thus,
new rights are not inferable from Hobbes's concept of liberty.
The modern view, conceiving of rights as aspects of liberty,
would have seemed incoherent to Hobbes.
This same conception of "liberty" underlies Bork's criticism
of Roe with its insistence that "liberty" is not an intelligible
source of rights.193 There is one important difference, however.
Hobbes made "liberty" subservient to life," but Roe's critic over-
looks "life" entirely.
In an age when "life, liberty, and property" was already a
well-known political formula, Hobbes pioneered the idea that
"life" and "liberty" cannot peacefully co-exist as principles,
whatever the Magna Carta's wording. A competition between
"life" and "liberty" provides the animating force of Leviathan.
His social contractors had to choose between the liberty of na-
ture and the life enhancements of commonwealth; they could not
have both. Hobbes's social contract amounts to a mechanism for
choosing life over liberty. Patrick Henry's famous cry, "give me
liberty, or give me death,"194 precisely reverses the principle of
Leviathan.
Another feature of Hobbes's account deserves notice. Levia-
than does not clearly distinguish between "is" and "ought." Life
and liberty have both attributes. In the end, however, life"
seems more like a fact, and "liberty" more like a right. Hobbes's
social contractors surrender natural liberty for a better life, but
not for a meaningful right to life enforceable against the sover-
190. Id. at 268-69.
191. Id. at 270 ("To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of
another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty.").
192. Id. at 269-71.
193. See discussion supra part I.B.
194. Quoted in MOSES Corr TYLER, PATRICK HENRY 145 (Houghton, Mifflin
& Co. 1898).
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eign.195 Subjects enjoy virtually no rights in a commonwealth,
although a commonwealth enhances their lives. Conversely,
people lead severely diminished lives ("nasty, brutish, and
short") in mere nature, where their liberty gives them a right to
"every thing."1 96
In treating "life" as a fact, and in opposing life and liberty,
Hobbes presaged American constitutional developments. Mod-
em constitutional law also treats life as a fact and liberty as a
right. Further, it too makes one of the two terms predominate.
Whereas Hobbes elevated life over liberty, however, modern con-
stitutional law raises "liberty" over life. Moreover, it fails to rec-
ognize the fundamental opposition between them that Hobbes
did; it proceeds as if it had made no choice at all.
2. John Locke
Locke's Second Treatise on Government powerfully influ-
enced the Framers of the Constitution. It portrays government
as a means of securing life, liberty, and property, and it war-
rants rebellion whenever government fails to secure these
rights.197 Revolutionary era Americans embraced both points,
writing the first into their constitutions and acting on the second
by launching the American Revolution.
195. Subjects in the commonwealth retain the right to disobey sovereign
commands that threaten their lives or bodily integrity. See supra note 185 and
accompanying text. They do not acquire that right, however, from the social
contract; it is the same right that everyone enjoyed in nature. Because all of
the subjects of a commonwealth are bound to assist the sovereign in overcoming
another subject's right of disobedience, one could hardly call the right a sub-
stantial one. See supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
196. See supra text accompanying note 189.
197. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 164, at 27 ("In pamphlet after pamphlet
the American writers cited Locke on natural rights and on the social and gov-
ernmental contract. .. ."); Boni, supra note 8, at 230 (suggesting that 'the
Founders greatly admired John Locke," or at least suggesting that such a claim
would be plausible); id. at 134 (ridiculing the claim that "in order to understand
the American Constitution... one must study not John Locke or even James
Madison, but a modem German Marxist"); RODNEY L. MOTT, DuE PROCESS OF
LAw: A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS
FOLLOWED BY CouRrs IN THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF "LAW OF THE
LAND" 90 (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1926) ("[In the realm of political theory the au-
thority of John Locke and the leaders of the Whig revolution of 1688 was practi-
cally unchallenged. It would seem.., that as regards both law and political
science, colonial thought in the middle of the eighteenth century was very simi-
lar to English thought at the end of the seventeenth century."); RicHARDs, supra
note 164, at 78-97 (discussing Lockean theory as the basis for American consti-
tutional thinking). But see infra note 314 (discussing Garry Wills's view that
Locke's influence on the Declaration of Independence has been overrated).
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In fact, Locke had adopted Hobbes's basic theoretical frame-
work, although the Second Treatise arrives at conclusions radi-
cally different from Hobbes's. Locke, like Hobbes, described a
state of nature, a social contract, and a transition to civil society.
He differed with Hobbes, however, on two basic points. Locke
insisted that "life" encompasses the life of all humanity. Locke
also had a different conception of when life constitutes an en-
forceable right. Both differences emerge in Locke's account of a
"law of nature."
Locke understood the "laws of nature" to command mutual
preservation, not merely self-preservation, as Hobbes believed.
While Hobbes described the "law of nature"198 as counseling ag-
gression against others,1 99 Locke told an entirely different story.
In a pivotal paragraph of The Second Treatise,200 Locke wrote as
follows:
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges
every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who
will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought
to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions,... Every
one . . . is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station
wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Man-
kind, and may not unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take away,
or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the
Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another.
20 1
Like Hobbes, then, Locke began with an expansive concept of
"life." In the quoted passage, Locke derived all other rights-
liberty, health, limb, and goods-by exploiting ambiguities in
the words "life" and "preservation." He began, as Hobbes had,
with "life" as self preservation, or simply remaining alive.
"Every one," Locke wrote, "is bound to preserve himself, and not
to quit his Station wilfully," which is to say, not to commit sui-
cide. Yet, that meaning expands over the course of the para-
graph into a broader right of "life."
198. Hobbes defined law of nature as "a Precept, or generall Rule, found out
by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his
life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by
which he thinketh it [life] may be best preserved." HOBBES, supra note 165, at
189.
199. "[Tlhere is nothing... [a person] can make use of, that may not be a
help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; [and] It followeth,
that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one
anothers body." Id. at 189-90.
200. In 1776, Virginia adopted this paragraph in its Declaration of Rights,
which was a model for the Constitution's Bill of Rights. See discussion infra
part HI.B.
201. See LocIc, supra note 160, at 271 (emphasis omitted).
[Vol. 78:585622
"LIFE" AND "LIBERTY"
The duty to preserve one's own life became the duty to pre-
serve everyone's life ("by the like reason .. .ought he ... to
preserve the rest of Mankind"). "Preserving" life thus means
"not impair[ing]" life. Not impairing life, in turn, entails pro-
tecting a person's liberty, health, limb, and goods. The duty of
refraining from suicide, with which Locke began the paragraph,
turns into everyone's entitlement to a full life, by the end of the
paragraph. In this way, Locke derived all natural rights, includ-
ing "liberty," from the concept of "life."
Another ambiguity reinforces this conclusion. Locke closed
his paragraph by invoking a duty not to "take away, or impair
the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Lib-
erty, Health, Limb or Goods of another."20 2 Here, the word
"Preservation" may relate to "Life" alone, or it may relate to the
entire phrase that follows, depending on how one reads the
comma after "Life." One interpretation deems "Liberty, Health,
Limb or Goods" to be things that "tend(] to the Preservation of
the Life." They matter, on this reading, only because of their
connection with life. Locke's starting premises about self-pres-
ervation bear the weight of this interpretation. On the other
hand, this interpretation fails to explain the panoply of natural
rights Locke posited in the Second Treatise. Liberty and goods
become superfluous, deserving protection if, and only if, "life" de-
mands it.
According to the second interpretation, "Liberty," "Health,"
"Limb," and "Goods" warrant preservation in their own right;
not merely as means of preserving life. This reading does ac-
count for the full panoply of natural rights. It fails to explain,
however, how those rights follow from the duty of "not quitting
one's station," the narrow sense of self-preservation that was
Locke's starting point. Evidently, "life" has come to mean not
just existence, but a full or good or unimpeded "life." Other
rights follow from that broad idea of "life." Like Hobbes, then,
Locke treated "life" as an expansive concept that encompasses
the basic elements people seek in their lives. Unlike the author
of Leviathan, however, Locke made "life" a broadly enforceable
right, indeed, the source of other rights.
For example, Locke derived property rights from his expan-
sive idea of "life."20 3 "Men, being once born," Locke explained,
202. Id.
203. Interestingly, Locke is widely regarded as the philosopher of "property"
rights. See, e.g., RicHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAmNGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF E~mqFr DoMAN, 9-18 (1985) (discussing Locke and property rights).
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"have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat
and Drink, and such other things, as Nature affords for their
Subsistence."20 4 The right to life, or "preservation," therefore
accounts for the first form of property, the right to possess food,
as well the right to be sustained in other ways. A parallel argu-
ment, based on revelation, follows similar lines: God gave the
world to people in common, and also gave "them reason to make
use of [the world] to the best advantage of Life."20 5 In so making
use of the world, people employ things and land: in short, prop-
erty. Thus, property exists in the service of "life."
Locke also related "property" and personhood: "Though the
Earth... be common to all Men," he wrote, "yet every Man has a
Property in his own Person,"20 6 that is, in his own "life." From
this comes property of every description:
The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and
joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Prop-
erty ... For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the La-
bourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to,
at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for
others.20
7
Thus, property rights arise when labor "joyns" a part of the
world to some person's life.
Likewise, Locke portrayed "liberty" as subordinate to
"life."208 Lockean "liberty" is not the prime right, or the source
of other rights, or even a right of the same high order as life. In
each respect, it differs from the modern concept of "liberty." The
condition of nature is "a State of Liberty";20 9 Locke argued, it is
"not a State of Licence,"210 because "though Man in that State
[of Nature] ha[s] an uncontroleable Liberty, to dispose of his
Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy himself,
or so much as any Creature in his Possession, but where some
nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it."211 Here, "lib-
204. LOCKE, supra note 160, at 285.
205. Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 287 (emphasis omitted).
207. Id. at 287-88 (emphasis omitted).
208. See supra text accompanying note 201 (quoting Locke's passage intro-
ducing natural rights which is part of a larger argument about liberty and the
state of nature).
209. LocKE, supra note 160, at 270 (emphasis omitted).
210. Id. (emphasis omitted).
211. Id. at 270-71.
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erty" seems to mean "absence of restraint,"212 as it does in Levi-
athan, but Locke was denying that "liberty" in nature is this raw
liberty. For even in nature, Lockean liberty is limited by consid-
erations pertaining to life; preservation of life, not liberty, is
Locke's starting point. From this beginning, "liberty" follows the
contours of the right of "life."
This "liberty" is an anomalous right. Although Locke often
invoked liberty in the same breath as life and property, the
rights of life and property in fact delimit liberty. Indeed, all of
natural law limits liberty, even in a state of nature where "all
Men are naturally in... a State of perfect Freedom to order
their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as
they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without
asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man."213
Though liberty is so limited, it does not reciprocally limit or con-
strain other rights.214 One does not ask, for example, whether
life" and "liberty" point toward opposite conclusions in a partic-
ular case; liberty is always subordinate to life.215 Its subordina-
tion raises questions of what kind of right "liberty" really is, and
whether it is a right like life or property at all.
At one point, the Second Treatise mentions a liberty "of in-
nocent Delights."216 If Locke had any sense of "liberty" as a free
standing right to autonomy, functioning like rights of life and
property, this is the only place in the Second Treatise where he
expressed it. Locke never defined "innocent delights," and,
again, there is only one reference to the concept. It seems likely,
however, that "innocent delights" are actions that do not violate
someone else's rights ("innocent") and that do not breach the ac-
tor's own duties. If so, "innocent delights" constitute the
residual category of actions that are not otherwise prohibited.
Something is an innocent delight because one wants it, and be-
cause no natural right or duty happens to require forbearance.
This points to an idea that is implicit in Locke's account.
Any interference with another person must have some reason for
212. Similarly, Locke stated that no one has the "Liberty to destroy him-
self," meaning that restraints exist on everyone's ability to do so. See text ac-
companying note 211.
213. LocKE, supra note 160, at 269 (emphasis omitted) (other emphasis
added).
214. Thus, a kind of short circuit exists in Locke's use of "liberty." Natural
rights limit natural liberty; yet "liberty" is one of the natural rights.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 201 and 211.
216. LocKE, supra note 160, at 352 ("For in the State of Nature, to omit the
liberty he has of innocent Delights, a Man has two Powers .... [namely, pre-
serving himself and others, and punishing violations of the laws of nature]").
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it: either protection of life, protection of property, or the ill-de-
fined "nobler use"217 considerations which Locke invoked at the
outset. That represents a basic principle of liberty in the Second
Treatise. It is a weak principle, however, because any valid rea-
son for interfering overcomes it. Indeed, it recalls Hobbesian lib-
erty: anything is permissible so long as the sovereign has not
forbidden it. If Hobbesian liberty is what remains after the sov-
ereign issues its commands, Lockean "innocent delights" are
what remain after one satisfies natural law and right, and those
natural rights are extensive. Locke's liberty is not really an in-
dependent force; it is what remains after every other force exerts
itself.
Locke's treatment of natural rights yields a state of nature
dramatically different from Hobbes's. While Hobbes imagined
an entirely unrestrained liberty,21s Locke saw a liberty entirely
constrained by right. In Locke's state of nature, people enjoy
natural rights of life and property. Moreover, everyone may "ex-
ecute" the law of nature and protect their natural rights by pun-
ishing offenders.219 Nature, therefore, includes both a system of
rights and a method of enforcing them.
Even so, nature leaves much to be desired on Locke's ac-
count. Everyone interprets and "executes" the laws of nature ac-
cording to their own lights. Bias and self-interest inevitably
predispose many people to misinterpret.220 No "known and in-
different Judge" with "Authority to determine all differences"
221
exists in nature, and the power to "back and support"222 judg-
ments about the law of nature is inadequate, because it relies
entirely upon private action. The Lockean social contract reme-
dies these problems by creating a "known and indifferent Judge"
of natural right, with power to enforce its judgments. The
advent of this judge produces "political society," or a
Commonwealth.
In Leviathan, contractors surrender the unrestrained lib-
erty of nature for the prospect of an enhanced life in the com-
monwealth.223 Lockean social contractors, by contrast, never
have unrestrained liberty in nature, and they always enjoy an
217. Id. at 271 (arguing that one may not "destroy" himself or any other
"Creature" unless "some nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it").
218. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
219. LOCKE, supra note 160, at 272-76.
220. Id. at 275-76, 350-53.
221. Id. at 351 (emphasis omitted).
222. Id.
223. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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entitlement to life and estate, albeit an entitlement with an im-
perfect method of enforcement in the state of nature. These con-
tractors could not trade an unrestrained liberty that they never
possessed, and they would not trade for a condition less desira-
ble than nature, where they already enjoyed natural rights.
These Lockean contractors create political society to preserve
their "Lives, Liberties and Estates," 224 the things guaranteed to
them by the Law of Nature, through the institution of a better
method of enforcement. The social contract effects this change.
Locke's "known and indifferent judge," the enforcer of natural
rights, however, is not a judiciary. It is the legislature.225 Laws
are the arbiters, but the existence of these laws, in turn, affects
natural right. Property and liberty undergo important changes
in political society.
The Second Treatise has surprisingly little to say regarding
property in political society. "[I]n Governments," Locke wrote,
"the Laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of
land is determined by positive constitutions."2 26 This perhaps
suggests that natural property rights are completely subject to
laws in political society. Locke did not mean, however, that reg-
ulation could obliterate natural property rights. "The Supream
Power," he wrote, "cannot take from any Man any part of his
Property without his own consent."22 7
By "consent," Locke may have meant "collective consent,"
specifically, the consent of the people's representatives in the
Legislature. 228 More likely, he had a stringent concept of what
constituted a taking. "Taking" for Locke seems to mean "appro-
priation" by the government, rather than merely making some-
one's property less valuable:
I have truly no Property in that, which another can by right take from
me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to
think, that the Supream or Legislative Power ... can do what it will,
and dispose of the Estates of the Subject arbitrarily, or take any part of
them at pleasure....
224. LOCKE, supra note 160, at 350.
225. Id. at 324-25.
226. Id. at 302.
227. Id. at 360 (emphasis omitted).
228. Laslett, Editorial Notes to LocE, supra note 160, at 360-61 n. accom-
panying lines 5-7 (observing that "Locke leaves it possible to suppose that con-
sent is collective, not individual."). But see LocxE, supra note 160, at 361
(arguing that the legislature-presumably the agency that could give "collec-
tive" consent-cannot take "any part of the Subjects Property, without their
own consent") (emphasis omitted) (other emphasis added).
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[Hlowever... [the Legislature] may have power to make Laws for the
regulating of Property between the Subjects one amongst another, yet
[it] can never have a Power to take to [itself] ... the whole or any part
of the Subjects Property, without their own consent. For this would be
in effect to leave them no Property at all.2
29
Natural property rights thus survived the transition to political
society, where they limited legislative powers and, at the same
time, were subject to legislative limitation and "regulation."
Locke offered a much fuller account of how the social con-
tract affects the liberty of the state of nature. Locke carefully
distinguished23 0 between "natural liberty" and the liberty of per-
sons in political society, which he called "civil liberty":
T[he] Natural Liberty of Man is to be free from any Superior Power on
Earth, and not to be under the Will or Legislative Authority of Man,
but to have only the Law of Nature for his Rule. The Liberty of Man, in
Society, is to be under no other Legislative Power, but that established,
by consent, in the Common-wealth, nor under the Dominion of any
Will, or Restraint of any Law, but what the Legislative shall enact,
according to the Trust put in it. [That trust, according to Locke, re-
quires the legislature to comply with natural law.] Freedom... is not
... [a] Liberty for every one to do what he lists [likes], to live as he
pleases, and not to be tyed by any Laws: But Freedom of Men under
Government, is, to have a standing Rule to live by, common to every
one of that Society, and made by the Legislative Power erected in it; A
Liberty to follow my own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes
not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbi-
trary Will of another Man. As Freedom of Nature is to be under no
other restraint but the Law of Nature.
2 3 1
In short, laws enacted by a duly constituted legislature do not
abridge civil liberty, provided the laws comport with natural
right; whereas natural liberty, as shown earlier,232 is itself not a
determinant of what natural right requires.
This requirement of consistency with natural right sepa-
rates Locke's and Hobbes's ideas of civil liberty. Hobbes would
have agreed with Locke that civil liberty was the "[1]iberty to
follow my own Will... where the rule prescribes not." That ech-
oes Hobbes's idea of liberty as the choices a sovereign left unreg-
ulated.23 3 Hobbes envisioned social contractors surrendering
their natural liberty to the sovereign, however, with liberty in a
commonwealth becoming the sovereign's freedom to do as it
229. LocKS, supra note 160, at 360-61 (emphasis omitted).
230. In contrast, American courts during the Lochner era equated constitu-
tional "liberty" with "natural liberty." See discussion infra part V.A.
231. LocKE, supra note 160, at 283-84 (emphasis omitted).
232. See supra notes 208-214 and accompanying text.
233. See discussion supra part II.B.1.
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pleases. 234 Natural right is not a political constraint on the
Hobbesian sovereign's choices; virtually all sovereign enact-
ments bind the subjects. 23 5 In contrast, Locke thought of civil
liberty as enforcing and securing natural right.
Thus, Hobbes and Locke had radically different conceptions
of law and liberty. Hobbes defined liberty as freedom from re-
straint.236 Given that definition, even duly enacted laws consti-
tute restraints abridging natural liberty because they limit
freedom of action. Hobbes therefore regarded all laws as in-
fringements of natural liberty. For him, the idea of laws that
enhance liberty was just nonsense. By contrast, Locke offered
precisely that idea of liberty:
For Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as the direc-
tion of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, and
prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those under that
Law. Could they be happier without it, the Law, as an useless thing
would of it self vanish; and that ill deserves the Name of Confinement
which hedges us in only from Bogs and Precipices. So that, however it
may be mistaken, the end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to
preserve and enlarge Freedom: For in all the states of created beings
capable of Laws, where there is no Law, there is no Freedom. For Lib-
erty is to be free from restraint and violence from others which cannot
be, where there is no Law: But Freedom is not, as we are told, A Lib-
erty for every Man to do what he lists [likes]: (For who could be free,
when every other Man's Humour might domineer over him?) But a
Liberty to dispose, and order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, Posses-
sions, and his whole Property, within the Allowance of those Laws
under which he is; and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of
another, but freely follow his own. 2 3 7
234. See supra text accompanying note 174.
235. In theory, the subjects of a Hobbesian commonwealth have a right to
disobey sovereign commands that threaten their lives. See discussion supra
part H.B.1. This could not be described, however, as a political right because a
sovereign remains free to subdue subjects who assert this so-called "right." See
supra text accompanying notes 189-191. In addition, the sovereign's other sub-
jects remain bound to support the sovereign against the subject whose life is
threatened. See supra text accompanying note 192.
Indeed, there were no conditions of human life-apart from the moment of
negotiating the social contract-when Hobbes treated natural law as more than
hortatory. Hobbesian sovereigns should obey natural law, but need not do so.
Persons in a state of nature also should obey natural law, but apart from the
command of self preservation, circumstances prevent them from doing so.
236. See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
237. LocKE, supra note 160, at 305-06 (emphasis omitted). The relation be-
tween "freedom" and "liberty" in this passage is unclear. At one point, Locke
defined "freedom" in terms of "liberty" ("Freedom is not... A Liberty for every
Man to do what he lists"); but at another point, he defined "liberty" in terms of
being "free" ("For Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others
which cannot be, where there is no Law"). Still elsewhere it appears that lib-
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Far from meaning "absence of restraint," Lockean civil liberty
and natural liberty depend on compliance with valid restraints.
According to Locke, enacted laws may be invalid for substantive
or procedural reasons. Substantively, the laws must comport
with natural right, while procedurally they must issue from a
duly constituted authority, such as a government or a legisla-
ture established by a social contract. Substantive liberty con-
sists of respect for natural right plus the principle of "innocent
delights," the idea that any interference with someone's actions
requires a valid reason. 238 Procedural liberty is the right of liv-
ing under a duly constituted government.
In Locke's theory, the laws of nature, the goals of civil soci-
ety, and the purposes of individual actors are identical: each
consists of the preservation of life, liberty, and estate.239 This
identity is a hallmark of his political philosophy. Yet, Locke de-
scribed these laws, goals, and purposes using numerous differ-
ent phrases. For example, in The Second Treatise he referred to
"Life,... Liberty, Health, Limb... [and] Goods";2 40 "Lives, Lib-
erties, and Estates";2 41 "Life, Health, Liberty, or Posses-
sions";242 "Estate, Liberty, Limbs and Life";243 "Lives, Liberties
erty is freedom, and freedom is liberty ("For in all the states of created beings
capable of Laws, where there is no Law, there is no Freedom. For Liberty is to
be free from restraint and violence"). Then again, sometimes "liberty" seems to
mean "raw liberty" or "absence of restraint" ("Liberty for every man to do what
he lists"); and sometimes it means "liberty under law" (e.g., the last sentence).
Without referring to either this passage or the word "liberty," Laslett re-
marks on Locke's "extraordinary" failure to define his terms in the Second Trea-
tise. Laslett, Introduction to LocxE, supra note 160, at 84. Laslett also notes
the similarity between this Second Treatise passage and a Leviathan passage.
In Leviathan, Hobbes observed as follows: "For the use of Lawes' is... to direct
and keep [the People] in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves.., as Hedges
are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way." Laslett, Editorial
Notes to LocKE, supra note 160, at 305-06 n. accompanying line 16 (quoting
HOBBES, supra note 165, at 388). Hobbes never recognized, however, a right or
a liberty to be free of bad laws, a right that is central to Locke's Second Treatise.
Nor would Hobbes have accepted Locke's claim that an essential part of "lib-
erty" is being subjected to laws which comport with natural right.
238. See supra notes 216-217 and accompanying text.
239. The obligations of parents to children also fall under the heading of
preserving (the child's) life, liberty, and estate. LocxE, supra note 160, at 303-
18.
240. Id. at 271.
241. Id. at 350.
242. Id. at 271.
243. Id. at 313 (referring to interests of a child that the parent must
protect).
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and Fortunes";24 "Lives or Goods";245 "Lives or Liberties"; 246
and "Liberties and Properties." 247 A more comprehensive state-
ment appears in Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration,248 in
which he invoked "Life, Liberty, Health and Indolency of Body;
and the Possession of outward things, such as Money, Lands,
Houses, Furniture and the like."2 49 This version renders prop-
erty as a list of possessions, and adds "Health" and "Indolency of
Body"250 to "Life."
These variations are not as surprising as they seem. No ca-
nonical text, such as the Due Process Clause, fixed Locke's
choice of words. Although the Magna Carta inspired Locke's for-
mulae, the Second Treatise insists that life, liberty, and estate
derive from Reason and the social contract, not from the Great
Charter.251 Locke's variations are also consistent with the rhet-
oric of his age and party.25 2
244. Id. at 359.
245. Id. at 311 (referring to power of parents).
246. Id. at 312 (referring to power of parents).
247. Id. at 367. See Laslett, Editorial Notes to LOCKE, supra note 160, at
323 n. accompanying para. 87 (surveying the Second Treatise's various phras-
ings of the natural rights formula).
248. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (James H. Tully ed.,
1983) (William Popple trans., 1689).
249. Id. at 26.
250. See 7 OxFoRD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 884-85 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "in-
dolency" as "Freedom from pain; a state of rest or ease, in which neither pain
nor pleasure is felt.") (cross-referencing "indolence" definition (2) and citing
Locke's usage).
251. At one point, Locke evoked the language of Chapter 39, observing that
the power of a legislature cannot be used to "destroy, enslave, or designedly to
impoverish the Subjects." LOCKE, supra note 160, at 357. In general, however,
the more modern formulas-life, liberty or estate" and its variants-suggest
that the Magna Carta is not the source of these rights.
252. By this time, the language of fundamental rights had a modern, ab-
stract cast, but the phrasings varied. For example, political writers invoked:
"lives and liberties," A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN IN THE CITY, TO ONE IN THE
COUNTRY, CONCERNING THE BILL FOR DISABLING THE DUKE OF YORK TO INHERIT
THE IMPERIAL CROWN OF THIS REALM, 12-13 (1680), quoted in ASHCRAFT, supra
note 160, at 190; "lives, liberties, and estates," cited in ASHCRAFr, supra note
160, at 206 n.107 (quoting from FRANCIS S. RONALDS, THE ATTEMPTED WHIG
REVOLUTION OF 1678-1681, at 13 (1974)); and "lives, liberties, and properties,"
cited in ASHCRAFT, supra note 160, at 291 (quoting LAURENCE ECHERD, THE HIS-
TORY OF ENGLAND 998-99 (1720)). Another version of the litany added a fourth
element: "laws, liberties, lives and estates." ASHCRAFT, supra note 160, at 315
(emphasis added) (quoting PAPERS OF THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY, Public
Records Office, London). Still another writer inveighed against the arbitrary
power of kings to "dispose of... [the subjects'] lands, goods, persons, liberty and
property," id. at 203 (quoting WIUAM LAWRENCE, MARRIAGE BY THE MORAL
LAW OF GOD VINDICATED 324 (1680)), a phrasing that rendered the traditional
freedom from "destruction" in terms of protecting "persons," rather than "lives."
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Obviously, Locke's failure to mention a right at one point or
another does not mean that he intended to exclude it.253 Some
formulations of his exclude every right-life, liberty, and estate,
as well as health, limb, and body. Although Locke mentioned
"health" and 'limb" less often than "life," and used the phrase
"indolency of body" only once, he still believed that the laws of
nature and the purposes of the social contract guarantee those
rights. Within the social contract framework it could hardly be
otherwise; no one would agree to social arrangements that im-
periled their health, limbs, or body. Locke's equation of natural
right with the personal objectives of the social contractors en-
sures protection for those rights.
Because the Second Treatise often omits a specific reference
to health, limb, and body, the question arises of what other
terms encompass those rights. "Property," "liberty," and "life"
are all viable possibilities. Locke spoke of a "property" in one's
person, for example, a property that presumably could include
health, limb, and body. Again, because "liberty" includes every
natural right, a state depriving someone of the full use of her
body or her health would not be a state of "liberty." "Life," how-
ever, is still the most likely candidate for embodying these con-
cepts. Life represents the fundamental Lockean right.
Moreover, Locke's fullest statements treat health, limb, and
body as aspects of "life." Furthermore, those who followed Locke
explicitly treat health, limb, and body under the rubric of
life. 2 5 4
3. Some Comparisons
The present day, expansive notion of "liberty" differs radi-
cally from Lockean liberty in several ways. First, unlike modern
According to Ashcraft, Whigs urging the exclusion of James II, a Catholic, from
the throne adopted the slogan "No Popery, No Slavery and Liberty and Prop-
erty," id. at 224, which recalls Locke's treatment of slavery as a violation of the
right to life. See discussion infra part II.B.3.a.
253. The alternative is to suppose that Locke changed his mind, wildly and
erratically, throughout the book-here considering "life" a natural right, there
regarding "life" as nothing-without even commenting on the discrepancies.
254. For discussion, see infra part 1.C.1 (discussing Hutcheson's views) and
part II.C.2 (discussing Blackstone's views).
The modern interpretation of life, liberty or property" makes it easy to
overlook broader meanings of the word "life." Beyond mere survival, we want to
have a "life." Nor is this broad idea of life confined to animate things. Robert
Bork, for example, writes of "[p~rofessions and academic disciplines that once
possessed a life and structure of their own" but have succumbed to "the belief
that nothing matters beyond politically desirable results." BoRK, supra note 8,
at 1 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 78:585632
"LIFE" AND "LIBERTY'6
"liberty," Lockean "liberty" is incapable of yielding new rights,
nor does it provide a benchmark for testing the validity of
laws.255 Further, Lockean "liberty" seems superfluous in the
formula of "life, liberty, and property," whereas modern "liberty"
seems to be the most important of the three rights.256 Precisely
because of such differences, social contract theory places modern
developments into perspective.257 This section argues that the
modern construction of "life, liberty, and property" mirrors
Locke's construction, using the same three elements to produce
an inverted structure.258
a. Liberty as a Summary Term
For a law to be valid under the modern view of liberty, it
must measure up to liberty's standards; liberty affords a bench-
mark of a law's validity.259 Locke turned that view on its head.
Except for the minimal principle of "innocent delights," Locke
did not test the substantive validity of laws against the standard
of liberty; his "liberty" has virtually no independent substantive
content.260
Locke's "liberty" is almost entirely the product of other
forces and concepts: the rights of life and property, the social
contract, and, in civil society, the dynamics of legitimate govern-
ment.261 To understand these forces is to completely under-
stand Locke's theory of rights. With the possible exception of
"innocent delights," no reference to political "liberty" is even nec-essary.26 2 Having discovered an infringement of the right of life,
255. See discussion infra part H.B.3.a.
256. See discussion infra part H.B.3.b.
257. See discussion infra part II.B.3.c (comparing Locke's and Hobbes's the-
ories to Ely's and Bork's).
258. See discussion infra part II.B.3.d.
259. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
260. It is true that any violation of Lockean natural right also infringes
Lockean political liberty. That follows from Locke's definition, making the ob-
servance of natural right an essential part of liberty. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 231-233. This connection, however, does not lend weight or
explanatory power to the concept of liberty. One still does not look to "liberty"
in order to decide whether a law violates natural right; rather, one looks to
natural right to decide whether there has been a violation of liberty.
261. See discussion supra part I.B.2.
262. It may be tempting to ask why Locke treated liberty as he did. To a
degree, the question is unfair: we might as well ask why anyone fails to regard
liberty as Locke did. In another way, the question is almost unanswerable.
Conceivably, Locke was concerned about the chaos of the commonwealth years,
when England was riven by civil war; perhaps he connected that period to an
unbridled conception of liberty. Or, he may have reacted to the authoritarian-
ism that Hobbesian "liberty" produced. Then again, Locke's patrons and polit-
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for example, it conveys nothing new to also call it an infringe-
ment of "liberty."
The modern, expansive idea of "liberty" is often considered
an outgrowth from the idea of "freedom from physical re-
straint."263 Yet, Locke rejected the idea of "freedom from physi-
cal restraint" even as the starting point, or core meaning, of
liberty. For one thing, Lockean liberty depends on the existence
of some restraints.264 What hedges us in from '"Bogs and
Precipices'"-literally, a physical restraint-enhances, rather
than denies, our liberty.265 Moreover, Locke treated unjust dep-
rivations of freedom as infringements of the right of life, even
when physical liberty is literally lost. Slavery, for example, rep-
resents a loss of "[f]reedom from Absolute, Arbitrary Power."266
Locke summarized why slavery is wrong as follows:
Freedom from Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and
closely joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with it,
but by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together. For a Man, not
having the Power of his own Life, cannot, by Compact, or his own Con-
sent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute,
Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his Life, when he pleases.
2 67
Even a brief, unjust restriction on someone's movements consti-
tutes a threat to life:
This makes it Lawful for a Man to kill a Thief, who has not in the least
hurt him, nor declared any design upon his Life, any farther then by
the use of Force, so to get him in his Power, as to take away his Money,
or what he pleases from him: because using force, where he has no
Right, to get me into his Power, let his pretence be what it will, I have
no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my Liberty, would
not when he had me in his Power, take away every thing else.
2 68
Lacking independent analytical power and incapable of ex-
plaining even the freedom from physical restraint, Lockean lib-
erty has the power to summarize political rights. This power
follows from the fact that any infringement of natural right and
ical allies were aristocrats; they perhaps had a sense of order that was
inconsistent with an unbridled concept of liberty.
263. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
264. See supra text accompanying note 237.
265. See supra text accompanying note 237.
266. LocKE, supra note 160, at 284 (emphasis omitted).
267. Id. (emphasis omitted). Locke allowed for slavery as an incident of law-
ful conquest because the lawful conqueror would have had the right to take the
captive's life. Id. He thought that slavery arose when someone "forfeited his
own Life, by some Act that deserves Death" and the person to whom the life was
forfeited "delay to take it, and make use of him to his own Service." Id.
268. Id. at 279-80 (emphasis omitted). Similarly, Hobbes deemed freedom of
movement a "right... necessarie for mans life." See supra note 182 and accom-
panying text.
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any deviation from the social contract are, on Locke's definition,
also violations of "liberty."269 One could summarize Locke's
political theory by observing that people are entitled to "liberty,"
although the concept of "liberty" itself adds little or nothing of
its own. Lockean "liberty" is like a logo on a building: eliminate
the logo, and the structure remains the same. Indeed, Locke
said that he intended to use the word "property," rather than
"liberty," to stand for the rights of life, liberty, and estate.270
Although the Second Treatise often uses "property" in the nar-
rower sense, as a synonym for "estate" (for example, in the ac-
count of how "property" arises from labor and derives from "life")
and often uses "liberty" in a broader sense (for example, in
Locke's discussion of the state of nature as a state of "liberty"),
the inconsistencies of usage do not matter: they do not change
the structure of his theory.271 Whether the logo atop Locke's
theory reads "liberty" or "property," the theory's content and
structure stay the same.
Nonetheless it remains significant that Lockean "liberty"
has the potential to summarize the theory of political right.
Locke designed "liberty" with that potential in mind. He did not
have to attach the label "liberty" to states that honor natural
rights; Locke chose to do so. The likely explanation is that "lib-
erty" functioned as a summary term for civil rights long before
Locke wrote the Second Treatise. Had Locke ignored that usage,
his discussion would not seem to be an analysis of "liberty" at
all. For that reason, Lockean "liberty" also has the capacity to
designate all of our rights.272 Like a hollow shell, Locke's polit-
ical "liberty" can contain all of our rights. One hundred years
later, American revolutionaries used "liberty" as a summary
269. Recall that Lockean "liberty" connotes respect for natural rights (sub-
stantive liberty) and the existence of a duly created government, consistent
with the social contract. See discussion supra part H.B.2.
270. LocxE, supra note 160, at 350. The broader meaning of"property" was
common usage in the late seventeenth century. Laslett, Editorial Notes to
LocxE, supra note 160, at 102-03. At one point, Hobbes even followed it by
observing that "[oif things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are
his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,) those that concern
conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living." HOBBES, supra
note 165, at 382-83 (emphasis added).
271. For discussion of Locke's inconsistent usage, see Laslett, Editorial
Notes to LocKE, supra note 160, at 102 (noting that Locke often used "property"
in the narrow sense).
272. Hobbes also labored to reconcile his unique conception of"liberty" with
accepted usage. At one point, he defined political "liberty" as all the activities
the sovereign had left unregulated. See discussion supra part I.B.1.
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term and thought of themselves as Lockeans. 273 Then, almost
300 years later, American courts began to derive natural rights
from liberty, the reverse of Locke's procedure, and virtually no
one noticed the difference. 274
b. The Meaning of "Liberty" in the Natural Rights Formula
Discerning Locke's intended meaning for "liberty" requires
additional analysis of phrases such as "life, limb, health, liberty
and goods" 275 and "life, liberty and estate." The meaning of
these references to "liberty" must be inferred from the Second
Treatise as a whole. First, 'iberty" means that only laws en-
acted by a duly constituted legislature-or, in a state of nature,
only individual acts that enforce natural right-carry binding
force. 276 This is a kind of "procedural" liberty, a right of freedom
from restraint unless the restraint issues from a particular
source. In addition, "liberty" connotes the minimal principle of
"innocent delights," the idea that every restraint of a person re-
quires some valid reason.277 Standing alone, "life" and "prop-
erty" and "natural right" do not convey these ideas, and to that
extent, Lockean "liberty" is not superfluous. Beyond the mini-
mal principle of innocent delights, however, the liberty" of "life,
liberty and estate" lacks any substantive content of its own.
"Liberty" does not even tell us when freedom of movement can
be restricted; Locke thought that "life" performs that function,
as the example of the "thief" shows.2 78 "Life" and "property"-
not "liberty"-distinguish substantively permissible restraints
from impermissible ones in Locke's theory.
As noted earlier, the word "liberty" can summarize Locke's
political theory, including the entitlement to natural rights. In
the phrase "life, liberty and estate," and in Locke's other word-
ings of the natural rights formula, however, liberty" does not
even do that. If it did, the phrase "life, liberty and property"
would suffer from the redundancy noted earlier in connection
with the modern view: "life" and "property" would be superflu-
273. See discussion infra part I.A.
274. See discussion infra part IV.A.
275. This problem is the reverse of one that arises under modern definitions
of "liberty." The modern view sees the "liberty" of the Due Process Clause as a
comprehensive source of rights. If "liberty" protects rights of life and property,
however, the words "life" and "property" become superfluous. In the Second
Treatise, the problem arises whether "liberty" is superfluous.
276. See discussion supra pp. 629-30 and text accompanying note 237 (en-
acted laws) and text accompanying note 219 (state of nature).
277. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
278. See supra text accompanying note 268.
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ous. We would be entitled to life and property, and we would
also be entitled to "liberty," which includes life and property.
This interpretation of Second Treatise "liberty" is of interest
because it parallels Ely's and Bork's interpretation of "liberty" in
the Due Process Clause.279 Those critics, as noted earlier, deny
that due process "liberty" has any substantive meaning.280 If
the preceding analysis is correct, the Second Treatise seemingly
supports their interpretation. 28'
In fact, the Second Treatise anticipates two modern and
seemingly inconsistent approaches to the Due Process Clause.
Locke's treatment of "liberty," as just discussed, supports that
due process "liberty" lacks substantive content. At the same
time, the Second Treatise as a whole, the social contract idea of
"Iife," and the idea that "liberty" standing alone incorporates
natural rights support the view that the Due Process Clause in-
cludes a comprehensive system of substantive, natural rights.
c. Locke and Hobbes; Ely and Bork
Despite social contract theory's age and philosophical focus,
it sheds light on Ely's and Bork's respective approaches to the
Due Process Clause. Ely's work resembles Locke's theory, at
least up to a point, whereas Bork's views often parallel Hobbes's
ideas.
Although Ely and Bork offer similar criticisms of Roe, their
approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment differ.282 Bork reads
constitutional "liberty" as meaning "freedom from restraint," the
freedom to do as one pleases, which is precisely Hobbes's mean-
ing.283 The definition makes it impossible to single out particu-
279. See discussion supra part I.B. Bork, however, would not accept the
principle of innocent delights, because he denies that due process "liberty" im-
poses a rationality test. Borny, supra note 8, at 45 (criticizing Holmes's Lochner
dissent, which had proposed a rationality test); id. at 234 (asserting that,
although the anti-contraceptive statute struck down in Griswold was a "lunatic
law," it was not unconstitutional).
280. See discussion supra part I.B.
281. For their interpretations, Ely and Bork rely on the words "due process,"
which they say designates "process" or procedure. The Second Treatise, how-
ever, arrives at the same interpretation of "liberty" without any reference to
"due process." If the constitutional guarantee read, "No person shall be de-
prived of liberty," the interpretation described in the text would remain
unchanged.
282. See discussion supra part I.B.
283. For example, Bork criticizes the idea that "liberty" includes the "free-
dom not to conform:" "A 'freedom not to conform? What can that possibly
mean? Freedom from law? Law requires conformity within the subjects it cov-
ers." BoRy, supra note 8, at 239. That was precisely Hobbes's point in saying
19941
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lar choices-abortion, for example-as special. Thus, Bork
argues that either liberty allows everything, which is absurd, or
it protects nothing; among human wants, liberty plays no favor-
ites.28 4 Bork's two poles, a liberty that encompasses every
choice and a liberty that encompasses none, parallel Hobbes's
alternatives of nature, where humanity is at liberty to do every-
thing, and a commonwealth, where subjects, having surrendered
it, have a natural liberty to do nothing. In effect, Bork gives a
modern twist to the seventeenth century concept of "license," of
men and women doing as they please. Locke denied that nature
is a state of license;28 5 Hobbes thought nature is precisely
that.28 6 Without using the same metaphor, Bork sides with
Hobbes: he too thinks of liberty as "license."
Whereas "license" connoted social anarchy in the seven-
teenth century, another kind of license, judicial license, troubles
Bork in the twentieth century.287 He knows that judges will
never lift all legal restraints, so not even their misguided con-
cept of constitutional liberty will really produce social anar-
chy.288 On the other hand, judges will confer license selectively,
Bork thinks, in accordance with their personal value prefer-
ences. 28 9 They will choose to license abortion, for example.
Judges deciding as they please have judicial "license;" an uncon-
strained, standardless liberty to decide constitutional cases. In-
terestingly, Bork expresses his alarm at this development using
terms that would befit a state of social anarchy or license.
290
Ely too denies that substantive rights can be derived from
liberty. What separates him from Bork, however, is an attrac-
tion to Locke's idea of procedural "liberty," as well Ely's sense
that "liberty"-or a related term, like "privileges and immuni-
ties"-is capable of summarizing rights. The latter tendency
that "where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the
liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion." HOBBES, supra note
165, at 271; see discussion supra part I.B.1.
284. For a discussion of Borls views, see supra part I.B.
285. LocKu, supra note 160, at 270; see discussion supra part I.B.2.
286. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
287. Bork, supra note 27, at 10 (arguing that judges are obliged to treat all
human gratifications equally, absent an explicit constitutional direction to the
contrary and that modern judges ignore this obligation).
288. BORK, supra note 8, at 18 (pointing out that "[nlo court" is "so willful"
as to impose its own preference "in every case").
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., id. at 10-11 (arguing that 1960s "activists" with "Jacobin" ten-
dencies are now fighting a battle against "the limits of respectable politics and
... political neutrality," with the federal courts a major battleground in this
struggle).
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shows itself in two ways. Ely essentially accepts a summary
concept of liberty in matters of procedural due process, which
addresses the question of whether government action must be
accompanied by a hearing.291 He thinks procedural due process
reaches every serious individual interest, and he finds such a
summary concept useful, despite its generality.
Ely also applies the idea of summarizing rights to certain
"substantive" issues. In the Fourteenth Amendment, Ely per-
ceives "a delegation to future constitutional decision-makers to
protect rights that are not listed either in the... Amendment or
elsewhere in the document."292 In effect, the Fourteenth
Amendment allows later generations to decide what rights an
earlier generation's summary term should include. Yet, Ely also
denies that new rights can be derived from "liberty" or any other
general term.293 In Ely's view, "future constitutional decision-
makers" should protect the workings of democratic political
processes, for example, the one person, one vote principle, as
well as the rights of socially disenfranchised groups, such as ra-
cial minorities. 294 He thinks this consistent with the democratic
structures of the Constitution, which ought to guide the present
day understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.295 Ely's
views resemble Locke's "procedural liberty," the entitlement to
governance by duly constituted authorities.296 Locke believed
that procedural liberty, that is, the guarantee of a properly con-
stituted government, usually assures the people's substantive,
natural rights.297 Yet, Locke thought that even a properly con-
stituted government could fail in that regard.298 The Second
Treatise therefore establishes conformity to natural right-what
I call "substantive liberty-as an independent test of the valid-
ity of government action.
Ely interprets the Fourteenth Amendment the way Locke
interpreted the social contract, until that last step. Ely distin-
291. Thus, Ely believes that "if you... [are] seriously hurt by the state you
... [are] entitled to [procedural] due process." ELY, supra note 48, at 19. This
makes "fliberty"--or as Ely also suggests, the "phrase 'life, liberty or prop-
ert.. . read as a unit," a summary for all protected rights.
292. Id. at 30. Ely finds this meaning in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than in the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 22-30.
293. Id. at 11-30.
294. Id. at 73-179.
295. E.g., id. at 181.
296. For discussion, see supra part II.B.3.c.
297. See discussion supra part H.B.3.b. and pp. 629-30.
298. See supra pp. 629-30.
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guishes between government structure and substantive rights,
and, as Locke had, emphasizes how structure assures against
abuse. Ely concludes, however, that only structure could pro-
vide that assurance.299 Not recognizing "life, liberty, and prop-
erty" as substantive rights, he argues for unenumerated
constitutional rights that only relate to structure. Ely thus ap-
plauds Baker v. Carr,300 assuring the fairness of political repre-
sentation, and Brown v. Board of Education,301 protecting
political minorities, but he regards Roe as a disaster. Whereas
Locke recognized structure and substance, Ely considers only
structure. Whether or not the logic of the Constitution dictates
Ely's theory, his work reflects, at least up to a point, the logic of
the Second Treatise.
As it happens, Locke also considered legislative apportion-
ment, the Baker issue, and arrived at an answer like Ely's solu-
tion. Population shifts had distorted the ancient Parliamentary
district system, and Locke thought that the King had a duty to
create more representative districts.30 2 This was a rare case of
Locke faulting a Stuart king for not exercising additional
power. No precedent existed for royal redistricting, but Locke
believed it was required, just as Ely believes that the logic of
political representation mandates one person, one vote. Inter-
estingly, Democracy and Distrust30 3 also ends on the same note
that the Second Treatise does, asking when citizens may disobey
government.30 4 Little in Ely's book addresses disobedience,
299. Structure, that is, plus enumerated rights.
300. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
301. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
302. LocKE, supra note 160, at 372-73.
To what gross absurdities the following of Custom, when Reason has
left it, may lead, we may be satisfied when we see the bare Name of a
Town, of which there remains not so much as the ruines, where scarce
so much Housing as a Sheep-coat; or more Inhabitants than a Shep-
herd is to be found, sends as many Representatives to the grand Assem-
bly of Law-makers, as a whole County numerous in People, and
powerful in riches .... If therefore the Executive, who has the power
of Convoking the Legislative, observing rather the true proportion,
than fashion of Representation, regulates, not by old custom, but true
reason, the number ofMembers... it cannot be judg'd, to have set up a
new Legislative, but to have restored the old and true one ....
Id.
303. ELY, supra note 48.
304. Compare LocKE, supra note 160, at 406-28 (discussing the right of
revolution) with ELY, supra note 48, at 183 (considering when a citizen, or a
judge, ought to disobey a law).
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however, and the ending was conceivably a bow in Locke's
direction.30 5
The same cannot be said about Bork's work. As Bork under-
stands the Constitution, it embodies precise directives for
human action, comparable to the commands of a Hobbesian sov-
ereign.306 Bork, like Hobbes, emphasizes the relativity of all
values; what is good is what people want.30 7 Apart from wants,
no standard of human value exists. That, in turn, explains
Bork's and Hobbes's insistence on precise legal directives. Gen-
eral statements of value cannot direct people's actions because
values do not exist, apart from particular wants. Therefore,
such statements are meaningless, and individuals interpret
value statements to validate their desires. To avoid this result,
legal rules must be precise, addressing particular wants and ac-
tions, rather than meaningless values. "Liberty" is a case in
point. Given their theory of value, Hobbes and Bork understand
"liberty" as unrestrained "license" because liberty cannot possi-
bly mean anything else. Both are positivists, deeply distrusting
abstractions, and "liberty" is the most abstract right of all.
Bork is not a Hobbesian, of course. Hobbes thought agree-
ments never bind the sovereign;308 Bork regards all officials as
subordinate to the Constitution.30 9 It is one thing to make a
sovereign absolute, as Hobbes does; it is something different to
make the Constitution sovereign. Yet within the confines of his
theory, Bork follows Hobbes's conception of right, and he has a
similar theory of value. In not trivial ways, therefore, Bork's
Constitution and Hobbes's social contract resemble one an-
other,310 and both differ dramatically from Locke's conceptions.
Of course, Ely and Bork have something else in common: they
305. Elsewhere in the book, Ely recalls being "a lad studying philosophy in
the late 1950's," but he does not, however, mention any particular philosophers
who influenced him. ELY, supra note 48, at 53.
306. Compare HOBBES, supra note 165, at 311-35 (developing the theory of
law as the "Command" or "Sign of the Will" of a sovereign) with Bork, supra
note 27, at 6 ("Court must be controlled by principles exterior to the will of the
Justices").
307. See discussion supra note 27.
308. See supra text accompanying note 180.
309. Bon, supra note 8, at 2 (arguing that the Constitution should "control
judges").
310. I have characterized Ely's and Bork's positions in terms of "liberty," but
they themselves sometimes use other terms. When Ely embraces a summary
term for rights, for example, he chooses "privileges and immunities" rather
than "liberty." See supra note 292 and accompanying text. Although Bork
deals with liberty explicitly, he does not view his own criticisms of the judiciary
as premised on a particular meaning of that term. Yet, these critics' arguments
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ignore "le," the concept from which Locke derived political "lib-
erty." In a distinctively modern way, they have "liberty" displac-
ing -life."
d. Mirror Images
The modern picture of "life, liberty, and property" is a mir-
ror image of Locke's version. Today "life" is a spurious right,
"liberty" is preeminent, and property is often linked with lib-
erty.31 ' The Second Treatise, on the other hand, makes "life"
preeminent, treats "liberty" as a spurious substantive right, and
links "property" with life.3 1 2 The foremost right in one series,
whether life or liberty, becomes spurious in the other, while
"property" holds a middle position in both.
The pattern of primary, intermediate, and spurious natural
rights is a kind of rhetorical fingerprint, shared by the Second
Treatise and modern constitutional law. Both impose the pat-
tern upon a phrase, life, liberty, or property," that suggests
three rights equal in stature, not a hierarchy of rights.
Neither the pattern of primary, spurious, and secondary
rights, nor the phrasing that suggests three equally important
rights, is inevitable. The Due Process Clause and the Second
Treatise might have treated the three rights as equal in stature,
as well as in name, but neither document did. Nor do the docu-
ments readily identify the true stature of each right. Again,
there could be two co-equal rights and one lesser one, or two
spurious rights instead of one. Yet, both documents employ the
same misleading verbal formula allied with the same odd hierar-
chy of primary, spurious, and secondary rights.
Whether Locke originated these patterns, or passed them
on from another source, remains unclear. At a minimum, he did
pass them on, which enhances his place in our constitutional
history. The Second Treatise would supply the model for Section
1 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which, in turn, became
the model for constitutional "life, liberty, or property."3 13 Ironi-
cally, today's modern, expansive concept of "liberty" in fact
originated in Locke's attempt to diminish "liberty" and
subordinate it to life."
follow the familiar lines, and address the recognized dilemmas, of social con-
tract theory.
311. See discussion supra part ll.A.
312. See discussion supra part H.B.2.
313. See discussion infra part h.B.
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C. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Frances Hutcheson
The Scottish philosopher Frances Hutcheson exercised an
influence on revolutionary America that rivaled Locke's. Garry
Wills identifies Hutcheson as the most powerful philosophical
influence on Jefferson and the text of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.3 14 Hutcheson also had an extraordinarily influential
idea of "liberty." In matters of general philosophy, he belonged
to the same school of thought as David Hume: whereas Locke
conceived of the human mind as a tabula rasa, an empty slate
written upon by experience, Hutcheson and Hume saw distinct
human capacities or "faculties." 15 In his political philosophy,
however, Hutcheson followed Locke rather than Hume. Hutche-
son posited a social contract and government based on con-
314. GARRY WimLS, INENTINCI AMERICA 167-255 (1978). Wills also suggests
that Locke's influence on the Declaration of Independence has been exagger-
ated and that revolutionary Americans never viewed Locke as the preeminent
authority on politics. Id. at 167-75. Many owned and read the Second Treatise,
but they also owned and read other political works by many other authors. Id.
at 171. Wills concludes that Locke's book was not so renowned that we can
assume its influence in any particular case. Id. at 175. Contra RicHARDs, supra
note 164, at 80-81 and n.15 (arguing that Jefferson derived the language and
premises of his Declaration of Independence from Locke, and that Wills "focuses
... too narrowly" on other figures).
Wills's argument is not inconsistent, however, with Locke's exercising a de-
cisive influence on the Americans' understanding of "life, liberty, or property."
Wills allows that Locke might have had a greater influence on others than he
did on Jefferson. Moreover, revolutionary era constitutions clearly echo lan-
guage of the Second Treatise. See infra part III.B. In any event, much of Wills's
analysis addresses Locke's, Hutcheson's, and Jefferson's respective views of
human nature and human knowledge, rather than addressing political ques-
tions that underlay "life, liberty, or property." It is those questions that are
directly relevant, because the Framers wrote "life, liberty or property"-not a
theory of mind or epistemology-into the Constitution.
Finally, Hutcheson himself followed the ideas, and occasionally the phras-
ing of Locke's Second Treatise, on the basic issues of political rights. See infra
part II.C.1. Therefore, the question of which one exercised the greater influence
is less important than it might seem. Regarding the social contract and life,
liberty, or property-Hutcheson was a Lockean.
315. See generally WILs, supra note 314, at 193-206 (contrasting Locke's
mental theory with Hutcheson's and Hume's); see also Daniel Walker Howe,
The Language of Faculty Psychology in the Federalist Papers, in CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE AND THE CONSTrrUTION 107 (Terrence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988)
(describing the seventeenth and eighteenth century picture of the human mind
as consisting of separate "faculties," rather than a Lockean tabula rasa).
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sent,316 and many details of his political theory, as well as some
of its language, echo the Second Treatise.3 17
More systematic than Locke, Hutcheson considered the first
natural right to be the "right to life, and to that perfection of
body which nature has given."318 That right, Hutcheson con-
tended, is "intimate" to everyone by "our immediate sense of
moral evil in all cruelty occasioning unnecessary pain, or abate-
ment of happiness to any of our fellows."319 Hutcheson also in-
voked an "inalienable" right "over our lives and limbs." 320
Among the "perfect"--or what we might call the "compelling"-
rights, Hutcheson included a person's right "to his life; to a good
name; to the integrity and soundness of his body; to the acquisi-
tions of his honest industry; to act according to his own choice
within the limits of the law of nature: this right we call natural
liberty...."3 21 He further followed Locke in distinguishing nat-
ural from civil liberty, and, as the following quotation suggests,
in subjecting all liberty to the laws of nature:
Civil liberty and natural have this in common, that as the latter is the
right each one has to act according to his own inclination within the
limits of the law of nature: So civil liberty is the right of acting as one
inclines within the bounds of the civil laws, as well as those of nature.
Laws are so far from excluding liberty, that they are its natural and
surest defence .... If indeed civil liberty meant an exemption from the
316. 2 FRANCs HuTcHESON, A SYSTEM OF MoRAL PHmOsoPHY 225-32 (Au-
gustus M. Kelley 1968) (1st ed. 1755). Hutcheson summarized his view as
follows:
Civil power is most naturally founded by these three different acts of a
whole people. 1. An agreement or contract of each one with all the rest
.... 2. A decree or designation, made by the whole people, of the form
or plan of power .... 3. A mutual agreement or contract between the
governors thus constituted and the people ....
Id. at 227. Hutcheson allowed, however, that government could justly precede
consent under one set of circumstances. For this exception to apply, a person
with "sufficient power" must have a "plan of polity, truly effectual for the gen-
eral good"; the people being "stupid" and "prejudiced," reject the plan; yet, there
is "all rational ground of concluding, that upon a short tryal [the people] will
heartily consent to it." Id. at 231. This exception varies the timing of, but not
the necessity for, consent.
317. For example, Hutcheson distinguished natural liberty from civil lib-
erty; identified a law of nature; and, in general, asked how the laws of nature
are effectuated in civil society. See discussion infra part H.C.1.
318. 1 HUTcHESON, supra note 316, at 293.
319. Id. at 293.
320. MORTON WmTE, THE PmLOsoPHY oF THE AMEmIcAN REVOLUTION 204
(1978).
321. 1 HuTcHESON, supra note 316, at 257.
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authority of the laws, the best regulated states would allow least
liberty.3
22
Hutcheson's position on "life" closely resembles Locke's
view. Both ranked "life" first among rights, implicitly or explic-
itly; both rejected the idea of "life" as mere biological existence;
and both protected bodily integrity as an aspect of "life." Hutch-
eson's right posits an ideal bodily state, bodily "perfection" and
"soundness," whereas Locke built his right to life on the idea of
non-interference with a current state, "indolence of body." This
may reflect other differences between Hutcheson and Locke re-
garding the human nature, but in terms of the right to life, it
amounts to little.
32 3
In terms of "liberty," however, Hutcheson introduced a new
element. He held that human beings possess certain "faculties,"
including a "moral" faculty,3 24 with distinctively human de-
signs.3 2 5 These faculties make up the human constitution. Con-
sequently, Hutcheson regarded the satisfaction of human
desires as an inherently good thing:
[In fact it is for the good of the system [that is, for the happiness of all]
that every desire and sense natural to us, even those of the lowest
kinds, should be gratified as far as their gratification is consistent with
the nobler enjoyments, and in a just subordination to them; there
seems a natural notion of right to attend them all. We think we have a
right to gratify them, as soon as we form moral notions, until we dis-
cover some opposition between these lower ones, and some principle we
naturally feel to be superior to them. This very sense of right seems
the foundation of that sense of liberty, that claim we all naturally in-
sist upon to act according to our own inclination in gratifying any de-
sire, until we see the inconsistence of its gratification with some
superior principles. 3
2 6
322. 2 HuTcHEsoN, supra note 316, at 281-82 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Hutcheson also echoed Locke's view that civic power was held in
"trust for the publick good." Id. at 272. For a discussion of Locke's views on
these points, see infra part II.B.2.
323. I doubt that Hutcheson would have recognized lesser rights of life for
persons whose bodies were not "perfect," because that would make too much of
the differences in wording.
324. For a summary of Hutcheson's views, see WiLI supra note 314, at 193-
200.
325. 1 HuTcHESON supra note 316, at 93.
In contrast, Lockean theory recognizes the human capacity for choice but
seemingly attaches little moral value to it. It is a datum, an aspect of the natu-
ral world. In Locke's view, moral force emanates from natural law, not human
choice. Further, Locke's principle of "innocent delights" allows interference
with free choice for any valid reason. See supra notes 237-239 and accompany-
ing text.
326. 1 HuTcHEsoN, supra note 316, at 254-55 (emphasis omitted). Hutche-
son's mention of "the nobler enjoyments" recalls Locke's claim that no one can
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In this conception, "liberty," or the satisfaction of human
desires, possesses intrinsic value. That remains true even
though lesser desires must be subordinated to "nobler" consider-
ations. Hutcheson even defined "liberty" as the ability to gratify
desire:
As nature has implanted in each man a desire of his own happiness,
and many tender affections toward others in some nearer relations of
life, and granted to each one some understanding and active powers,
with a natural impulse to exercise them for the purposes of these natu-
ral affections; 'tis plain each one has a natural right to exert his pow-
ers, according to his judgment and inclination, for these purposes, in
all such industry, labour, or amusements, as are not hurtful to others
in their persons or goods, while no more publick interests necessarily
requires his labours, or requires that his actions should be under the
direction of others. This right we call natural liberty ..... This right of
natural liberty is not only suggested by the selfish parts of our consti-
tution, but by many generous affections, and by our moral sense, which
represents our own voluntary actions as the grand dignity and perfec-
tion of our nature.
3 27
Hutcheson thus valued voluntary action, in ways that Locke
did not. Whereas Hutcheson envisioned the "grand dignity and
perfection of our nature," Locke saw a mere absence of restraint,
and, perhaps the raw, biological capacity of choice.328 Like
Locke's famous tabula rasa, a mind empty of knowledge and not
predisposed to hold any kind of information, the Lockean will is
not fit for particular choices. 329 Hutcheson, on the other hand,
conceived of the will as predisposed to choices that ought to be
made. Thus, Locke's "liberty" is morally superfluous;330 Hutche-
son's has moral significance. Locke made autonomy, or "inno-
cent delights," a residual category that receives virtually no
attention;331 Hutcheson made "liberty" a basic, animating force
of his theory and of human life.
These distinctions are not merely academic. Suppose, for
example, that the Due Process Clause used a Lockean concep-
tion of "liberty." The principle of "innocent delights" would en-
sure that any interference with a person's action has a valid
reason. Moreover, everyone could "follow... [his or her] own
Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not."33 2 On the
destroy "any Creature" except "where some nobler use ... calls for it." LocKS,
supra note 160, at 271 (emphasis added).
327. 1 HUTCHESON, supra note 316, at 293-95 (second emphasis omitted).
328. See discussion supra pp. 625-26.
329. See supra note 325.
330. See discussion supra part II.B.3.b.
331. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
332. LocK, supra note 160, at 283-84 (emphasis added).
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other hand, no right of individual autonomy in decision making
would exist beyond what an insistence on legality and natural
right, without any reference to liberty, would afford. For in-
stance, a "liberty" to use contraceptives could not exist in the
face of a valid "rule" that prohibits their use. Indeed, the word
"liberty" would probably add nothing to the phrase "due pro-
cess." Without any mention of "liberty," due process suggests
the principle of legality and the requirement of valid reasons.
Therefore, if the Clause read, "no person shall be deprived of life
or property without due process of law" it would mean the same
thing. Hutcheson's "liberty," by contrast, is a right to autonomy.
One could construct an argument, for example, that the right to
choose contraceptives constitutes an aspect of "liberty," even
though the government has outlawed contraceptives. That
meaning adds something to the Due Process Clause.
Subjecting these two ideas of liberty to the technique of con-
stitutional balancing also reveals their differences. To "balance"
is to weigh individual liberty interests against competing inter-
ests of the government.333 Because Lockean "liberty" is "weight-
less," it adds nothing to the balance on the individual's side.
Since it demands no more than a duly enacted law, and honors
any valid reason for the enactment, Lockean "liberty" confers
nothing beyond an entitlement to due administration of the
laws. Generally, however, courts do not balance an individual's
interests in due administration of the laws (Lockean "liberty")
against any governmental interest in departures from the prin-
ciple of "due administration."33 4 In contrast, Hutcheson's con-
ception of "liberty" does not have weight that courts can balance
against government interests. In Hutcheson's view, the fact
that somebody desires an action affords some reason to regard
the action as moral. His principle of autonomy is not absolute
because choices "hurtful to others in their persons or goods" and
acts contrary to higher "publick interests" are not allowed.3 35
Nor is modern liberty absolute.
333. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (asserting that
"liberty interests" must be balanced against "relevant state interests").
334. Under extraordinary circumstances, such balancing is conceivable. At
least Korematsu v. United States suggests something very much like it. 323
U.S. 214 (1944). Upholding the exclusion of Japanese Americans from areas of
the West Coast during World War II, id. at 219, the Court seemingly recognized
a kind of emergency exception, allowing departures from the ordinary course of
constitutional law under certain conditions of war, id. at 223-24.
335. 1 HuTcHEsoN, supra note 316, at 294; see also id. at 256 ("[No moral
agent... can upon close reflection approve himself in... following any other
disposition of his nature, when he discerns, upon the best evidence he can have,
1994] 647
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
One should not exaggerate Hutcheson's differences with
Locke. Severe limitations on autonomy separate Hutcheson's
philosophy from hedonism and anarchism. One should also re-
member that Locke employed a chameleon concept of "liberty"
capable of blending with a wide variety of views.33 6 It would not
even be farfetched to take Hutcheson's approach as a gloss on
Locke's liberty, one that internalized into human nature matters
which Locke treated as part of the human environment. Most
importantly, Hutcheson, like Locke,33 7 subjected his conception
of "liberty" to the right of life,338 to unnamed "nobler enjoy-
ments,"33 9 and to the requirements of law.340 Desiring or will-
ing an action creates no more than a rebuttable presumption
that the action comports with the human constitution; upon
analysis, that action might still turn out to be impermissible.
Ultimately, the law prevails. Hutcheson, like Locke, re-
garded civil liberty as "the right of acting as one inclines within
the bounds of the civil laws, as well as those of nature."341 Yet,
the fact remains that Hutcheson made more of "liberty" than
Locke did. If someone desires an action, that desire alone af-
fords a reason to regard the action as consistent with "nature."
Hutcheson's "liberty" has moral force, while Locke's "liberty"
does not. Thus, Hutcheson's liberty forms a bridge between the
Lockean and the modern conceptions.
2. Blackstone
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 42 was
the most influential and widely-read law book in America during
the latter eighteenth century.3 43 Published in 1765, the Corn-
that doing so is contrary to the universal interest or the most extensive happi-
ness [of humanity].").
336. For discussion, see supra part ll.B.3.a.
337. See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text (liberty subordinate to
life); supra note 211 and accompanying text (no liberty to destroy a creature
except where there is a "nobler use" than its bare preservation); supra note 231
and accompanying text (liberty subject to law).
338. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
341. 2 HuTCHESON, supra note 316, at 281 (emphasis added) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
342. BLAcKsToNE, supra note 155.
343. Charging a grand jury in 1799, for example, Supreme Court Justice
Iredell described the Commentaries thus:
for nearly thirty years ... the manual of almost every student of law in
the United States, and its uncommon excellence has also introduced it
into the libraries, and often to the favorite reading of private gentle-
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mentaries appeared too late to influence colonial charters or
early American state constitutions. Moreover, Blackstone was a
conservative royalist. The Magna Carta and the Second Trea-
tise had been forged out of political struggles with English kings,
but Blackstone's Commentaries glorify royal power. None of this
endeared Blackstone to revolutionary colonists like Jefferson.3 44
Nevertheless, Blackstone's work had a wide and often sympa-
thetic audience. As Justice Iredell said, Blackstone's "view of
... [a] subject could scarcely be unknown to those who framed
the Amendments to the Constitution. . .. "345
Despite his conservatism, Blackstone largely followed
Locke's view of "life, liberty, and property." In particular, Black-
stone recognized "limb" and "health" in tandem with the right to
"life," and like Hutcheson, Blackstone did so explicitly. For ex-
ample, he distinguished "absolute rights," which "are so in their
primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to their per-
sons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled
to enjoy, whether out of society or in it,"346 from "relative
men; so that his [Blackstone's] views of... [a] subject could scarcely be
unknown to those who framed the Amendments to the Constitution
FRANCES WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES 478 (1849), quoted in
Julian S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, 27 Nw.
L. REv. 629, 654 (1933). In particular, Justice Iredell was referring to Black-
stone's views of freedom of the press, and its relevance to the meaning of the
First Amendment, but the same point applies to the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAV
112 (2d ed. 1985) (noting the "ubiquity of Blackstone" among revolutionary era
lawyers, who "referred to Blackstone constantly"); KEPnT L. HALL, THE MAGIC
MIRROR: LAw iN AMERICAN HISTORY 52 (1988) (observing that Blackstone was
"preeminent, and no other legal figure equalled his impact on the colonies");
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 209 (1979) (concluding that the Commentaries were "the single most im-
portant source on English legal thinking in the 18th century, and it has had as
much (or more) influence on American legal thought as it has had on British").
Certain Americans criticized Blackstone, including Thomas Jefferson, but
the disagreement never touched the enumeration of absolute rights in the Com-
mentaries. To the contrary, Jefferson deemed Blackstone hostile to liberty and
overly sympathetic to authority-in effect as insufficiently dedicated to natural
rights. See HALL, supra, at 52; Waterman, supra, at 629-34. Jefferson also ob-jected to Blackstone's views about judicial power to declare and alter the com-
mon law, Waterman, supra, at 642-45, a disagreement with overtones for the
American practice ofjudicial review. Yet, the issue ofjudicial review should not
be confused with questions of the existence and identity of fundamental
rights-a matter that Jefferson and Blackstone agreed about in the first
instance.
344. See Waterman, supra note 343, at 634-35.
345. WHARTON, supra note 343, at 478.
346. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 155, at *123.
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rights," which "are incident to... [persons] as members of soci-
ety... standing in various relations to each other.34 7 The "prin-
cipal aim of society," according to Blackstone, is "to protect
individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which
were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature."348 These
rights Blackstone called "personal security,"349 "personal lib-
erty,"350 and "property."3 51
"Personal security" is Blackstone's version of the Magna
Carta's freedom from "destruction," and the Lockean-Hutch-
esonian right of "life." It encompasses "a person's legal and un-
interrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health,
and his reputation."3 52 "Limbs" include "those members which
may be useful... [to a person] in fight" and which "enable [him]
to protect himself from external injuries in a state of nature."353
Such limbs "cannot be Wantonly destroyed or disabled."354
"Body" includes "the rest... [of someone's] person or body," that
is, everything not included under "limbs," and "body" is pro-
tected by "the same natural right."3 55 Evidently, Blackstone be-
lieved that life, limb, body, health, and reputation belong
together because the loss of any one of them, including reputa-
tion, could be said to "destroy" a person.
Reputation aside, the subcategories of "personal security"
mesh with Locke's account of life. Locke cited "limb" and
"health," and his "indolency of body" appears indistinguishable
from Blackstone's right to one's "body." Blackstone followed
Hutcheson even more closely, in that Hutcheson also included
reputation as an aspect of "life." Thus, Blackstone, the most
prominent legal influence on the Framers, and Locke and
Hutcheson, probably the most prominent philosophical influ-
ences, agreed on a formula for higher order rights that includes
"limb," "health," and "[indolency of] body."
The fact that Blackstone's "life" is only a subcategory of his
right of personal security does not change the analysis. The
Framers did not use "life" in Blackstone's narrow sense, m-
tending thereby to exclude health, limb, and body from constitu-
347. Id.
348. Id. at *120.
349. Id. at *125.
350. Id. at *130.
351. Id. at *134.
352. Id. at *125 (emphasis added).
353. Id. at *126.
354. Id.
355. Id. at *130.
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tional protection. It seems inconceivable that anyone familiar
with Locke, Hutcheson, and Blackstone would use "life" to limit
widely accepted notions of natural right. These writers held
that health, limb, and body are fundamental rights that belong
to the same family of rights as "life." Therefore, the Framers
would not choose the word life" to express the opposite idea,
that health, limb, and body are not protected. The lengthy tradi-
tion of reading "life" broadly rules out a narrow interpretation
that Blackstone himself would have rejected.
More general reasons also support this conclusion. If the
Framers intended to constrict the meaning of natural right, as
understood by Blackstone, Hutcheson, and Locke, some evidence
of their intent and reasons should have survived. It is no small
thing, in a revolutionary document, to excise widely-accepted
natural rights. Yet, the Framers left no evidence of an intention
to narrow the classic natural rights formulas in any way. Still
another consideration reinforces these conclusions. Blackstone,
Hutcheson, and Locke thought that fundamental rights underlie
the relations of persons to other persons, as well as the relation
of persons to governments.356 These rights form the basis of pri-
vate as well as constitutional law, as the Commentaries make
abundantly clear. Thus, removing "body" and "limb" from the
meaning of life" would imply the unthinkable: that persons
could freely maim each other in their private relations without
interference from the law.
3. David Hume
Like Frances Hutcheson, David Hume was a Scottish mor-
alist philosopher. Yet, Hume was also a severe critic of social
contract theory, and he advanced a radically different concep-
tion of rights. Hume regarded the social contract as a fan-
tasy.3 57 Nations may originate, he said, with a population's
tacit consent to the rule of a particular person, but that is not a
social contract. An act of acquiescence to existing political
356. In effect, social contract theory blurs the distinction between public and
private rights, because all rights derived from the "compact" among persons or
from a natural right that predates political society's existence.
357. See DAvm HUmE, Of the Origin of Government, in EsSAYs, MoRAL AN
PoLTICAL (1777), reprinted in Huhe's MoRAL AND PoIr~irAL PHILOsOPHY 311-
14 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 1972) [hereinafter HUME, Origin of Government]; DAVID
Hum, Of the Original Contract, in EssAYs, MoRAL AND POLrTCAL (1777), re-
printed in HuME's MoRAL AND PoLrcAL PHILosoPHY 356-72 (Henry D. Aiken
ed., 1972) [hereinafter Hums, Original Contract].
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power or authority does not create political power;358 because
the authority precedes the tacit consent, consent cannot explain
the authority. Nor is there the bargaining between equals that
social contract theory posits. More generally, the long history of
governments founded by conquest, violence, and fraud, govern-
ments now accepted by their subjects, suggests that political
power originates from something other than a contract.359
Hume also argued that an exchange of promises cannot un-
derlie government. Promises are meaningless, he said, without
a prior understanding that people should honor them. This
prior understanding arises from a process Hume called
"convention":
This convention is not of the nature of a promise: For even promises
themselves ... arise from human conventions. It is only a general
sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society
express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their con-
duct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave
another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same
manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regu-
lation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually
express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and
behaviour. And this may properly enough be call'd a convention or
agreement betwixt us, tho' without the interposition of a promise .... .
Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or conven-
tion, tho' they have never given promises to each other.36 0
Not only does "convention" replace contract, but the desire to
protect property-rather than preservation of life-becomes the
impetus of political society:
[H]av[ing] ... observ'd, that the principal disturbance in society arises
from those goods, which we call external, and from their looseness and
easy transition from one person to another; they must seek for a rem-
edy, by putting these goods, as far as possible, on the same footing with
the fix'd and constant advantages of the mind and body. This can be
done after no other manner, than by a convention enter'd into by all
the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of
those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment
of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry.... Instead of
358. HuMb, Original Contract, supra note 357, at 357-60. Note the trace of
this idea in Hutcheson's claim that, under some circumstances, acquiescence to
a plan of political power could follow the institution of the plan. See supra note
316. Hutcheson nonetheless insisted that consent was essential to political
power; if consent was not forthcoming, the power was illegitimate. See supra
note 316.
359. HUME, Original Contract, supra note 357, at 362-63. Hume remarked
that government was "formed by violence and submitted to from necessity." Id.
at 363.
360. DAVID HUmE, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 490 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 1978) (1739).
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departing from our own interest, or from that of our nearest friends, by
abstaining from the possessions of others, we cannot better consult
both these interests, than by such a convention; because it is by that
means we maintain society, which is so necessary to their well-being
and subsistence, as well as to our own.
3 61
These three points-political authority preceding political
consent, conventions dictated by "interests" rather than binding
promises, and security for property rather than "life" as the pri-
mary political concernm-led Hume to a view of "liberty" radically
different from the social contract theories, and uncannily like
the modern view. Reduced to essentials, social contract theory
is an analytical device that subordinates "liberty" to "life." The
theory envisions people who trade natural liberty to form polit-
ical societies, by mutual consent, in the interests of life."
Hume, on the other hand, ruled out consent as the source of
political power, seeing political life as a constant battle between
"liberty" and "authority." In Hume's view, neither principle
should, or could, entirely overcome the other:
In all governments there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or se-
cret, between Authority and Liberty, and neither of them can ever ab-
solutely prevail in the contest. A great sacrifice of liberty must
necessarily be made in every government, yet even the authority which
confines liberty can never and perhaps ought never in any constitution
to become quite entire and uncontrollable. The sultan is master of the
life and fortune of any individual, but will not be permitted to impose
new taxes on his subjects; a French monarch can impose taxes at plea-
sure, but would find it dangerous to attempt the lives and fortunes of
individuals.... The government which, in common appellation, re-
ceives the appellation of "free," is that which admits of a partition of
power among several members whose united authority is no less, or is
commonly greater, than that of any monarch, but who, in the usual
course of administration, must act by general and equal laws that are
previously known to all the members and to all their subjects. In this
sense it must be owned that liberty is the perfection of civil society, but
still authority must be acknowledged essential to its very existence.3 6
2
This inevitable conflict of liberty and authority is not Hume's
only difference with Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Locke. Another is
that Hume does not seem to recognize '9ie" as a basic force in
political life: all three of his "fundamental laws of nature" relate
to property and contract.3 63 There is still another difference.
Hume thought that nations develop distinctive political institu-
tions, based on unique mixtures of liberty and authority. Social
361. Id. at 489.
362. Hum, Original Contract, supra note 357, at 313-14.
363. Huim, supra note 360, at 526 (stating that "the three fundamental
laws of nature [are]... stability of possession.., its transference by consent...
and[ ] the performance of promises") (emphasis omitted).
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contract theorists, by contrast, suppose that every political soci-
ety is fundamentally the same, insofar as all result from the
same type of social contract.364 For Hume, universal guarantees
of life, liberty, and property, or universal constraints on govern-
ment such as no taxation without representation, simply do not
exist. For Locke and Hutcheson, societies do not exist without
such guarantees.
Hume's ideas have a distinctly modern ring because they re-
semble the current gloss on the Due Process Clause. Like the
modem Court, Hume saw "liberty" as the counterpoint to gov-
ernment authority and thought that when liberty is enhanced,
authority is necessarily diminished, and vice versa. Yet also like
the modern Court, Hume believed that liberty and authority
must co-exist. It also follows from Hume's views that each na-
tion must look to its own customs and traditions, rather than to
a single, unvarying architecture of liberty, to understand it-
self.3 65 Similarly, modern constitutional law often espouses that
view, most recently in the Casey joint opinion.3 66 Hume even
treats "life" and "body" as natural facts, not political rights, just
as the modern reading of "life" in the Due Process Clause
does.367 Hume wrote, for example, about "putting... goods, as
far as possible, on the same footing with the fix'd and constant
advantages of the mind and body."3 6s
Hume's ideas seem commonplace only because they enjoy
such wide acceptance today. The ideas are not obviously true.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any idea of "liberty" being obvi-
ously true. As we have seen, Locke, Hobbes, and Hutcheson dif-
fered with Hume on every point. For that matter, the Framers
of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause also disagreed with
Hume. That clause speaks in the language of social contract
theory of "life, liberty, and property," which Hume emphatically
rejected.3 69 Today, however, we read the Due Process Clause as
a compendium of Humean principles. Hume's balance of liberty
and authority has become a lodestar for interpreting the clause,
364. See discussion supra parts H.B.1 (Hobbes), II.B.2 (Locke), II.0.1
(Hutcheson).
365. See supra text accompanying note 362.
366. See discussion infra part VI.A.
367. See discussion supra part I.A.
368. HuME, supra note 360, at 489.
369. Moreover, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, upon which the clause is
based, is unmistakenly Lockean in style and content. See discussion infra part
III.B.
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as we increasingly look to Humean customs and traditions,
rather than to Lockean concepts, to define our rights.3 70
So we have come full circle. Propositions that the Framers
embraced, such as Locke's and Hutcheson's idea of "life," we now
reject out of hand, as a matter of the definition of words. In
place of those tenets, we find the politics of Hume which the
Framers rejected when they endorsed social contract theory and
the "life, liberty, and property" formula. All this is done, para-
doxically, in the name of faithfulness to the Framers' intent.
III. RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA
A. REVOLUTIONARY LIBERTY
In the revolutionary era, "liberty" became the Americans'
rallying cry. The question remains, however, as to which "lib-
erty" the Americans had in mind: Hobbes's, Locke's, Hutche-
son's, or Hume's. Hobbes's account was anathema to the
Americans, for he stood for everything the Americans op-
posed.371 Locke's account of natural rights and the social con-
tract 3 72 and Hutcheson's theory of human faculties and
happiness 3 73 were particularly influential. Although cited less
frequently, Hume enjoyed respect too,37 4 but not because of his
theory of liberty.37 5
Colonial writers often misunderstood English theorists or
cited them for the most unlikely propositions.3 76 Even serious
American authors could be excused if they missed nuances in
370. For a discussion of the role of history and tradition in English constitu-
tional thought prior to the seventeenth century, see Thomas C. Grey, Origins of
the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 852-54 (1978). This earlier tradition, Grey
points out, regarded "custom" as "the most reliable evidence of the content of
natural law." Id. at 854. Hume departed from that tradition. Customary ar-
rangements were not presumptively reasonable, in his view; they had custom-
and only custom-to commend them. On the other hand, custom was more
than enough.
371. See BAILYN, supra note 164, at 28-29 (noting that American loyalists
and patriots alike denounced Hobbes).
372. See discussion supra part H.B.2.
373. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
374. See BAiLYN, supra note 164, at 28 n.8; MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY,
THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1987) (citing Hume and Locke as
prime influences on The Federalist).
375. Jefferson, for one, expressed profound dislike for Hume's political
views. For discussion of Jefferson's view of Hume, see Craig Walton, Hume and
Jefferson on the Uses of History in Humm: A RE-EVALUATION 389 (Donald W.
Livingston & James T. King eds., 1976).
376. See BAILYN, supra note 164, at 28-29.
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Locke's or Hutcheson's theory of liberty, because the arguments
are philosophical, complex, and only subtly different from com-
peting accounts. The chameleon-like qualities of "liberty" in the
Second Treatise did not help,3 77 nor did the emotional aura that
attached to "liberty" in a revolutionary era. With so much
risked in its name, it must have been difficult to appreciate that
"liberty" has a long tradition of meaning different things to dif-
ferent people. Nice distinctions between Locke's, Hutcheson's,
and Hume's ideas could be lost under these circumstances.
Liberty gained in rhetorical importance during this era as
compared with Locke's or Hutcheson's treatment of the subject,
and it also gained in emotional force as compared with Hume's
approach. "We will be freemen, or we will die,"378 a colonial
wrote in 1768 as he warned against "betray[ing] the trust re-
posed in us by our ancestors, by giving up the least of our liber-
ties."379 This "trust" presumably consisted of natural rights,
which is what Locke meant by the term,380 although Locke re-
ferred to a trust reposed in legislatures, not individuals, and
Locke's "trust" has nothing to do with "ancestors," apart from
the social contractors. Most importantly, "liberty" or "freedom"
occupied the center of the rhetorical stage, a place that Locke
never gave it.
Revolutionary political reflections often included Hume's
idea of liberty, mixed in with the conceptions of Locke and
Hutcheson. A 1774 sermon, for example, declared that "[p]erfect
liberty and perfect government are perfectly harmonious,"38 ' a
Lockean and Hutchesonian theme.38 2 The same author, how-
ever, sought to "estimate the quantity of liberty in any particu-
lar constitution,"38 3 which reflects a Humean sentiment at odds
377. See discussion supra part I.B.3.a.
378. Silas Downer, A Discourse at the Dedication of the Tree of Liberty
(1768), reprinted in 1 AMERIcAN PoLIcAL WRITING DURING Tm FOUNDING ERA
1760-1805, at 97, 107 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
379. Id.
380. Locke argued that the power of government extended no "farther than
the common good," LocKE, supra note 160, at 353 (emphasis omitted); that the
public good lay in the protection and preservation of natural rights, id.; and
that the legislature's "trust" was to protect this public good, id. at 356, 372. See
also id. at 375 (applying the concept of "trust" to the executive power). Hutche-
son used "trust" in the same way, invoking, for example, "the trust intended for
... [a sovereign] by the laws." 2 HUTCHESON, supra note 316, at 305.
381. Nathaniel Niles, Two Discourses on Liberty (1774) reprinted in 1 AMER.
icAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, supra note 378, at 257,
270.
382. See discussion supra parts II.B.2, II.C.1.
383. NILEs, supra note 381, at 259.
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with the Lockean notion of "perfect" liberty.38 4 Nevertheless,
the author returned to a social contract theme, treating civil lib-
erty as due administration of the laws in the manner of Locke,
Hutcheson, and even Hobbes, 38 5 by declaring as follows:
Civil Liberty consists, not in any inclinations of the members of a com-
munity; but in the being and due administration of such a system of
laws, as effectually tends to the greatest felicity of a state .... [T]o live
under such a constitution, so administered, is to be the member of a
free State.3
8 6
Still, a major concern of the era has a strong Humean flavor.
The American colonists were preoccupied with questions of
political power's relationship to liberty.387 They thought power
pushed against liberty's "legitimate boundaries" 388 and that
power's "natural prey, its necessary victim, was liberty, or law,
or right."3 8 9 Yet, they also deemed political power "neces-
sary" 390 and "natural,"3 91 regarding it as a by-product of the so-
cial contract, 39 2 a Lockean and Hutchesonian view. The
colonists thought they had derived their conception of power and
liberty from Locke,3 93 but in fact, Lockean theory has little to
384. On this question of "liberty" and "perfection," Hume wrote as follows:
The government which, in common appellation, receives the appella-
tion of "free," is that which... in the usual course of administration,
must act by general and equal laws that are previously known to all
the members and to all their subjects. In this sense it must be owned
that liberty is the perfection of civil society, but still authority must be
acknowledged essential to its very existence ....
HUME, Origin of Government, supra note 357, at 314.
Although liberty may be the "perfection of civil society," the converse is not
true: civil society is not the "perfection of liberty" to Hume. Nor would Hume
desire a "perfect liberty," since he insists that liberty must be counterbalanced
with authority. Even Hume's identification of liberty with the "perfection of
civil society" is grudging;, he says there is a "sense" in which that "must be
owned." His reluctance arises from an emphatic rejection of Locke's ideals of
consent and natural right as the sole foundations for legitimate government.
385. Locke and Hutcheson regarded legal restraints as essential to civil lib-
erty. See supra parts 1.B.2, H.C.1. The idea of a state enjoying "felicity" sug-
gests Hobbes's concept of freedom as an attribute of sovereigns rather than of
individuals. See supra part II.B.1.
386. NILEs, supra note 381, at 260.
387. See generally BAmLYN, supra note 164, at 55-60.
388. Id. at 56.
389. Id. at 57.
390. Id. at 58.
391. Id.
392. BAILYN, supra note 164, at 59.
393. Id. ("[p]ower created legitimately by those voluntary compacts which
the colonists knew from Lockean theory to be logical and from their own experi-
ence to be practical").
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say about power, and that little is not consistent with these colo-
nial views.
According to Locke, authority and law do not compete with
liberty. To the contrary, Locke regarded authority and law as
civil liberty's essential components. 394 Moreover, Locke did not
worry about "too much" power: government authority is either
exercised in accordance with the people's "trust," or it is not,
with no question of degree.3 95 Finally, Locke portrayed "abso-
lute power" as ultimately a threat to "life,"396 not liberty, be-
cause "he who would get me into his Power without my consent,
would use me as he pleased, when he had got me there, and de-
stroy me too when he had a fancy to it .... To be free from such
force is the only security of my Preservation."3 97
In no small measure, the colonists' views of power are
Humean.3 98 Hume had envisioned a "perpetual intestine strug-
gle.., between Authority and Liberty;" 399 precisely what wor-
ried the Americans. Hume also recognized degrees of liberty,
something Locke never did. On the other hand, the colonists
saw power as an insidious threat to liberty,400 while Hume envi-
394. See supra part H.B.2.
395. Locke did discuss questions of degree, but in another connection. Locke
argued that people would not revolt-though they had a right to do so-over
occasional or minor breaches of the government's trust. Only sustained and
serious breaches, affecting large numbers of people, would trigger rebellion, he
thought. LocKE, supra note 160, at 415 ("Revolutions happen not upon every
little mismanagement in publick affairs.") (emphasis omitted). There is an idea
of degree here, but it is not a matter of degrees of liberty. Nor is it a question of
authority slowly gaining the upper hand over liberty; Locke simply did not
think of liberty and authority in that way.
396. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
397. Id. Locke went on to say that being in another person's "Absolute
Power" was "against the Right of my Freedom" and made one "a Slave." Id.
Then he observed that one who would "take away... Freedom" in a state of
nature "must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every thing
else, that Freedom being the Foundation of all the rest." Id. (emphasis omit-
ted). Perhaps more than any other passage in the Second Treatise, this one
treats "freedom" as a fundamental concept, but it still subordinates "freedom"
to life." Remaining free, Locke pointed out, "is the only security of my Preser-
vation." Id. Freedom is the "Fence" protecting one's life. Id. In addition, "he,
who would take away my Liberty, would.., when he had me in his Power, take
away everything else." Id. at 280 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, the theme of
the chapter is the right to make war upon those who threaten one with "De-
struction." Id. at 278. Thus, "freedom" counts because of its connection with
"life."
398. See generally BAmYN, supra note 164, at 55-93 (describing the colonists'
views of the conflict between power and liberty).
399. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
400. See generally BAiLYN, supra note 164, at 55-93.
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sioned myriad accommodations of liberty and authority. Simi-
larly, the idea of an ideal state or degree of liberty, which the
colonists' conception implied, is closer to Locke than to Hume.40 1
In sum, the colonists sometimes blended together the con-
ceptions of liberty advanced by Hobbes, Locke, Hutcheson, and
Hume. The colonists also regarded "liberty" as a force that ani-
mates history and politics, in a way that none of these English
philosophers did.40 2 Of course, the colonists differed among
themselves, in political viewpoint and in their abstract concep-
tions of liberty. Yet, some general conclusions about their views
are possible.
First, Hobbesian elements occasionally infiltrated American
thinking. The tendency to attribute the quality of liberty to a
nation, rather than an individual, and the view that natural lib-
erty represents the sole distinguishing feature of the state of na-
ture are Hobbesian ideas. Almost certainly, the inherent appeal
of these ideas, rather than any overt reliance on Hobbes as an
authority, explains their appearance. Because Hobbes created
social contract theory, his variants of it constituted powerful al-
ternatives, within the larger structure of the theory. Those who
learned their social contract theory by studying Locke or Hutch-
eson could easily reinvent Hobbesian principles, without realiz-
ing what they had done. Further, the drafters of American Due
Process Clauses rejected Hume's views. Although the colonials
sometimes commingled Hume's ideas with Locke's and Hutche-
son's, and Hume's ideas of liberty and authority found some sup-
port among the Americans, especially after the Revolutionary
War,403 the Americans remained firmly committed to social con-
401. Hume had a high regard for the English system, however, and for the
degree of liberty it afforded. See DAVID HUME, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,
in EssAYs, MORAL AND POLITICAL (1777), reprinted in HuiM's MORAL AND PoLrr-
IcAL PmLosoPmy, supra note 357, at 373-85 (describing an ideal
commonwealth).
402. Hume regarded history as a perpetual battle between liberty and au-
thority, not the gradual unfolding of liberty's design; and social contract theo-
rists thought that the original contract set the terms of social life once and for
all. For further discussion of the social contract theorists' view of history, see
infra part VIA.
403. The Americans felt in need of a theory of social conflict after 1776. See
WOOD, supra note 164, at 608-09 (suggesting that the Americans' concerns
about social faction led them to a more individualistic conception of liberty after
the Revolution); Grey, supra note 370, at 892 (suggesting that beliefs about nat-
ural law may have changed after the Revolution). Locke portrayed life, liberty,
and property as every individual's right, every person's goal, and every govern-
ment's trust. At the same time, Locke ignored social division and faction, which
produce competing conceptions of life, liberty, and property. Hence, the Ameri-
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tract theory, thereby rejecting the essentials of Hume's political
philosophy.404 Americans still believed in natural rights,405
although they worried more than Locke did about whether those
rights would prevail in the short term. Liberty might be at war
with authority, as Hume said, but that did not mean all out-
comes of the battle were equally legitimate.405 The war of lib-
erty and authority jeopardized natural rights, according to the
Americans, but it did not replace these rights, as Hume had
argued.40 7
B. LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY IN REVOLUTIONARY ERA
CONSTITUTIONS
Colonial charters and early state constitutions often in-
cluded clauses modeled after the Magna Carta,40° clauses using
the modern formula of "life, liberty and estate,"409 or both.410
cans had to turn to Hume, not Locke. Moreover, one of Hume's essays antici-
pates Madison's discussion of faction and political society in The Federalist No.
10. See DOUGLAS ADAm, "That Politics May Be Reduced To A Science:" David
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING
FATHERS 93, 98-102 (1974); HUME, supra note 401; THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison).
404. See discussion supra notes 371-375 and accompanying text; see also in-
fra notes 413-422 and accompanying text (describing the Lockean ideas and
wording of the Virginia Declaration of Rights).
405. See BAILYN, supra note 177, at 26-27 (describing the influence of Locke
and natural rights theory).
406. Id. at 55-93 (describing the Americans' fears about power).
407. It may be that the "war" of liberty and authority, and Hume's influence
generally, mattered more on questions of government structure than on ques-
tions of individual right during this era.
408. E.g., FUNDAMENTAL CONST. OF EAST N.J., art. XIX, reprinted in 5 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FoRm-
ING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2574, 2580 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909)
[hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (providing "[No person or
persons ... shall be taken and imprisoned, or be devised of his freehold, free
custom or liberty, or be outlawed or exiled, or any other way destroyed; nor
shall they be condemn'd or judgment pass'd upon them, but by lawful judgment
of their peers .... ).
409. E.g., CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL LAwS OF WEST N.J. of 1676, ch. XVII,
reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 408, at 2548,
2549 (employing the modern phrasing: "[N]o ... inhabitant... shall be de-
prived or condemned of life, limb, liberty, estate, property or any ways hurt in
his or their privileges, freedoms or franchises, upon any account whatsoever,
without a due tryal, and judgment passed by twelve good and lawful men.... ").
410. E.g., MD. CONST.'S DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XXI, reprinted
in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 408, at 1686, 1688 (stating
"no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liber-
ties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or de-
prived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the
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Magna Carta-type clauses guarantee bodily integrity, under the
heading of a freedom from "destruction." Some of the modern
clauses explicitly guarantee "limb," or "person,"411 in addition to
the usual life, liberty, and estate. Other clauses, however, con-
fine themselves to "life, liberty, and property," and do not explic-
itly mention "destruction," "limb," or "person." Yet, these
clauses could hardly mean less than the Magna Carta phrasing
that Americans still used. The only difference between the two
might be that "ife, liberty, and property" exclude the full free-
dom from "destruction." That would be true if "life" in the mod-
em formula encompasses biological existence and no more. If,
however, "life, liberty, and property" had somehow come to mean
"all of the Magna Carta rights, except limb, health, and body,"
then it would be incredible for Americans to also subscribe to the
Magna Carta formula, which they did, sometimes combining it
with "life, liberty, and property" in the same clause.
The Americans' adherence to social contract theory, their fa-
miliarity with Locke, Hutcheson, and Blackstone, and, after the
Stamp Act crisis, their revolutionary beliefs, all strongly suggest
that all "life, liberty, property" clauses protect life" in the full
social contract sense of the term.412 Indeed, by the late eight-
eenth century, it is doubtful that "life, liberty, and property"
could be used any other way. For example, Hume did not sug-
gest that "life, liberty, and property" means something different
than Locke's interpretation; rather, disbelieving the natural
rights of life, liberty, and property, Hume simply avoided the
phrase. In America, this was an era that treated absolute rights
as "self-evident," a time of revolutionary triumph when any idea
of constricting previously recognized natural rights, such as the
law of the land."); see also N.C. CONST.'S DECLARATION OF RIGHTs of 1776, art.
XII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 408, at 2787,
2788; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLI, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNsTI-
TUTIONS, supra note 408, at 3241, 3257.
411. E.g., MAss. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. II, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 408, at 1888, 1889 ("no subject shall be hurt,
molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping....")
(emphasis added); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, sec. 11, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTrTUTIoNs, supra note 408, at 3092, 3101 ("all courts shall be
open, and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have remedy by the due course of law") (emphasis added);
CHARTER OF FUNDNiENTAL LAWS OF WEST N.J. of 1676, ch. XVII, reprinted in 5
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 408, at 2548, 2549.
412. If people make an original compact that protects what they hold dear,
they will surely include protection for health, limb, and body in the agreement.
For discussion, see supra part II.C.2.
19941
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
right of freedom from "destruction," must have been
unthinkable.
Furthermore, Article 1 of the most influential constitutional
document of the revolutionary era, George Mason's 1776 Decla-
ration of Rights for Virginia,413 makes its commitment to social
contract theory and Lockean principles explicit:4 14
[All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possess-
ing property, and persuing and obtaining happiness and safety.41 5
That section of the Declaration largely reprises Locke's deriva-
tion of natural rights in his Second Treatise: "being all equal
and independent," Locke wrote, "no one ought to harm another
in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions."41 6
Articles 2 and 3 of Mason's Virginia Declaration also follow
Locke's derivation of natural rights. Article 2 reiterates a basic
theme of the Second Treatise,417 declaring that "all power is
vested in, and consequently derived from, the People."418 Article
3 proclaims that governments failing to serve "the common ben-
413. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, reprinted in 2 THE RooTS OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTs: AN ILLUSTRATED SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 234
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980). Bernard Schwartz calls the Virginia Declaration
"a landmark in the development that was to culminate in the federal Bill of
Rights," Bernard Schwartz, Commentary to VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
of 1776, in 2 THE RooS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 233, and "the first
document that may truly be called an American Bill of Rights," id. at 233-34.
414. One writer calls the Virginia Declaration "an echo of John Locke." ROB-
ERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 27 (1955).
415. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 1, supra note 413, at
234. Many states copied this clause. See, e.g., CONST. OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT
FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. of 1780, pt. 1, art. I, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 408, at 1888, 1889 ("All men are born
free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights;
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives
and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine,
that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness"); VT. CONST. of 1777,
ch. 1, § I, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 408, at
3737, 3739 ("all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are the enjoying and
defending [sic] life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property,
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety").
416. LOCKE, supra note 160, at 271.
417. See, e.g., id. at 412 (arguing that when a government grasps for "Abso-
lute Power over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of the People" it forfeits its
legitimate power, and the "the Power... devolves to the People") (emphasis
omitted).
418. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 2, supra note 413, at
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efit, protection, and security of the people" are liable to be over-
turned by a "majority of the community," which has "an
indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter,
or abolish" them. 419 Locke, for his part, insisted on the
"Supream Power" of the "People" to "remove or alter" the govern-
ment.420 Although Locke did not require the concurrence of a
majority before a right to remove the government arose, he did
observe that "it ... [is] impossible for one or a few oppressed
Men to disturb the Government, where the Body of the People do
not think themselves concerned in it,"421 but it is a different
matter when the government oppression "is so great, that the
Majority feel it."422 Thus, the premises, and often the language,
of the Virginia Declaration echo the Second Treatise. Given
these similarities, one could fairly read the Virginia Declara-
tion's right of "life" as meaning the same thing as "life" in the
Second Treatise, a right that encompasses health, body, and
limb. Because the Virginia Declaration became a model for
other constitutions in the era, including the Federal Constitu-
tion, the same interpretation applies to them.
The Virginia Declaration reflects Hutcheson's as well as
Locke's influence. Mason's reference to rights that men cannot
bargain away in any compact sounds Hutcheson's basic theme of
419. Id. art. 3, at 234.
420. LocKE, supra note 160, at 367 (emphasis omitted).
421. Id. at 404 (emphasis omitted).
422. Id. at 380 ("Nor let any one think, this lays a perpetual foundation for
Disorder: for this operates not, till the Inconvenience is so great, that the Ma-jority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended"); see
also id. at 414-15 (explaining why citizens do not resort to revolution to remedy
every misstep of government officials).
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution comes even closer to Locke's exact
wording. Without mentioning a "majority," it declares that "the people have a
right to alter the government, and to take measures necessary for their safety,
prosperity, and happiness" whenever the government fails to protect individu-
als in the enjoyment of "their natural rights, and the blessings of life." CONST.
OR FORM OF GOVFRNMENT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASs. of 1780, preamble,
reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTIUvONS, supra note 408, at 1889.
The Massachusetts Constitution also declares that "life, liberty, and property"
ought to be protected "according to standing laws" and that "the people of this
commonwealth are not controllable by any other laws than those to which their
constitutional representative body have given their consent." Id. at art. 10, re-
printed in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTIrmONS, supra note 408, at 1891. For
his part, Locke explained that "the Legislative... is bound to dispense Justice,
and decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing laws," LocKE,
supra note 160, at 358 (emphasis omitted), and emphasized that nothing can
have the "force and obligation of a Law, which has not its Sanction from that
Legislative, which the publick has chosen and appointed," id. at 356 (emphasis
omitted).
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inalienable rights.423 Similarly, the references to "enjoyment" of
life and liberty owe more to Hutcheson than to Locke, because
Hutcheson's natural liberty includes an element of personal au-
tonomy and Locke's does not.424 Any differences between Locke
and Hutcheson about "liberty" probably seemed of little impor-
tance, however, assuming anyone recognized them at the time.
Only the later history of "liberty" makes such questions
important. 425
IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF A NEW "LIBERTY"
During America's founding era, the right of "life" protected a
person's health, limb, and body. Two hundred years later, life,
health, limb, and body have become aspects of "liberty," to the
extent they receive constitutional protection at all. Today, the
right of "life" approaches meaninglessness. 426 Political, social,
and legal events of the nineteenth century suggest how "life" lost
its meaning and how "liberty" came to supplant it.
A. AFTER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: POLICE POWER
THEORY
What "life" meant to John Locke in 1690, it also meant to
George Mason in 1790. It retained that meaning through the
first three quarters of the nineteenth century, including the pe-
riod when Congress wrote and adopted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Justice Field, referring to the Fourteenth Amendment in
1877, observed that:
By the term "life," as here used, something more is meant than mere
animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all
those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed.... The deprivation
not only of life, but of whatever God has given to every one with life, for
its growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision in question
427
7°...
423. See WiLLs, supra note 314, at 229-39 (arguing that Hutcheson's concept
of "unalienable rights" underlay Jefferson's reference to "inalienable rights" in
the Declaration of Independence).
424. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
425. See discussion infra part VI.C.
426. See discussion supra part I.A.
427. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added). Justice Field dissented in the Slaughter-House Cases because the
Court rejected life, liberty, and property as constitutionally enforceable sub-
stantive rights. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). In
Munn, the majority adhered to the rationale of the Slaughter-House Cases, but
no Justice, in either case, contended that the word "life" meant something less
than Justice Field claimed it did.
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Story's Commentaries on the Constitution agreed, noting that
"[t]he limbs are equally protected with the life."428 "Due pro-
cess," another writer said, "is nothing new. It is only the Magna
Carta over again .... [It] protects life and limb against attack
.... '[L]ife and liberty'... cover the things specified by Black-
stone, but they cover more."429 Counsel in the Slaughter-House
Cases also emphasized this understanding of "life," arguing that
life encompasses "the right to one's self, to one's own faculties,
physical and intellectual,... [to] one's own brain, eyes, hands,
feet, in a word to... [one's] soul and body.., an incontestable
right... of whose enjoyment and exercise by its owner no one
could complain."430
Yet in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a new con-
cept of "liberty" supplanted the traditional idea of "life." A series
of state court decisions, interpreting due process clauses in state
constitutions, mark the change. 431 These decisions treat
"human faculties," which Justice Field saw as aspects of life,
under the heading of "liberty." In 1888, the New York Court of
Appeals said "[t]he term 'liberty' . . . is deemed to embrace the
right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with
which he has been endowed by his Creator."43 2 The Ohio
Supreme Court agreed, characterizing "liberty" as a "right to the
free use of ... [a person's] faculties."433 Standing alone, these
are not major departures from the historic understanding:
Hutcheson himself could have said much the same thing.434
428. JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTAIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 697 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 1891).
429. HENRY BRANNON, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GuARAN-
TEED BY TE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT To =H CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 103, 107, 110 (1901). Brannon's last remark, that "life and liberty" now
"cover more" than in Blackstone's era, was directed to state constitutions specif-
ically, but his larger point was that in the Fourteenth Amendment, the words
warranted the same expansive interpretation. See id.
430. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 45 (1873) (providing the reporter's account of
plaintiffs argument and noting that counsel cited TNIRs, DE LA PROPRI =T 36,
47).
431. E.g., Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 35 N.E. 62, 64 (Ill. 1893) (invalidat-
ing a requirement that employers pay weekly wages); City of Cleveland v. Cle-
ments Bros. Const. Co., 65 N.E. 885, 891 (Ohio 1902) (invalidating restrictions
on hours of work by employees of public contractors); People v. Gillson, 17 N.E.
343, 347 (N.Y. 1888) (invalidating a prohibition on premiums in connection
with retail food sales); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 115 (N.Y. 1885) (invalidating a
prohibition on manufacturing cigars in tenement houses).
432. Gillson, 17 N.E. at 345; see also infra note 435 and accompanying text.
433. Clements Bros., 65 N.E. at 888.
434. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
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At the same time, courts began to characterize labor and
occupational choice as preeminent opportunities for exercising
human "faculties." In 1893, the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that "liberty" includes the "right of every man to be free in the
use of his powers and faculties, and to adopt and pursue such
avocation or calling as he may choose."435 In 1902, the Ohio
Supreme Court tightened the connection between human facul-
ties and labor, finding that "liberty" encompasses a person's
right "to the free use of all his faculties in the pursuit of an hon-
est vocation."436 Other courts concurred. 437 This emphasis on
labor-paid labor or a vocation-was new, even though the prin-
ciple that human labor implicates natural rights dates back to
Locke and Hutcheson. Although Locke treated labor as the ba-
sis of property rights438 and Hutcheson considered labor a pro-
tected aspect of natural liberty,43 9 neither philosopher regarded
paid labor as the epitome of liberty, as nineteenth century
American courts appeared to think.
Even more dramatically, courts began to ignore the right of
'life" in favor of an expansive concept of liberty. This change
unfolded over the period of a single decade. To illustrate, Jus-
tice Field treated "life" as a signal right in 1877.44 In the next
year, the New York Court of Appeals treated life" as a vital con-
435. Braceville Coal Co., 35 N.E. at 63.
436. City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Const. Co., 65 N.E. 885, 888 (Ohio
1902).
437. See, e.g., Exparte Kubach, 24 P. 737, 738 (Cal. 1890) (per curiam) ("any
person is at liberty to pursue any lawful calling,... not encroaching on the
rights of others"); In re Morgan, 58 P. 1071, 1073 (Colo. 1899) ("[Liberty] in-
cludes the privilege of choosing any lawful occupation for the exercise of one's
physical and mental faculties which is not injurious to others."); People v. Gill-
son, 17 N.E. 343, 345 (N.Y. 1888) ("A person living under our constitution has
the right to adopt and follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the
community, as he may see fit. The term 'liberty'.. . is not dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint... but... [includes the] right to use his facul-
ties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in
any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation.").
438. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
439. 'IT]is plain each one has a natural right to exert his powers, ac-
cording to his own judgment and inclination, for these purposes, in all
such industry, labour, or amusements, as are not hurtful to others in
their persons or goods, while no more publick interests necessarily re-
quires his labours, or requires that his actions should be under the
direction of others. This right we call natural liberty.
1 HuTcHEsoN, supra note 316, at 294 (emphasis omitted). The inclusion of
"amusements," the stress placed on human happiness, and especially the recog-
nition of limits on liberty all distinguish Hutcheson's account from that of late
nineteenth century American judges.
440. See supra note 427 and accompanying text.
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cept that is at least the equal of "liberty." According to Bertholf
v. O'Reilly,441 the guaranty of "life, liberty, and property":
is not construed in any narrow or technical sense. The right to life may
be invaded, without its destruction. One may be deprived of his liberty
in a constitutional sense without putting his person in confinement.
Property may be taken without manual interference therewith or its
physical destruction. The right to life includes the right of an individ-
ual to his body in its completeness and without dismemberment; the
right to liberty, the right to exercise his faculties and to follow a lawful
avocation for the support of life; the right of property, the right to ac-
quire power and enjoy it in any way consistent with the equal rights of
others and the just exactions and demands of the State.44 2
Here the court gave equal billing to the three rights, and each
received an expansive interpretation. 443 The court did treat the
enjoyment of human faculties and the pursuit of a vocation as
aspects of liberty, but the court also linked the pursuit of a voca-
tion to the "support of life," a phrase that echoes Locke and
Hutcheson, who had made liberty subservient to life. 4"
Within ten years, liberty became preeminent in the New
York Court of Appeals's eyes; property became an adjunct to lib-
erty; and life, for all intents and purposes, disappeared as a
right. In 1885, for example, the court reviewed the meaning of
the state's due process clause in In re Jacobs.445 The judges ob-
served that "liberty" and "property" warrant expansive interpre-
tations,"46 but they made no such observation about "life."
"Life," in fact, received no attention as a right. The Jacobs court
quoted an earlier case which referred to the "common business
and callings of life""4 7 and the "ordinary callings of life,"" 8 but
now the court described the right to pursue such callings as an
aspect of "liberty.""9 It was one thing to invoke "avocation[s] for
441. 74 N.Y. 509 (N.Y. 1878).
442. Id. at 515.
443. If any right in Bertholf seems poised to assume the preeminent posi-
tion, it is property rather than liberty.
444. See discussion supra parts II.B.2, II.C.1.
445. 98 N.Y. 98 (N.Y. 1885).
446. Regarding the former, the Jacobs court observed that "one may be de-
prived of his liberty and his constitutional rights thereto violated without the
actual imprisonment or restraint of his person." Id. at 106. Regarding the lat-
ter, the court said that "[tihe constitutional guaranty that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law may be violated without the
physical taking of property for public or private use." Id. at 105.
447. Id. at 107 (quoting Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S.
746, 757 (1884) (Field, J., concurring) (emphasis added)).
448. Id. (quoting Butchers, 111 U.S. at 764 (Bradley, J., concurring) (empha-
sis added)).
449. Id. at 106-07.
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the support of life,"45 0 as the Bertholf court did, in an opinion
that treats "life" as a right on par with "liberty," but it is another
thing to speak of the "ordinary callings of life" when "life" re-
ceived no attention as a right. In Jacobs, the New York Court of
Appeals treated "life" as a natural fact rather than a natural
right.
People v. Gillson,451 an 1888 decision of the New York Court
of Appeals, secured the new analytical and rhetorical frame-
work. Gilison invalidated a law prohibiting premiums or prizes
in connection with the retail food sales. 45 2 For the court, Justice
Peckham examined the meaning of due process clauses, 453 but
altogether ignored the right of life. Justice Peckham did observe
that food is among the "necessaries of life,"454 and that the law
affects the "liberty to adopt or follow.., a livelihood."455 None of
that, however, was tied to any right of life. Indeed, Justice
Peckham used "livelihood" in place of older expressions, such as
"calling of life,"456 that at least hint at a broader role for the
concept. Moreover, he treated liberty as more salient than prop-
erty, discussing liberty at length and property only in pass-
ing.457 Property had survived as a right, but it would exist
henceforth in liberty's shadow.
By 1891, the Framers' concept of "life" was becoming a his-
torical relic. That year, the Harvard Law Review published a
student essay arguing that Blackstone's definition of personal
security-including "life, limb, health, and reputation"-was
"fairly... included under the term life' in our constitutions."458
The author also observed that the "true meaning" of "life, lib-
erty, and property" was being lost, submerged in ever expanding
and unjustifiably broad definitions of "liberty" that courts were
spinning out.459 The author's historical investigation had led
450. Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509, 515 (N.Y. 1878) (emphasis added).
451. 17 N.E. 343 (N.Y. 1888).
452. Id. at 344.
453. Id. at 345-47.
454. Id. at 346 (stating that coffee was "almost one of the necessaries of life
to a large number of people.").
455. Id.
456. See supra text accompanying note 447.
457. See People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343, 345-46 (N.Y. 1888).
458. Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term 'Liberty" in Those
Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and
Property," 4 HARv. L. REv. 365, 377 (1891).
459. Id. at 374-82 (arguing that "liberty" meant "freedom from... [physical]
restraint"); id. at 383-92 (arguing that cases adopting a broader interpretation
are wrong).
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him to the broad definition of "life," and his discoveries must
have seemed new, because his essay won a prize.460
During the same period, the theory of a "police power"
moved to the fore, implementing a conception of liberty that dif-
fers dramatically from Locke's and Hutcheson's ideas. A state's
"police power" consists of its power to enact laws "promot[ing]
the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the peo-
ple."461 Police power theory regards such laws as infringements
on liberty, albeit necessary, and therefore, valid ones. 462 "Lib-
erty" in police power theory means "freedom from restraint."463
It follows that general welfare came at the cost of individual
right. Infringements of liberty, however, did not always violate
constitutional guarantees; government itself would be impossi-
ble if they did. According to these theorists, measures within
the police power's scope comport with constitutional "liberty"
(although liberty is in fact lost), while outside of the police
power's range, the constitutional right of liberty holds sway.464
Given this framework, it is little wonder that courts viewed
social and economic legislation with a wary eye. Using the po-
lice power doctrine, courts ensured that any cost in liberty was
"reasonably necessary."465 As the New York Court of Appeals
explained, unless courts confine the police power to its proper
bounds, "the power of the legislature would be practically with-
out limitation. In the assumed exercise of the police power in
the interest of the health, the welfare, or the safety of the public,
every right of the citizen might be invaded and every constitu-
tional barrier swept away."466 To prevent this, courts would de-
termine whether laws were "reasonably necessary" and would
prohibit legislatures from cloaking laws "under the guise of a
police regulation" when there was another legislative "object
and purpose."467
These conceptions differ dramatically from Locke's and
Hutcheson's ideas. Social contract theory does not define "civil
liberty" as freedom from legal restraint, as police power theory
460. Id. at 365.
461. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
462. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (noting that the right of
liberty is subject to "such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by states
pursuant to the police power").
463. E.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905) (treating lib-
erty as the right of "freedom from restraints").
464. Id.
465. People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343, 346 (N.Y. 1888).
466. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 110 (N.Y. 1885).
467. Gillson, 17 N.E. at 347.
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does. To the contrary, Locke's and Hutcheson's "liberty" de-
pends on the existence of restraints. 468 That is true in a state of
nature, and even more true in civil society, where laws preserve
liberty. The conflict that animates police power theory, public
good versus individual liberty, is absent in the social contract
tradition. Locke regarded public good and individual right as
harmonious;469 Hutcheson thought laws constitute the "natural
and surest defence"470 of liberty; and even Hobbes identified in-
dividual liberty in a commonwealth with the liberty of the sover-
eign, obviating any conflict between public and individual
good. 471
Police power theory, in effect, guards natural liberty, some-
thing that does not exist in Locke's and Hutcheson's civil society.
Nineteenth century theorists supposed that natural liberty coex-
ists with civil society, and that civil society necessarily en-
croaches on natural liberty.472 In fact, police power theory
conceives of the state in the way that Hobbes had conceived of
individuals in a state of nature: unbounded and lacking innate
controls. Therefore, the boundary between political society and
natural liberty requires zealous guarding, and that is the office
of the courts. By contrast, social contract theory replaces natu-
ral liberty with civil liberty, and civil liberty is subject to enacted
laws as well as natural right. Neither laws nor the social con-
468. See discussion supra parts II.B.2, II.C.1.
469. See discussion supra part II.B.2. In theory, Locke allowed that an indi-
vidual's own life, liberty, and estate could come "in competition," LOcKE, supra
note 160, at 271, with the life, liberty, and property of "Mankind," id. Under
those circumstances, Locke allowed the individual to prefer his or her own pres-
ervation. Yet, such conflicts received little attention from Locke. By and large,
he thought everyone's interests were harmonious. Even Locke's account of
property in the state of nature emphasizes that enough would be left for every-
one: B would be no worse off, Locke maintained, because A had acquired prop-
erty. See id. at 288 ("For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the
Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at
least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.") (emphasis
omitted).
470. 2 HUTCHESON, supra note 316, at 281.
471. See discussion supra part H.B.1.
472. RioHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EmaSNT DoMAIN 3-18 (1985). Epstein treats rights in a way reminiscent of
police power theory, yet claims that his account is Lockean: "A [Lockean] natu-
ral rights theory asserts that the end of the state is to protect liberty and prop-
erty, as these conceptions are understood independent of and prior to the
formation of the state." Id. at 5. Like police power theorists, however, Epstein
ignores the Lockean right of "life" and uses natural, rather than civil, liberty as
the standard for government action. Those two steps turn Locke's social con-
tract idea into police power theory, a very different animal.
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tract infringe natural liberty, in this view, because for Hutche-
son, Hobbes, and Locke, natural liberty is the coin paid in the
social contract. Natural liberty does not coexist with govern-
ments, and so governments could not infringe upon it.
Unsurprisingly, given these antithetical frameworks, social
contract and police power theories produce different hierarchial
rights. Social contract theory posits an expansive right to life,473
while police power theory ignores life. Police power doctrine
makes liberty, defined as freedom from restraint, an all encom-
passing right; social contract theory does not even regard "lib-
erty" as a freedom from restraint. When a Lockean legislature
protected health, it preserved the right of life; when a police
power legislature protected health, it pursued a public objective
at the price of liberty.
Yet, Locke's chameleon-like concept of "liberty" could ob-
scure his differences with police power theory. Indeed, the Sec-
ond Treatise sometimes reads as if Locke had created the police
power doctrine. For example, Locke wrote that a person joining
civil society must "part... with as much of his natural liberty in
providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the
Society shall require."474 Police power theorists could agree
wholeheartedly; they demanded, after all, that public measures
be "reasonably necessary." Locke's reference to "the good, pros-
perity, and safety of the Society" echoes the police power concept
of "the health, the welfare, [and] the safety of the public."475
Locke was no police power theorist, however. He declared it
"not only necessary, but just" for people to sacrifice their liberty,
because "other Members of the Society do the like."47 6 This is
not police power theory's grudging sacrifice of liberty. Moreover,
Locke's contractors sacrifice their natural liberty to one another
as consideration for a social contract; they do not lose natural
"liberty" through state encroachment, as police power theory
supposes. Nor is Locke's "natural liberty" the "freedom from re-
straints" of police power theory. Rather, Lockean natural liberty
is subject to demands imposed by the life and health of all hu-
manity.477 Locke's dictum about sacrificing as much liberty as
the public good "shall require" should be read expansively: it is
473. As the preceding account suggests, Hobbes's, Locke's, and Hutcheson's
disagreements with each other turned on the concept of "liberty." They all of-
fered essentially the same definition of "life."
474. LocKE, supra note 160, at 353.
475. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 110 (N.Y. 1885).
476. LocKE, supra note 160, at 353.
477. See generally supra part H.B.2.
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an observation about how much, not how little, natural liberty is
lost.
Lochner v. New York 478 illustrates these differences. The
Court 4 79 struck down a supposed "health" law that limited the
workday of bakery employees, finding the law outside of the po-
lice power's scope, and, hence, a violation of liberty.480 The
Lochner Court dismissed any relationship between hours of
work and healthfulness of bread as ephemeral,481 and it refused
to countenance any measure designed to redress an imbalance of
bargaining power between employer and employee.482 What re-
mained was an argument that the statute fell within the scope
of the state's police power because it protected the health of indi-
vidual bakers.48 3 The Court viewed bakery labor, however, as
not fundamentally different from other lines of work. A state
could therefore justify virtually any labor regulation in any occu-
pation by using the same arguments. That, the Lochner Court
concluded, would nullify the liberty to make employment con-
tracts.48 4 Like many opinions of the era, Lochner's pivotal argu-
ment takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum: if the state can
do this, it can do anything.
Lochner is the epitome of a police power decision: it ignores
the right of life, emphasizes choice of occupation as an aspect of
liberty,485 and focuses on the police powers of states,4 6 with
'liberty" being the dominant theme of the opinion. Yet, Lochner
478. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
479. As a member of the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Peckham, the
author of the decision, was instrumental in the development of police power
theory. For example, Justice Peckham authored People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343
(N.Y. 1888). See supra note 431. Later, in Lochner, he produced the opinion
that lent its name to this entire era of American constitutional law.
480. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. The "law must be upheld, if at all, as a law pertaining to the health of
the individual engaged in the occupation of a baker." Id.
484. Id. at 60. Liberty of person and freedom of contract would be reduced
to "visionary" status. Id.
485. Id. at 53; see also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (stat-
ing that "liberty... means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the
mere physical restraint of his person ... but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to
use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his liveli-
hood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that
purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essen-
tial to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.").
486. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
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makes no sense on Lockean principles. In the Second Treatise,
liberty is not a higher value than health; rather, health is part
and parcel of life."48 7 More importantly, measures that pro-
mote the health of workers simply do not infringe on Lockean
"liberty." In fact, a failure to protect workers' health constitutes
a breach of the public good and a violation of the right of "life."
Nor is it particularly threatening that similar measures might
cover other lines of work, because "liberty," in Locke's scheme,
does not depend on any particular number of free, unregulated
choices. Lochner's reductio guards the boundary between natu-
ral liberty and society, a boundary that, as noted earlier, does
not exist in Locke's theory.
Lochner's police power concept also diverges from Hutche-
son's ideas, notwithstanding the element of "autonomy" in his
concept of natural liberty. The good of all human beings repre-
sents the highest moral and political values to Hutcheson, who
believed that human beings are constituted so as to feel this ob-
ligation.488 He also regarded natural liberty as the exercise of
the human constitution. 48 9 Hutcheson recognized that an indi-
vidual's felt desires do not always tend to the greatest good;
some desires ought to be suppressed.490 Such views do not allow
for the sharp clash between individual liberty and social welfare
in a state of civil society4 91 that animates police power theory.
487. See supra notes 201-202, 254 and accompanying text.
488. 1 HUTCHESON, supra note 316, at 9-10 (describing an innate desire for
our own and humanity's happiness); id. at 272 ("[A]ll wise and just laws have
some tendency to the general happiness, or to the good of some part of the sys-
tem subservient to and consistent with the general good."); 2 id. at 105 (stating
that all have a "higher sense of obligation to do nothing contrary to any publick
interest").
489. See discussion supra part 1.C.1
490. See supra text accompanying note 335.
491. Hutcheson believed that "industry" and "labor" provide occasions for
the exercise of "natural liberty." Although people can misuse this liberty, he
thought that:
[wihile they are not injurious to others, and while no wise human insti-
tution has for the publick good subjected them to the controll of magis-
trates or laws, the sense of natural liberty is so strong, and the loss of
it so deeply resented by human nature, that it would generally create
more misery to deprive men of it because of their imprudence, than
what is to be feared from their imprudent use of it .... Let men in-
struct, teach, and convince their fellows as far as they can about the
proper use of their natural powers, or persuade them to submit volun-
tarily to some wise plans of civil power where their important interests
shall be secured. But till this be done, men must enjoy their natural
liberty as long as they are not injurious, and while no great publick
interest requires some restriction of it.
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With its new definition of "liberty" and its eviscerated right
of life, the police power theory defined a new constitutional era.
The wonder is not that the new doctrines diverge from the origi-
nal understandings, rather, it is that the new doctrines sound so
much like the older ones, despite their contrary characters. Be-
cause the same word, "liberty," lent itself to both eras, the
change largely escaped notice. 492
B. THE DEMISE OF THE POLICE POWER THEORY
Police power theory met its sudden demise in the late 1930s
and early 1940s, after President Roosevelt criticized the Court
for its decisions invalidating New Deal measures. 493 Doctri-
nally, the Court now rejected "reasonable necessity," the police
power standard of "liberty," and substituted a "rationality" test,
an easily satisfied requirement that, as a practical matter, ac-
commodates every social or economic measure put to the test.
Minimum wage and maximum hour laws, price regulations, and
other social and economic legislation that the Court had struck
down, it now sustained.494 This shift usually receives an insti-
tutional, and even an overtly political, explanation: President
Roosevelt had challenged the Court, and the Court yielded.495
1 HUTCHESON, supra note 316, at 294-95. The laborer thus should be left alone
in a state of nature, so long as no one else is harmed. Submission to "Wise plans
of civil power" that secure "important interests" of the individual, like living
under a legitimate government, however, deprives one of this natural liberty.
"Civil liberty" takes its place. There is nothing absurd about regulating every-
one's hours of work, if that is part of a "wise plan.. . of civil power." Id.
492. But see Shattuck, supra note 458, at 384-92 (noting developments in
the interpretation of liberty in constitutional law).
493. See GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 122-24 (describing President Roosevelt's
and the Court's relationship during this period); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Sou-
ter, JJ.) (arguing that the end of the Lochner era resulted when the Depression
taught the "unmistakable" lesson that the Lochner line of cases rested on "fun-
damentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregu-
lated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare"); id. at 2863-64
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(observing that Lochner was overturned while President Roosevelt's proposal to
"reorganize" the Supreme Court was pending in Congress, but arguing that
Lochner represented a constitutional, rather than an economic or policy mis-
take on the Courts part, and warranted overruling for that reason alone).
494. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding
what appeared a rather tenuous measure on rationality grounds); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (announcing a rationality
test); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling a prior
decision and upholding a minimum wage law that applied to women).
495. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2883 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) (implying that the Court's abandonment of
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In the process, the Justices adopted a different vision of their
constitutional competence and responsibilities; the Court's insti-
tutional role changed, as the Justices deferred to the political
branches of government, at least in social and economic
matters.49
6
Yet, these developments have a conceptual dimension as
well, because the Court's conception of "liberty" had changed.
"Reasonable necessity" had implemented the police power view;
"rationality," the new standard, reflects an entirely different
view of "liberty." Unfortunately, the Court did not articulate
this new view. It portrayed rational basis review in negative
terms, as a repudiation of Lochner;497 in positive terms, as a def-
erential review;498 and in comparative terms, as the lowest level
of constitutional scrutiny.499 Yet, the Court never explained the
meaning of this new "liberty." Social contract theory describes
the "liberty" of the Framers, and police power theory describes
the "liberty" of the Lochner era, but modern "liberty" lacks any
theoretical grounding.
Modern "liberty" includes two other strands that the Court
has also left dangling, tying them neither to each other, nor to
the rational basis test, nor to any large conception of liberty.
One strand involves the Constitution's first eight amendments,
and the question of whether Fourteenth Amendment "liberty"
incorporates those guarantees and makes them applicable to the
states. The Court resolved this question by a process of "selec-
tive incorporation" that, in practice, incorporates the bulk of the
Bill of Rights.500 Liberty's other strand is the concept of sub-
Lochner was, among other things, a "switch in time" that saved the Court from
further political contests with President Roosevelt).
496. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("The courts are
without authority either to declare ... [economic and social] policy or, when it is
declared by the legislature, to override it.").
497. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 456-65 (describing the shift
from Lochner to rational basis review).
498. E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (declaring that
courts will no longer "substitute" their social and economic beliefs for the judg-
ments of legislative bodies, as they had in the Lochner era).
499. E.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2719 (1993) (discussing rational basis scrutiny).
500. For discussion, see, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 107, § 11-2 (asserting that
the Court has incorporated all, or significant parts, of the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, and citing cases). But see Fresno Rifle &
Pistol Club Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1992) (declining to
incorporate the Second Amendment and reaffirming the doctrine of selective,
rather than total, incorporation); NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 138, § 10.2
(noting that the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the Fifth Amendment
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stantive due process and the line of decisions that includes Roe
and Casey. These cases seem to define the problem of liberty for
our time, yet they say less about the nature of liberty than one
would expect. Generally, we know the result a Justice derives
from substantive "liberty."50' Often we know which technique,
rational basis review or strict scrutiny, a Justice thinks is appro-
priate.50 2 Sometimes we even know that one Justice thinks an-
other Justice has a "stunted" view of liberty.50 3 What "liberty"
actually means, however, we are told less often.
Roe, in particular, received criticism for its brief treatment
of liberty.50 4 The Court seemingly announced that protected lib-
erties exist under the Constitution, including privacy, and that
some aspects of privacy are fundamental, including abortion.505
No articulated theory of liberty supports Justice Blackmun's
conclusions, nor did the Roe dissenters advance any contrary
theory of liberty. Justice Rehnquist asserted, with little expla-
nation, that a rationality test should apply.506 In dissent, Jus-
tice White argued that "nothing in the language or history of the
Constitution ... support[s] the Court's judgment,"50 7 but he did
not elaborate any conception of liberty either; instead, he im-
plied that elaboration is unnecessary, since no viable theory of
liberty could support Roe's result.
Justice Blackmun's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's Casey
opinions also fit the same mold. Justice Blackmun wrote pas-
sionately about liberty, but, in substance, reiterated the conclu-
right to indictment by a grand jury, and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
in civil trials have not been incorporated, and citing cases).
501. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("the Court was no doubt
correct in finding [marriage] to be an aspect of liberty protected against State
interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause").
502. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,233 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) ("I view the compelling-state-interest standard as an inappropriate mea-
sure of the constitutionality of State abortion laws.").
503. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
504. E.g., Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police
Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. Rlv. 689,
691 (1976) (observing that the Roe Court "failed to locate this vague right in
constitutional text or tradition"); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. Rnv. 1569, 1569 (1979) (noting that even Roe's supporters find the
opinion dissatisfying); see also supra part I.B (discussing Bork's and Ely's
criticisms).
505. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 154 (1973).
506. Id. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
507. Id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting).
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sions he had stated in Roe.50° Chief Justice Rehnquist also
restated his Roe conclusions,509 adding that even if substantive
due process sometimes yields fundamental rights (like a right to
marry, to procreate, or to have access to contraceptives), abor-
tion is not one of them.510 Without offering an account of either
"liberty interests" or fundamental rights, the Chief Justice as-
signed abortion and contraception to different categories.51'
Justice Scalia and the Casey joint opinion each went further
toward a definition of "liberty," although they proceeded in oppo-
site directions. The joint opinion described constitutional "lib-
erty" as a meaningful concept whose present day significance
can be discovered through the process of "reasoned judg-
ment."51 2 Justice Scalia denied that claim, finding in "reasoned
judgment" only a cloak for "personal predilection[s]" of the Jus-
tices. 513 The joint opinion invoked the "balance struck by this
country" between "the liberty of the individual" and the de-
mands of organized society.514 Justice Scalia argued that consti-
tutional "liberty" does not protect acts that the Constitution's
text never mentions, at least when there exists a national his-
tory of prohibiting the acts in question.515
The joint opinion went farther than Justice Scalia, however,
by espousing a theory of political as well as constitutional lib-
erty. Justice Scalia sought to explain what "liberty" means in
the Constitution, not what "liberty" means apart from that docu-
ment.5 16 Yet, the Framers protected "liberty," the political con-
cept dating back to the Magna Carta, not some new, juridical
idea of "constitutional liberty." Since the demise of the police
power theory, that seemingly trivial truth is often forgotten:
"constitutional liberty" means liberty.
508. See discussion supra part I.C.1.
509. In Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted a different attitude toward
non-abortion, substantive due process cases such as Griswold. See supra part
I.C.I.
510. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2859 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
511. Id. The attempted distinction surely requires some elaboration. One
could as well describe contraception as a "purposeful interference with potential
life" and ask how it differs from abortion.
512. Id. at 2806 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
513. Id. at 2876 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).
514. Id. at 2806 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)).
515. Id. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).
516. Id.
1994]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
It is possible, of course, that the Court's decisions on consti-
tutional liberty lack a coherent relationship to any deeper con-
ception of liberty. Perhaps there once was a connection, but over
time it became attenuated beyond recognition, as "liberty" be-
came a technical legal term. Perhaps no concept of liberty capa-
ble of guiding judicial decision making ever existed, or ever
could exist, an argument suggested by Justice Scalia and made
by Robert Bork.517 Perhaps "liberty," correctly understood, pro-
duces the results that police power theory reached, and, being
unable to subscribe to that theory, we jerry-rig specious solu-
tions to the problem of defining "liberty."
All of these suppositions are mistaken. Each presumes that
the Lochner era closed the 300 year old tradition of thinking
about human rights that began with Thomas Hobbes. In fact,
the end of the Lochner era marks a return to the Lockean con-
ception of rights that had animated the Framers.
V. MODERN LIBERTY: ECHOES OF THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT
The three strands of modern "liberty" are rarely considered
parts of a single, coherent doctrine. Incorporation is thought of
as the solution to a problem of federalism. Rational review is
supposed to be an institutional response to the crisis of the New
Deal, a product of events in the 1930s, rather than the 1790s or
the 1860s. Substantive due process elicits a variety of view-
points, ranging from Bork's account of constitutional heresy, to
Justice Blackmun's confidence that the Court can identify fun-
damental rights, to Chief Justice Rehnquist's idea of "rational-
ity" as a self-evident default standard of constitutional review.
Yet, all three strands of modern "liberty"-incorporation, ration-
ality review, and substantive due process-also appear as parts
of Locke's and Hutcheson's version of liberty, a coincidence
which suggests that modern liberty" in fact reprises social con-
tract theory.
A. INCORPORATION
Civil liberty, according to Locke and Hutcheson, requires
that enacted laws comport with natural right: liberty, in effect,
incorporates the natural rights of life and property. 518 This con-
517. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (Justice Scalia) and notes
282-285 and accompanying text (Bork).
518. See supra parts H.B.2, II.C.1.
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ception parallels the modem idea of Fourteenth Amendment
"liberty" incorporating fundamental rights spelled out elsewhere
in the document, in the Bill of Rights. Both approaches under-
stand "liberty" in terms of basic rights that exist apart from the
concept of liberty itself.
Today "liberty" is often regarded as a source of rights, a
fountain from which rights flow, rather than a vessel that con-
veys other, independent rights. Given modem definitions, the
idea of liberty "incorporating" other rights seemingly makes lit-
tle sense. Justice Frankfurter, for example, criticized the incor-
poration thesis as an "extraordinarily strange" interpretation of
the Due Process Clause, an interpretation that "[t]hose reading
the English language with the meaning which it ordinarily con-
veys... [and] those conversant with the political and legal his-
tory of the concept of due process" must find incredible. 519 Yet,
Locke understood "liberty" in precisely that way; the Framers
followed Locke; and the "liberty" of incorporation theory func-
tions exactly like Lockean liberty. Like later commentators,
Justice Frankfurter committed the fallacy of confusing his per-
sonal theory of liberty with a dictionary definition of the word.
B. RATIONAL BASIs REVIEw
Rational basis review requires a state to have a legitimate
purpose for its enactments, and that the state's methods bear a
rational relationship to its purpose.520 Since the close of the
Lochner era, the Court has tested social and economic legislation
against the guarantee of "liberty" using this lenient standard.
Rationality, however, is a quintessentially Lockean test for "lib-
erty," or, to be more precise, for the residue of "liberty" that re-
mains after subtracting the natural rights of life and property
that liberty incorporated. Lockean "liberty" requires that any
interference with a person have some reason for it.521 This re-
striction is weak, because any reason will do, and because Locke
did not recognize an independent principle of autonomy.52 2 The
requirement of a "reason" represents a minimum demand that
suits liberty's minimal, independent substantive content.523
Likewise, the modem idea of "rationality review" requires some
519. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
520. See supra part I.C.3.
521. Otherwise, the idea of"innocent delights" allows a person to do as he or
she wishes. See discussion supra part H.B.2.
522. See supra notes 214-216, 328-332 and accompanying text.
523. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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reason, or any reason, for a state's action. It represents exactly
the same principle as that asserted by Locke.
C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND PRIVACY
The third strand of modern liberty, consisting of substantive
due process rights and privacy, also follows the social contract
model. In this context, however, life rather than liberty is the
relevant Lockean right. Modern doctrines of privacy and sub-
stantive due process effect a return to the social contract concep-
tion of life.
Several considerations point to this conclusion. One is the
weakness of textual arguments based on "liberty." Such argu-
ments fail to explain why economic liberties receive only ra-
tional basis review, while other liberties, like the right to use
contraceptives, are entitled to strict scrutiny. The Constitu-
tion's text draws no distinction among the different kinds of lib-
erty. If the Constitution contains a textual basis for rights of
privacy, "liberty" seems not to be it.
There are also suggestions that the Court did not actually
rely on "liberty" in Griswold v. Connecticut or Roe v. Wade.
Roe's perfunctory references, for example, hardly indicate that
the Justices seriously reflected on "liberty" as part of their delib-
erations.5 24 Nor did Griswold, which created modern privacy,
rely on "liberty" as an animating concept. Justice Douglas for
the Griswold Court derived privacy from "penumbras" of the
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, not from any con-
cept of "liberty."5 25 In their dissents, Justices Stewart and
Black denied that "liberty" constitutes a source of privacy
rights,5 2 6 and only two of the concurring Justices, Harlan and
White, argued that an unalloyed right of "liberty" supports the
Griswold result.52 7  In his concurring opinion, Justice
Goldberg 528 relied on "liberty," but with evident uneasiness. 5 29
524. See supra note 504 and accompanying text.
525. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
526. Id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 507-08 (Black, J., dissenting).
527. Id. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("ordered liberty" is the proper
test); id. at 502 (White, J., concurring) (relying on the "liberty" protected by the
Due Process Clause).
528. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
529. To buttress his liberty argument, Justice Goldberg emphasized the
Ninth Amendment, which he considered evidence of the Framers' commitment
to unenumerated fundamental rights. Id. at 488. Although Justice Goldberg
also stated that the Ninth Amendment is not a binding source of independent
constitutional rights, the fact remains that "liberty" alone did not appear to him
strong enough to carry the day. Id. at 487-93.
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Later cases unhesitatingly cite "liberty" as the source of privacy
rights,5 30 and it is tempting to explain the Griswold Justices'
uneasiness as arising from their fear of tainting the new doc-
trine with the ghost of Lochner era substantive due process.53 '
Taking the Justices at their word, however, a majority of the
Griswold Court doubted, or flat out did not believe, that privacy
rights flow from "liberty."
It is true, of course, that none of the Griswold Justices spe-
cifically cited "life" as the source of privacy rights. Yet, Justice
Douglas wrote of marital privacy as protecting a "way of life,"5 32
a description that Locke himself might have used to describe the
same right. Justice Douglas also quoted an 1886 decision533
that described the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as protection
against "invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life,"5 34 a phrase that explicitly links privacy to life.
Justice Goldberg went further, all but reinventing the Lock-
ean conception of rights. Justice Goldberg suggested that Four-
teenth Amendment "liberty" somehow incorporates Ninth
Amendment unenumerated rights.535 His unspoken premise is
that "liberty" represents a commitment to independently ex-
isting, fundamental rights which is precisely the Lockean mean-
ing of "liberty."53 6 If Justice Goldberg had also recognized "life"
as the relevant, "enumerated" right, the parallel with Locke
would have been complete.
In fact, the very concept of constitutional "privacy" suggests
a Lockean conception of liberty. If "liberty" constitutes a source
of rights, "privacy" has no real analytical function. The process
of deriving rights from "liberty" does not require an intermedi-
ate premise like privacy. Nor does liberty have so many aspects
530. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) (citing cases); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) ("freedom of personal choice in mat-
ters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
531. Lochner relied on "liberty," see supra note 478, and if the new substan-
tive due process flows from some other source, so much the better. For a review
of arguments that liken Griswold and Roe to Lochner, see generally Helen Gar-
field, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner,
61 WASH. L. REv. 293 (1986).
532. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (emphasis added).
533. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
534. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at
630) (internal quotations omitted).
535. Id. at 488.
536. See discussion supra part H.B.2.
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that subcategories, like "privacy," are required to keep track of
them all.537 Thus, Griswold could have derived the right of ac-
cess to contraceptives without any mention of "privacy." On the
other hand, if the liberty of Griswold is Locke's liberty, it be-
comes necessary to spell out the independent right-in this case,
privacy or "life"-that is being threatened.
The Roe v. Wade opinion invites a similar conclusion. Crit-
ics fault Roe for not explaining the derivation of "privacy" from
"liberty,"538 but this very "failure" fits the Lockean model in
which rights are not derived from "liberty" at all.539 Roe's "pri-
vacy" does not really originate with "liberty." In Justice Black-
mun's opinion, the concept of privacy lends its content to liberty;
liberty does not define privacy. 540 Roe's "liberty," then, like
Locke's, is made up of free standing rights having a prior, in-
dependent existence of their own. The Court did not explain
how privacy follows from liberty because privacy simply does not
arise in that way. Just as Griswold's and Roe's "liberty" recre-
ates Lockean liberty, their concept of "privacy" recreates the
Lockean right of "life." Privacy operates in Griswold and Roe as
a fundamental right, supplying substance to the concept of lib-
erty, in the same way that "life" in the Second Treatise supplies
"liberty" with content.54' The application of the privacy doctrine
to abortion rights follows the contours of Lockean "life."
Descriptions of privacy today often read like invocations of
the social contract right of life, suggesting, once again, their
identity. Proponents of abortion rights, for example, often men-
tion a woman's right to control her "life."542 Such references are
537. The Court had recognized only one substantive due process right since
the demise of police power theory, the right of access to contraceptives in Gris-
wold itself.
538. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 504, at 690-91.
539. See discussion supra parts II.B.3.a-b.
540. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
541. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
542. Some legal commentary characterizes abortion rights in the same way.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2846 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) (describing family planning as a "critical life choice" for a woman and re-
ferring to the "impact" of a pregnancy "on a woman's life"); Guido Calabresi,
The Supreme Court 1990 Term, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitu-
tional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HAnv. L.
REv. 80, 91 (1991) (stating that "anti-abortion laws impose a degree of control
over women's lives.., that is not imposed on men"); Estrich & Sullivan, supra
note 89, at 127 (stating that "[1l]iberty requires independence in making the
most important decisions in life"); Ruth B. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Auton-
omy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rlv. 375, 383 (1985)
(Justice Ginsburg, then a Circuit Judge, arguing that abortion rights bear on "a
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not intended to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, yet, like
Justice Douglas's Griswold opinion, they echo the Lockean right
to "life." Nor are the echoes always casual: "Privacy," the
Supreme Court has stated, is freedom from government interfer-
ence in "matters... fundamentally affecting a person,"543 recal-
ling Locke's and Hobbes's equation of a right to "life" with a
right to one's "person."544
Commentators have come even closer to Locke's formula-
tions. Jed Rubenfeld, for example, argues that the idea of per-
sonhood "has so invaded privacy doctrine that [personhood] now
regularly is seen either as the value underlying the right or as a
synonym for the right itself."5 45 Rubenfeld views privacy as the
right not to have the government "take over the lives of... per-
sons,"5 46 a formulation that strikingly parallels a passage from
the Second Treatise:
[D]eclaring by Word or Action... a sedate settled Design, upon an-
other Mans Life, puts him in a State of War with him against whom he
has declared such an Intention ....
And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another Man into his Ab-
solute Power, does thereby put himself into a State of War with him; It
being ... understood as a Declaration of a Design upon his Life. For I
have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his Power
without my consent, would use me as he pleased, when he had got me
woman's autonomous charge of her full life's course," an argument that Justice
Ginsburg-like social contract theorists-derived from an idea of equality);
Reva Siegal, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 335 (1992)
(stating that "society intervenes in women's lives to protect the unborn").
"Life" also helps to bridge the gap between constitutional and purely philo-
sophical arguments about abortion rights. Thus, a leading philosophical argu-
ment about abortion-Judith Jarvis Thompson's hypothetical case of a woman
who awakens one day to find another adult suddenly connected to, and depen-
dent upon, her body-involves many of the same questions about limb, health,
and body, and about control over a life, that one would expect in a Lockean
account of "life." Judith J. Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 47, 48-49 (1971).
543. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added).
544. See discussion supra parts H.B.1-2.
545. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737,752 (1989).
Although Rubenfeld criticizes widely held views about personhood, nothing in
his critique weakens the connection between modem personhood (or privacy)
and historic life. He even suggests a view of privacy that uncannily resembles
the older conception. See infra note 550.
546. Id. at 784 (emphasis omitted). Rubenfeld also describes privacy as the
"fundamental freedom not to have one's life too totally determined by a...
state." Id.
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there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it .... To be free from
such force is the only security of my Preservation.
547
The phrase "design upon his life" in this passage connotes the
intent to kill, but it also signifies an intent to "design" someone's
life. Lockean theory insists that the latter implies the former:
"he who... would use me as he pleased... [would] destroy me
too when he had a fancy... ." 54 For his part, Rubenfeld finds
precisely this sense of designing another person's "life"-the
heart of the Lockean concept 549-to be at the heart of constitu-
tional privacy. Like Justice Goldberg in Griswold and Justice
Blackmun in Roe, Rubenfeld recreates Locke's conception of
rights without realizing it. Rubenfeld even denies that privacy
arose from the social contract tradition.5 50 Yet, a Lockean anal-
ysis represents the real driving force behind his analysis.
Viewed in this light, police power theory and the Lochner era
mark an interlude between the Framers' social contract beliefs
and the reprise of those beliefs in modern privacy and substan-
tive due process theory.
VI. ABORTION AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Today's disputes about abortion parallel historic arguments
over social contract theory. We have already seen how Bork's
and Ely's criticisms of Roe follow the historic fault lines,551 and
with the addition of a Humean element, the same is true of
Casey.
547. LocKE, supra note 160, at 278-79 (emphasis omitted) (other emphasis
added).
548. Id. The next passage in the Second Treatise reiterates this point: One
can kill a thief in self defense even though the thief has not "hurt" the victim or
"declared any design" to do so. Id. at 279. Locke explained his reasoning as
follows: "using force, where he has no Right, to get me into his Power, let his
pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take
away my Liberty, would not when he had me in his Power, take away every
thing else." Id. at 280 (emphasis omitted). Cf Rubenfeld, supra note 545, at
806 (arguing that privacy violations consist of the "forced, affirmative occupa-
tion and direction of individuals' lives").
549. See Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 89, at 125-26 (describing rights of
liberty and autonomy in terms that echo Locke's account of the right of life);
Regan, supra note 504, at 1615 (stating that "unwanted pregnancy is serious
bodily harm justifying the use of deadly force in self-defense").
550. Rubenfeld, supra note 545, at 804 ("The right to privacy, as I have
sought to elucidate it, became a right only at the moment when we constituted
ourselves as a democratic polity .... It does not purport to antedate the Consti-
tution or to arise from a source, such as the 'social contract,' superior in author-
ity to the Constitution. The right to privacy is a constitutional right because
the Constitution is the document that establishes democracy in this country.").
551. See discussion supra part II.B.3.c.
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A. CAsEY AND ITS LOCKEAN PARALLELS
The Casey joint opinion includes a powerful strain of
Hume's ideas. Hume regarded liberty as a malleable thing that
history shapes into various forms in different societies, and he
thought that all political institutions reflect the struggle of lib-
erty with authority, a contest in which too much liberty is as
dangerous as too much authority.552 At the same time, Hume
believed that English political history had produced an espe-
cially happy accommodation of the two. 5 sS The Casey joint opin-
ion embodies uncannily similar views. Quoting Justice Harlan's
opinion in Poe v. Ullman,554 the authors of the joint opinion
agreed that due process:
represent[s] the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of re-
spect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty
and the demands of organized society .... The balance of which...
[we] speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as
the traditions from which it broke.555
The conflict of liberty and authority, the recognition of author-
ity's indispensability, and the idea of a uniquely national defini-
tion of liberty all echo Hume.556 Each of the themes differs, in
rhetoric or in substance, from the Lockean social contract ideas
that Hume had attacked.
Unlike the derivative and subordinate "liberty" of Locke,
Justice Harlan's "liberty" is a basic force in political society and
theory. Using Justice Harlan's concept, one can meaningfully
ask whether liberty encompasses a particular right. With Lock-
ean "liberty," by contrast, the issue becomes whether a right fol-
lows from life or property, because Lockean liberty only
incorporates those rights. Thus, Justice Harlan unhesitatingly
invoked "liberty" in Griswold when other Justices, with a more
Lockean outlook, either ignored "liberty" altogether or com-
pounded it with Ninth Amendment fundamental rights. Justice
Harlan's "balance" between liberty and the "demands of organ-
ized society" echoes another Humean critique of Locke's theory.
"Balancing" presupposes both a conflict between liberty and au-
thority (or, in modern terms, between individual liberty and "le-
552. See discussion supra part 1.C.3.
553. See infra note 562.
554. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdic-
tional grounds).
555. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992) (joint opin-
ion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) (quoting 367 U.S. at 542).
556. For discussion of Hume's views, see supra part II.C.3.
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gitimate" state interests) and the possibility of resolving the
conflict in a variety of ways that are more or less favorable to
liberty.557 These very points lay at the heart of Hume's attack
on Locke. Locke had portrayed rightful authority as a compo-
nent of civil liberty, not something in conflict with it; 55s thus,
one could never balance Lockean liberty against authority. Nor
could Lockean liberty subordinate itself, in any degree, to
authority.
Yet, Justice Harlan and the authors of the Casey joint opin-
ion also recognized a Lockean strain in "liberty." The joint opin-
ion quotes Justice Harlan's description:
This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points .... It is a rational
continuum which ... includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints, . and which also recognizes,
what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to jus-
tify their abridgment. 55 9
This passage is decidedly not Humean. Hume's "liberty" is
formed by history out of different materials in different na-
tions,560 something like an evolving geological landscape.
Neither the political nor geographical landscape could be de-
scribed as a "a rational continuum," in Hume's view. Nor does
Hume's liberty cover "all substantial arbitrary impositions." To
the contrary, he insisted that "liberty" encompasses different
things in different nations. The animating ideas of this passage
of the Casey joint opinion-that rights have a universal form,
that they afford comprehensive protection, and that they are dis-
coverable by reason-echo Locke rather than Hume.
Strictly speaking, Justice Harlan did not contradict himself.
In the passage that echoes Hume, Justice Harlan was analyzing
the concept of "due process," while in the passage that echoes
Locke, he was analyzing "liberty." Justice Harlan thought that
due process limits the entitlement to liberty, which is what the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests. Yet, an undenia-
ble tension exists between Justice Harlan's two formulations.
This tension arises from what he said and not from any Humean
or Lockean gloss on his views.561 How rights can be rational
557. See supra note 555 and accompanying text.
558. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
559. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, &
Souter, JJ.) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)).
560. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
561. Justice Harlan was hardly the first to combine Lockean and Humean
elements in a single account of liberty. For example, a leading political scientist
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constructs and historical byproducts at the same time requires
some explanation. Lockean and Humean principles suggest, if
not an explanation, at least a way of describing the tensions
within this conception of liberty.
Hume viewed political authority and political liberty as
fluid concepts taking varied shapes and forms in different socie-
ties: history, rather than moral principle, determines their
form.56 2 Locke, on the other hand, held that principles of life,
liberty, and property decisively shape every political society.
These rights are not fluid, as Hume envisioned them, and they
do not conform to a shape that history imposes. Rather, Locke's
rights are fixed in content and universal in application. Every-
where and necessarily these rights shape human affairs and his-
tory through the medium of the social contract. Justice Harlan
and the Casey joint opinion embraced the views of both Hume
and Locke, despite the inconsistency. The result is Casey's doc-
trinal confusion. The joint opinion's Lockean strain points in the
direction of Roe and strict scrutiny; its Humean strain points
toward Justice Scalia's reliance on tradition.
B. ROE, STRICT SCRUTINY AND LocKEAN RIGHTS
Strict scrutiny is the natural technique for implementing
Locke's vision of rights. Lockean rights represent universal
moral principles, and a principle cannot be universal when gov-
ernment interests prevail over it, even if government interests
prevail only sometimes and only on "balance." Nor can rights
determine the course of political history, which is their Lockean
destiny, if the demands of government "authority" exert a coun-
of the Civil War era defined liberty as "a high degree of untrammeled political
action in the citizen, and an acknowledgment of his dignity and his important
rights by the government," JAMEs M. McPHERsoN, ABAH LINcoLN AND THE
SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 45 (quoting FRANcIs LIEBER, ON CIvIL LIBERTY
AND SELF-GovER~mENT (1853)), a definition that is both Lockean (liberty as rec-
ognition of important rights) and Humean (liberty as freedom from government
restraints). In similar fashion, revolutionary era writers overlooked the ten-
sions and conflicts between these competing conceptions of liberty. See supra
part HIAL. When Justice Harlan and the authors of Casey developed legal tests
from such ideas, the tensions surfaced.
562. See supra part H.C.3. Hume also thought England had reached a par-
ticularly happy political state, HuME, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, supra
note 401, at 383-84, and he wrote an essay recommending improvements in its
form of government, see generally id. There is no contradiction, however. Moral
principles do not underlie the natural, physical world, yet human beings try to
shape nature in accordance with their moral principles. Similarly, Hume al-
lowed individuals a role in shaping history, without supposing that history it-
self represents the play of moral principles.
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tervailing force of their own on political history. Strict scrutiny
embodies Locke's ideas by subordinating government interests
to individual right.
Conversely, Hume's rights are ill-suited to strict scrutiny.
Hume recognized no universal principles, and he thought that
historical accidents determine the balance of liberty and author-
ity in particular societies; in his view, liberty does not trump
government authority. Hume looked for accommodations be-
tween right and authority; strict scrutiny, by contrast, elevates
rights and subordinates authority under all but the most com-
pelling circumstances.
The fit between these theories of right and judicial tech-
nique is not perfect, however. Locke recognized no conflict be-
tween government ends and individual rights, so he failed to
acknowledge what strict scrutiny allows, the possibility of com-
pelling government interests overcoming individual right under
some circumstances. Similarly, the Humean conception sug-
gests that every government action reflects a possible, and there-
fore, an acceptable balance of liberty and authority. Carried to
an extreme, this would mean that not even irrational govern-
ment action violates individual right.
Even these incongruities, however, reflect tensions within
modern judicial doctrine. The technique of strict scrutiny some-
times appears inconsistent with any restriction on fundamental
rights, an appearance that suits a purely Lockean position. Ra-
tional basis review sometimes appears to tolerate every possible
government action, which is the same tendency noted in Hume.
In any case, strict scrutiny's affinity for Locke, and rational ba-
sis review's affinity for Hume, are clear.
Roe itself embodies a Lockean theory of rights, even though
the Court's balancing of interests might appear Humean. The
Roe Court identified state "interests"563 in maternal health and
in potential fetal life and spoke of balancing 64 state interests
against the woman's right of privacy. This balancing seems to
reflect Hume's opposition between liberty and authority, rather
than the identity of individual right and government purpose
posited by Locke. The appearance of balancing, however, is
misleading.
563. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
564. Id. (stating that the life of a pregnant woman is to be "balanced"
against the potential life of a fetus); id. at 152 ("It is with these interests, and
the weight to be attached to them, that this case is concerned.").
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All government interests that the Roe Court deemed worthy
of consideration, the health of the woman as well as the "poten-
tial life" of the fetus, represent aspects of the Lockean right of
life, which encompasses health as well as human existence.565
The Court gave no weight to any other interest. Viewed this
way, Roe's apparent balancing resolves questions internal to the
concept of life. In Roe, Justice Blackmun did not balance "life"
against anything else, but simply explained what the right of life
requires in the particular case of abortion. Authority, Justice
Harlan's "demands of organized society," counts for nothing in
this analysis, apart from the government's obligation to preserve
life.
In a similar way, Justice Stevens's opinion in Casey uses the
language of Humean balancing to define the contours of a Lock-
ean-style right. Justice Stevens posited state "interests" 566 in
restricting abortion and asked whether those state interests
"outweigh the pregnant woman's interest in personal liberty."567
In fact, Justice Stevens dismissed every consideration not ger-
mane to historic "life." There are legitimate (not compelling)
state interests, he said, in "m i ng... [the] offense" that "a
million abortions each year" 568 causes to those who regard abor-
tion as wrong. There is also a legitimate state interest in "ex-
panding the population," either to add "additional productive
citizens" to society or because "the potential human lives [not
aborted] might include the occasional Mozart or Curie."569 To
invalidate abortion prohibitions that serve those interests is to
diminish the government's power.570 Justice Stevens, however,
did not "balance" those interests against the woman's right of
privacy, as a Humean approach would suggest, nor did he ana-
lyze it as a question of degree. Effectively applying strict scru-
tiny, Justice Stevens simply deemed such interests incapable of
565. See discussion supra part HI.B.2.
566. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2839 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
567. Id.
568. Id. at 2840.
569. Id.
570. Based on Hutcheson's principles, see supra part H.C.I., one might ar-
gue that an increase in population or an additional genius among the popula-
tion would benefit the life of mankind as a whole-humanity as a system. That,
in turn, would create a conflict between individual and "system" rights. How-
ever Hutcheson might resolve that conflict, Locke clearly comes down on the
side of the individual. LocKE, supra note 160, at 271.
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diminishing the woman's right.571 Although Justice Stevens
wrote as if government interests and individual interests had to
be weighed against one another, in reality, he did not "balance"
these interests but simply ruled out the government interests
using the benchmarks of Lockean "life." His opinion is an at-
tempt to define a right of "life" and its contours, rather than an
effort to assess competing government and individual interests.
This technique of appearing to seek a Humean balance
while actually defining the contours of Lockean life, suggests a
larger point. Strict scrutiny is often distinguished from rational
basis review in quantitative terms. Strict scrutiny is said to re-
quire a weightier state interest and to demand a closer fit be-
tween the state's means and its ends than the rational basis
test. Yet, in the area of abortion, at least, something more basic
separates the two tests. Strict scrutiny effectively implements
the historic right of "life," ruling out consideration of factors that
do not bear on "life." Rational basis review, on the other hand,
does not recognize the Lockean right of life, but instead identi-
fies Humean-type "interests" that attach to individuals and the
state. What separates the two approaches is precisely what sep-
arates Locke's conception of rights from Hume's formation.
The Court's division in Casey, thus, echoes an older dispute.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, adhering closely to Roe,
adopted a Lockean view of rights. Justice Scalia emphasized
history and Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized rationality, but
what distinguishes both of these opinions is the failure to recog-
nize a Lockean right of life. The authors of the joint opinion,
attempting to combine Locke's and Hume's views of rights, pro-
duced unsurprisingly confusing results by confounding strict
scrutiny and rational review.572 This may or may not have cov-
ered shifting positions on abortion, as Justice Scalia thought,5 73
but it surely reflects the joint opinion's ambivalence about the
deepest questions of liberty.
C. How LocKEAN LiFE SOUuLD CHANGE MODERN DEBATE
The congruence of Roe v. Wade with Locke's political philos-
ophy has three important implications: "life" provides the tex-
tual basis for abortion rights in the Constitution; further, strict
571. The "state interest in population control," Justice Stevens wrote,
"would not be sufficient to overcome a woman's liberty interest." 112 S. Ct. at
2840 n.3.
572. See discussion supra part I.C.
573. See discussion supra part I.C.3.
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scrutiny is required to implement the right; and last, far from
being a reprise of Lochner, as critics charge, Roe constitutes a
decisive rejection of Lochner era jurisprudence.
The first, most obvious implication is that "life's" historic
meaning-including limb, health, and indolency of body-af-
fords a secure, textual base for abortion rights in the Constitu-
tion. Moreover, opinions like Roe and Griswold contain a
powerful Lockean strain because their right of privacy recreates
the Lockean right of life.574 Thus, privacy itself has a textual
foundation in the Constitution.
The existence of this textual basis does not preclude all ar-
gument about abortion rights, but it does change the nature of
the controversy. Defeating the right of abortion requires argu-
ment about the meaning of constitutional life," rather than a
claim that the Constitution says nothing about the subject. One
might argue that fetuses have lives, and that a conflict, there-
fore, exists between the woman's and the fetus' rights of life. No
Justice has ever endorsed that argument,575 and the considera-
tions cited in Roe-for example, that abortion is not generally
regarded as murder 76 and that fetuses are not counted in the
census, 577 counsel strongly against it. Nonetheless that kind of
argument is the only one that responds to the right of "life."578
574. See discussion supra part I.B.2.
575. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Stan-
dards, 106 HARv. L. Rav. 24, 28 & n.28 (1992) (pointing out that no member of
the Court has ever adopted the theory that human life begins at conception).
576. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-141 & 157-58 n.54 (1973).
577. Id. at 157 n.53.
578. It should be noted that Hutcheson thought abortions immoral, 2
HuTcHEsoN, supra note 316, at 107 ("Mankind... ha[s] a... right to prevent
any perversions of the natural instinct [of human reproduction] from its wise
purposes, or any defeating of its end. Such are all monstrous lusts, and arts of
abortion."), while Blackstone considered abortions after "quickening" to be ille-
gal, 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 155, at *129-30 (arguing that legally protected
life begins at the point of quickening, when a fetus "is able to stir in the
mother's womb," and noting that abortion after quickening, though illegal, con-
stitutes an offense less serious than murder or manslaughter). See also Roe,
410 U.S. at 132-36 (discussing the common law treatment of quickening, which
generally occurs from the sixteenth to the eighteenth week of pregnancy). It is
important, however, to understand the premises about women's roles and the
human condition that underlay these conclusions. For it is those premises,
rather than a restrictive concept of "life" or a degraded concept of rights, that
produced their stands on abortion.
Hutcheson stressed the moral equality of men and women, dissenting from
the idea that wives surrender their legal identity to their husbands. 2 HUTCHE.
SON, supra note 316, at 165. Nonetheless, Hutcheson thought that men "more
generally excel in fortitude, or strength of genius," even if there are "other as
amiable dispositions in which women excelled." Id. at 163; see also id. at 164
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The second implication is that abortion does not constitute a
mere "liberty interest," as the Casey dissenters thought; rather
it warrants strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny corresponds to
Locke's and the Framers' view of rights as the shaping force be-
hind social arrangements and political structures. Conversely,
the "rational basis" test advocated by the Casey dissenters re-
flects either Hume's views, which are decidedly not incorporated
into the Due Process Clauses, or else a truncated version of
Lockean "liberty" that omits the concept's prime function of in-
corporating other natural rights.57 9 Either position reflects a
historical mistake.
The fit between the Second Treatise and modern theory is
not perfect, however. One flaw arises from Locke's failure to dis-
(arguing that a wife ought to defer to her husband in some matters because of
his wisdom, and he ought to defer to her in other matters, but when they disa-
gree about really important questions, arbitration by a third party is desirable).
Regarding sexual matters, Hutcheson sometimes argued that men should not
be promiscuous, because, if they were, women would be promiscuous too; as a
result, men would not care for children because of uncertainty about paternity.
See, e.g., id. at 162 ("if the husband could have children by another woman, that
other woman may bear them to another man, for as good purpose to the pub-
lick"). Similarly, he spoke of a woman's, but not a man's, "character for chas-
tity." Id. at 157.
Hutcheson's starting point was a "general obligation on ... individuals" to
"continu[e] the human race" by producing, and educating children. Id. at 106-
07. Although both men and women labor under that obligation-men, for ex-
ample, had to refrain from promiscuity because it makes it difficult to identify a
child's natural father, who has a special duty to educate and support the infant,
id. at 107, 157-women had more of the burden of reproduction. '[A] nation is
made populous," Hutcheson wrote, "when all the women are kept bearing and
nursing of [sic] children while they are capable of it." Id. at 160. This moral
duty of women to bear children apparently underlies Hutcheson's view of abor-
tion. Recall his description of "arts of abortion" as "perversions of the natural
instinct [toward human reproduction] from its wise purposes" and as means of
"defeating" that natural instincts "end." See supra this note. Considerations of
"life" led Hutcheson to his view of abortion.
If, however, we reject the premise of a duty to reproduce-or the still more
fundamental premise that unending increases in population benefit human-
ity-Hutcheson's position on abortion collapses and his own right of "life" points
to the opposite conclusion. But see id. at 191 (arguing that "children cannot be
deemed accessions or fruits going along with property of their parents bodies"-
an argument, however, designed to show that parents could not neglect their
children's education, once the child has a "soul;" Hutcheson did not argue that
fetuses have souls and he did not link this argument to the question of
abortion.).
Blackstone's views on abortion were part and parcel of a more invidious
view of women's roles. He argued, for example, that the "very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during ... marriage." 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 169, at *442.
579. See discussion supra parts II.B, II.C.3, V.B.
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tinguish between actions proper for legislatures and actions
proper for courts. Because Locke had no conception of an in-
dependent judiciary whose decisions on fundamental law bind
the legislative and executive branches, 580 and because he did
not distinguish measures a government might take to preserve
life, liberty, or estate from measures that it must take, Locke
never anticipated essential distinctions in a system of judicial
review. Without these distinctions, if a legislature constitution-
ally may enact a Medicare program in order to preserve lives, for
example, it follows that courts must mandate a Medicare pro-
gram to protect the right of life. This difficulty recalls the so-
called "double standard" in substantive due process theories
based on liberty,5 s1 whereby some liberties are singled out for
strict scrutiny, while most liberties receive the less rigorous ra-
tional basis review. Now the problem is justifying anything less
than strict scrutiny in a scheme that treats "life" as an expan-
sive fundamental right.
Just as strict scrutiny seems exceptional in a modern theory
of liberty, rational basis review is exceptional, and demands an
explanation, in Lockean theories. Such an explanation exists,
and it originates, surprisingly enough, with Hobbes. Recall that
Hobbes and Locke offered similar definitions of "life,"58 2 despite
their otherwise profound differences over how to organize polit-
ical societies. Yet, Hobbes drew an important distinction when
he made a sovereign's command over industry, art, and science
(as well as property, taxation, and forms of governance) abso-
lute.58 3 Other aspects of "life," those closer to its core meaning
of personhood, however, receive very different treatment:
As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine
Rights of Nature... so it is necessarie for mans life, to retaine some; as
[the] right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion,
580. In fact, Locke regarded the legislature as the umpire of rights in a gov-
ernment. LocKE, supra note 160, at 407 (asserting the people provided for
"Umpirage... in their Legislative, for the ending all Differences, that may
arise amongst any of them"); id. at 325 (asserting that "the Legislative" is the
"Judge on Earth" that "determine[s] all ... Controversies"); see also Laslett,
Editorial Notes to Locxca, supra note 160, at 325 n. accompanying lines 13-19
(observing that "Locke talks of the Legislative where the Judiciary might be
expected").
581. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 503-06 (describing the "double
standard" problem).
582. Both began with "life" in the sense of self preservation, and both con-
cluded with a much broader meaning. See supra parts II.B.1-2, II.B.3.c.
583. Hobbes argued that unquestioning obedience by subjects was necessary
in these cases in order to secure a higher quality of life. See supra part II.B.1.
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waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which a
man cannot live, or not live well.
5 8 4
People thus retain the rights necessary for "life," including the
right to "governe... [one's] owne body," at the same time that,
in order to enhance their lives, they surrender all other rights.
By singling out core attributes of "life," Hobbes in effect created
two levels of scrutiny for government action: one allows ques-
tioning sovereign commands, and the other requires unquestion-
ing acceptance.
Locke implicitly suggested a similar distinction. Locke's
listing of the rights of "health," "limb," and "indolency of body,"
which he singled out as special attributes of "life," seems identi-
cal to Hobbes's right of governing one's body. It is not farfetched
to suggest that Locke, like Hobbes, and like Roe v. Wade, would
have recognized their special quality as well by according them a
higher level of protection. Conversely, matters never included in
Locke's natural rights formulas, such as rights to contract and
structure economic arrangements, would receive a lower level of
protection.
An understanding of Lockean political philosophy in rela-
tion to Roe produces two reinterpretations of constitutional his-
tory. First, far from being a return to Lochner's excesses, as
Roe's critics contend, Roe decisively rejects Lochner's conception
of liberty.585 Lochner rested on a Hobbesian idea of liberty as
"freedom from restraint,"58 6 a Humean idea of individual rights
perpetually in conflict with government authority,58 7 and, some-
what inconsistently, a peculiarly American idea of "liberty" as
sacred and nearly inviolable,588 notwithstanding all of the
above. These ideas are far removed from the Lockean concep-
tions that animated the Framers and that underlie Roe. In fact,
it is Roe's critics, like Bork, who recreate Lochner's idea of "lib-
erty" as "freedom from restraint."58 9
Further, Roe's relationship to Griswold needs rethinking.
Doctrinally, Griswold is commonly regarded as a more funda-
584. HOBBES, supra note 165, at 211-12. The same elements appear in Hob-
bes's account of a "Law of Nature": "[A] man is forbidden to do, that, which is
destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to
omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved." Id. at 189.
585. See generally Garfield, supra note 531.
586. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text (Hobbes's idea of lib-
erty as the "absence of externall impediments").
587. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
588. See discussion supra part HI.A, especially note 402 and accompanying
text.
589. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
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mental decision than Roe,590 but in fact Roe squares better with
the historical meaning of "life" and so, enjoys an even firmer
foundation in the Constitution. Arguably, the interests at stake
in Griswold implicate health or "indolency of body," yet their
connection is weaker than in the case of abortion. Locke recog-
nized no right of self-fulfillment or self-gratification, as such.
Sexual expression may constitute a Lockean "innocent delight"
with which no one has any rational reason to interfere, and it
has still a stronger claim to being an aspect of Hutcheson's "lib-
erty," which encompasses the use of human faculties.59 ' Yet,
abortion's claim under the right of life is even more powerful and
goes back further in the social contract tradition. Although
Griswold can claim support in Hutcheson's idea of liberty and
perhaps as a Lockean "innocent delight," Roe's is the more fun-
damental right because it directly implicates a woman's health,
limb, and life.
D. IMPLICATIONS OF LocKEAN LIFE FOR OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
The historic meaning of life bears on a variety of constitu-
tional questions besides abortion. For example, in Paul v. Da-
ViS, 5 9 2 the Court misread the relevant history and, as a result,
also misread the Fourteenth Amendment. The Paul Court con-
cluded that "liberty" does not encompass reputation, and that
reputation, standing alone, enjoys no protection under the Due
590. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2860 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("The Court in Roe reached too far when it analogized the right to abort a fetus
to the right[ ] involved in... Griswold, and thereby deemed the right to abor-
tion fundamental."); compare Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion
and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83,
93 (1989) (arguing that Roe follows from Griswold and asking, "[i]f Griswold is
to remain good law, how can one fail to conclude that women have at least a
presumptive fundamental liberty interest in deciding to terminate a preg-
nancy?") and Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 89, at 128-29 (arguing that Roe is
an inseparable part of the fabric of the right recognized in Griswold) with Wil-
liam Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review from Griswold v.
Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely Overruling Roe,
1989 DuKE L.J. 1677, 1683 (arguing that "Griswold... did not imply Roe, or
anything even close").
591. See discussion supra part 1I.C.1.
592. 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) ("The words 'liberty' and 'property' as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a candi-
date for special protection. .. ."); accord Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1794
(1991) (reaffirming Paul v. Davis and applying its rationale to a claim that im-
plicated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
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Process Clause.593 Historic "life," however, does include "repu-
tation": it is the shadow cast by one's "life."594 If the meaning of
words in the founding era matters, reputation deserves constitu-
tional protection after all.
Again, Justice White's principle in Bowers v. Hardwick,595
that a constitutional right's force and weight should be propor-
tional to the explicitness of its support in the document, pro-
duces new results because of the textual right of life. Interests
that qualify only marginally as aspects of liberty may relate to
"life" explicitly, and in that way gain added constitutional force.
In Youngberg v. Romeo,596 for example, the Court readily recog-
nized the right to physical liberty of retarded, involuntary in-
mates of state institutions, but found it "more troubling"597 that
the plaintiff also claimed a right to habilitation or institutional
treatment. In the end, the Court recognized a treatment right
that effectuated interests in physical liberty, and no more.59 8
States must provide treatment, according to Romeo, only when
treatment would enhance the patient's freedom of movement
within the institution, or speed freedom from confinement.599 If
"life" had its proper place in constitutional law, however, the
Court might well recognize a more expansive right; certainly,
there would be no reason to confine treatment, an aspect of "life"
and "health," to the parameters of physical "liberty."
There is also a wider implication. What the Court found
"troubling" in Romeo was the idea of a constitutional entitle-
ment to ameliorative government action. 600 Repeatedly, the
Court has held that due process does not guarantee minimum
593. 424 U.S. at 711-12.
594. Blackstone counted reputation among the things secured by the right
of personal security, see supra text accompanying note 349, and Hutcheson in-
cluded one's "good name" among the things protected by the right of life, see
supra text accompanying note 321.
595. 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
596. 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982).
597. Id.
598. The Court contained any right to treatment within the limits of a right
to physical liberty: it held, in effect, that when states are constitutionally
obliged to protect physical liberty, an otherwise required measure is not ex-
cused merely because it also constitutes treatment. Id. at 324.
599. Id. at 322 ("ITihe minimally adequate training required by the Consti-
tution is such training as may be reasonable in light of respondents liberty
interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints.").
600. Id. at 317 (noting that the state has no constitutional duty to provide
"substantive services" to those in its border).
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levels of housing, care, service, or sustenance, 601 and these
precedents made a right to treatment more problematic in the
eyes of the Romeo Court.602 Decisions denying an entitlement to
minirmum necessities, however, stand in tension with the right
to "fife." Minimum levels of sustenance are necessary for life,
and preservation of life is the foremost right in the social con-
tract tradition. The whole point of the right is to require affirm-
ative government action so that people can live "well," as Hobbes
said.60 3
Forcible medical interventions also implicate this right of
life. In Cruzan,60 4 a widely-noticed case, the Court recognized a
"liberty interest" in refusing life-saving treatments, 60 5 but it
also posited a balancing test, with the state's interest in life" set
against the interest of the individual, leading the Court to defer
to the state.60 6 Recognition of the right to "indolency of body"
might have changed this result by adding weight to the individ-
ual's interest or triggering strict scrutiny of the state's meas-
ures. The right of refusing treatment would have had more
"cognizable roots in the Constitution."60 7
Finally, a state prison inmate's freedom from forced, psychi-
atric drugging provides another example in which the historic
right of life could change a constitutional result. In the Court's
eyes, an inmate's "liberty interest" in freedom from drugging6°8
warranted minimal substantive and procedural protections. 60 9
Yet, that freedom constitutes an integral part of historic life, be-
601. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989) (citing cases).
602. On the other hand, the Court has recognized a right to government
services-and, specifically, to medical care-for those held involuntarily in gov-
ernment facilities. See Romeo, 457 U.S. at 317. Thus, it is questionable
whether the Romeo plaintiffs argument even challenged the Court's prece-
dents. Indeed, the Court had no difficulty in declaring that institutionalized
retarded persons possess a right to ordinary medical treatment not limited by
any relationship between treatment and physical liberty. Id. at 324.
603. HOBBES, supra note 165, at 212. Beyond the minimum requirements of
continued existence and health, "living well" may not be a core attribute of life,
and so it would not receive heightened protection.
604. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
605. Id. at 279.
606. Id. at 281-82.
607. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
608. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990).
609. Id. at 222 (upholding forced drugging of dangerous inmates so long as
the drugging is deemed "in the prisoner's medical interests, given the legiti-
mate needs of his institutional confinement"); id. at 228-36 (upholding internal
prison medical review procedures against a procedural due process challenge);
compare id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (call-
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cause it implicates one's health and body.610 As in Cruzan, rec-
ognizing the full dimensions of the historic right to life enhances
the individual's claim and invites the application of strict
scrutiny.611
CONCLUSION
Judges seem to have the luxury of building constitutional
theories as if out of sand. According to the critics of Roe v. Wade,
the Justices simply chose a theory that suited their fancy; they
lacked a constitutional blueprint for their theoretical castle in
the sand. This Article contends that these critics are mistaken
because a constitutional blueprint in fact exists-the historic
right of life, which includes limb, health, and indolency of body.
True, Roe may not be the only structure that could have been
built upon that right, but "life" is the recognizable blueprint for
the decision nonetheless. Blueprints translate with difficulty
into structures, and Roe is as close an approximation as any.
Moreover, the structures of modern substantive due process
bear an uncanny resemblance to those of Locke and Hutcheson,
the seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers whose
views profoundly influenced the Framers of the Constitution. It
is as though, after building our own structures, we suddenly
came upon the sand castles that the Framers tried to capture in
their constitutional blueprint. Time has worn away some of
their details, and the world surrounding the Framers' castles
may have vanished, but the Framers' structures and ours pretty
well match. This is a reason to believe in blueprints.
ing the state's procedures "a mock trial before an institutionally biased
tribunal").
610. The side effects of the drugs included a disfiguring syndrome that re-
sulted from neurological damage in 10-25% of drugged patients, along with a
wide array of other distressing physical and mental symptoms. Id. at 229-30
(surveying the drugs' side effects). A small percentage of recipients died from
drug effects, id., implicating life" in the narrow sense. See generally Sheldon
Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72 GEO.
L.J. 1725, 1740-49 (1984) (assessing the significance of side effects to patients,
doctors, and the law). It is also worth noting that Harper, the plaintiff, thought
the drugs affected his life" as well as his liberty: "Well all you want to do is
medicate me and you've been medicating me .... [Y]ou are burning me out of
my life... you are burning me out of my freedom." Harper, 490 U.S. at 240 n.4
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
611. In dissent, Justice Stevens wrote that "[tihere is no doubt... that a
competent individual's right to refuse such medication is a fundamental liberty
interest deserving the highest order of protection." Id. at 241.
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